


актуальная история

Михаил МЕЛЬТЮХОВ

БЕССАРАБСКИЙ ВОПРОС МЕЖДУ МИРОВЫМИ ВОЙНАМИ

1917—1940



Наталия Нарочницкая
представляет...

Abstract

The book is devoted to the study of the largest territorial dispute in the history of the Soviet Union with Romania over Bessarabia. The involvement of declassified materials made it possible to significantly supplement the known information, and in some cases for the first time to recreate the events of Soviet-Romanian relations in 1917–1940. The reader will learn about how Romania managed to occupy Bessarabia, why the Red Army failed to expel the Romanian interventionists from the region, what impact the Bessarabian issue had on relations between Moscow and Bucharest in the interwar period. The main attention is paid to the events of the summer of 1940, when the USSR was able to liberate Bessarabia under the conditions of the Second World War. The archival documents now available have made it possible to study in detail the Bessarabian campaign of the Red Army in 1940. The book

is intended not only for specialists, but also for all lovers of thoughtful reading who are interested in the history of their country.

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Mikhail Meltyukhov

**Bessarabian question between the
world
wars 1917–1940**

Foreword

World War II was a turning point in the history of the 20th century, which is why so many copies have been broken by historians and political scientists about these events. In recent years, the controversy has gone far beyond scientific discussions. The historical events of 70 years ago continue to be actively used in the modern ideological and political confrontation. The Russian Federation, which is the legal successor of the Soviet Union, is trying to impose an inferiority complex in connection with the events on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, using for this a direct falsification of the events of the second half of the 1930s - early 1940s. in order to "prove" that Germany and the USSR bear equal responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War. At the same time, the most rabid propagandists are already talking about the fact that the Soviet Union is the main culprit for the outbreak of the war.

A thorough and ideologically cliché-free assessment of the events that took place in the interwar period and at the beginning of World War II is long overdue. However, today, instead of conscientiously opening the unexplored pages of history and archives, the West has concentrated its efforts on only one task - to get rid of the inferiority complex and guilt for the fall of fascism. The interpretation of events directly in Eastern Europe between the two world wars becomes a particularly important tool for rewriting the history of the 20th century.

This is facilitated by the fact that the political forces that came to power in Eastern European countries, which cannot boast of any noticeable success in the development of their countries, have successfully mastered the method of diverting public attention to hypercriticism of the recent past, when the Soviet Union played the leading role in Eastern Europe. Indiscriminately criticizing everything and everyone, presenting their eastern neighbor as a kind of "totalitarian monster", Eastern European politicians are trying to prove their "Europeanness", to work off the funds invested in them. Naturally, they cannot admit that, being a poor European backwater and an agrarian appendage of Western countries, Eastern Europe is precisely in

the second half of the 20th century gained the opportunity of independent development for the benefit of its own peoples, having made a leap to modern standards of development. After all, recognizing this means recognizing the positive role of the USSR in the region. It is clear that this completely contradicts the image of the Soviet Union as an "occupier" that is being imposed

today. In addition, it should be understood that this Eastern European criticism of the "Soviet" past is actively used by the Western media to influence their own public opinion in order to completely revise the history and consequences of the Second World War. In this case, a rather simple propaganda technique is used - since this criticism comes from Eastern Europeans, it means that it is correct, since they "know" their history better. The fact that many of these replicated critical theses contradict not only well-known historical documents, but simply common sense does not play any role, since the creation of hotbeds of tension on the western borders of Russia is beneficial to the West, the winner in the Cold War.

The main theme used to "denounce" the Soviet Union is the Soviet-German non-aggression pact signed on August 23, 1939, which is now actively demonized under the brand name of "conspiracy between Hitler and Stalin" against Europe. Accordingly, many foreign and Russian authors talk about the "Soviet-German alliance", which opened the way for the start of World War II. It is on this basis that the theses of Polish historians about the "joint" Soviet-German attack on Poland in September 1939 and its division, the Baltic authors about the "occupation" of this region either in 1939 or in 1940 are built. contradicts well-known historical facts, including Soviet documents of that period recently introduced into scientific circulation, does not play any role. After all, history is politics overturned into the past.

However, an unbiased look at the events of the late 1930s. shows that all attempts by the Soviet Union to reach an agreement with Britain and France ran into their unwillingness to cooperate on an equal footing with Moscow. London and Paris were much more interested in an agreement with Berlin, which was supposed to secure them by pushing Germany to defeat the USSR. In this situation

The Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 did indeed change the sequence and "schedule" of attacks planned by Hitler to something less acceptable to the West. But the main thing is that the 1939 treaty, having changed "only" the "schedule" of the war, also changed the post-war configuration, making it impossible for the Anglo-Saxons to enter Eastern Europe either at the beginning of the war or after the victory. And, consequently, the hopes to withdraw Eastern Europe from the orbit of the USSR failed. Accordingly, the treaty was an outstanding success of Soviet diplomacy, restoring the territory of the historical Russian state. On the other hand, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 is the biggest failure of British strategy in the entire 20th century, and that is why it will always be demonized. Romania, which was a direct ally of the Third Reich during the

Second World War, also occupies its place among the critics of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union of that period. Of course, Romanian authors do not allow any criticism of their own history, their country was just a victim of circumstances sandwiched between two "predators". In contrast to the Polish authors, who are engaged in a rather active debate on the problems of the history of international relations in the 1930s-1940s. and forced to enter into public disputes, Romanian historiography took a different path. Romanian historical literature has created its own picture of the events of international politics, loosely connected with the studies of neighboring countries. It is clear that under these conditions the Romanian authors try not to bother themselves with any detailed argumentation of their theses. Romania's main claim to the USSR is that the eastern neighbor twice - in 1812 (that is, even before the emergence of the Romanian state) and in 1940 "took away" the territory of Bessarabia from her. According to Bucharest, all the territories "annexed" by the USSR in 1940, where the Republic of Moldova is now located, as well as the Chernivtsi region and

a number of districts of the Odessa region of Ukraine, should be "returned" to Romania, for which these claims should be ideologically substantiated. The Romanianophile M. Ghimpu, signed on June 24, 2010 by the Acting President of the Republic of Moldova, Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament, fits well into these intentions.

decree declaring June 28 "the day of Soviet occupation". This document caused a number of political conflicts both in Moldova itself and abroad. On the one hand, the Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova declared the legitimacy of such a definition of the events of 1940. On the other hand, on July 12, the Constitutional Court of the Republic recognized this decree as unconstitutional.

Similar ideas were voiced as early as June 23, 1990, when the Supreme Council of the SSR Moldova approved the "Conclusion of the Commission of the Supreme Council of the SSR Moldova on the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and the Additional Secret Protocol, as well as their consequences for Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina", in which the creation on August 2, 1940 of the Moldavian SSR as a result of the "Soviet occupation" was declared illegal. Thus, the republic abolished itself, because, apart from the corresponding decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 2, 1940, there are simply no other documents constituting it within its borders. As a result, Transnistria received an absolutely legal right to self-determination, which was exercised by it on September 2, 1990.

It is the Bessarabian issue - one of the little-known issues of international politics of the interwar period - that the book of Doctor of Historical Sciences M.I. Meltyukhov. As you know, during the Revolution and the Civil War in Russia, the western borders of our country changed. Soviet Russia recognized the independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Accordingly, peace treaties were signed with all these countries, establishing new borders in Eastern Europe. At the same time, it should be noted that the signing of these peace treaties in all cases, with the exception of Lithuania, was preceded by undeclared wars. However, despite the fact that Moscow was forced to make significant concessions on territorial issues, it should still be stated that the Soviet side officially recognized these borders. However, on the issue of belonging to the former Bessarabian province of the Russian Empire, the situation was fundamentally different. Taking advantage

of the political chaos in Russia and relying on the support of Germany and Austria-Hungary, Romania in January 1918

occupied this Russian territory. As a result, Romania became the first country to intervene in the territory of the former Russian Empire. Naturally, the Soviet government protested to Bucharest and severed diplomatic relations with the aggressor. In March 1918, the successes of Soviet troops in Ukraine forced the Romanian leadership to sign an agreement that provided for the withdrawal of Romanian troops from Bessarabia within two months. Thus, Bucharest recognized the fact of its occupation of Bessarabia. However, the beginning of the German-Austrian-Hungarian intervention contributed to the fact that Bucharest did not comply with this agreement. As a result, Bessarabia remained under Romanian occupation, but all attempts by Soviet Russia to resolve this issue at the negotiating table were ignored by the Romanian side, which in October 1920 obtained consent from the Entente powers to recognize this territory as part of Romania. At the same time, as the author rightly emphasizes, the Entente countries had no right to transfer to Romania the territory of Bessarabia that did not belong to them. Moreover, even this absolutely illegal agreement of the Entente countries with Romania was never ratified and, accordingly, did not become a legally correct international document. Thus, the Bessarabian question arose in Soviet-Romanian relations, which became the result of not only the very first, but also the longest foreign intervention on the territory of our country. In the book offered to the reader's attention, the attempts of the Soviet Union to resolve this issue through bilateral negotiations are examined in detail. However, an indispensable condition for Romania's consent to such negotiations was the constant demand that Moscow first recognize Bessarabia as part of Romanian territory. As a result, until 1934, not only were there no diplomatic relations between the two neighboring states, but there was also no mutually recognized border line. Naturally, in this situation, Romania constantly sought to receive support from states unfriendly to the USSR. The result of this policy was the Polish-Romanian military anti-Soviet alliance and the orientation of Bucharest towards France.

In the mid-1930s, as Franco-Soviet relations normalized and as a result of the USSR's entry into the League of Nations, Moscow and

Bucharest agreed to establish diplomatic relations, but the issue of belonging to Bessarabia, by the tacit consent of both parties, was postponed to the future. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the Soviet Union never abandoned Bessarabia, continuing to consider it a territory under Romanian occupation. The growing influence of Germany in Europe and the weakening of the influence of France led to the fact that Romania gradually began to focus on Berlin, seeing in it a new possible defender against Soviet claims. Naturally, in 1939 the Bessarabian issue became part of the Soviet-German settlement. According to the secret additional protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Moscow emphasized its interest in Bessarabia, while Berlin declared its disinterest in this issue. So gradually the Soviet side created political opportunities for resolving the Bessarabian issue. The outbreak of World War II, and especially the events of May-June 1940 in Western Europe, where

Germany defeated the Anglo-French coalition, allowed the Soviet Union to finally solve this protracted problem. On the basis of declassified Soviet documents M.I. Meltyukhov for the first time comprehensively described not only diplomatic, but also Moscow's military preparations for resolving the Bessarabian issue. Based on a thorough study of the currently available historical documents, the author rightly emphasizes that the actions of the USSR against Romania were neither "Soviet aggression" nor "occupation", as Romanian researchers and some Russian "fighters against totalitarianism" claim. It is impossible not to agree with the main conclusion of the author: "As a result of the actions of the Soviet Union in June 1940, the Soviet-Romanian border along the Prut and Danube rivers, established by the decision of the Berlin Congress of 1878, was restored. Bessarabia was liberated from the Romanian occupation and reunited with the USSR. As for Northern Bukovina, in this case, this territory was annexed to the USSR and a new border was established between the Prut and the Carpathians. In international legal terms, the Soviet-Romanian border established by the agreement of June 28, 1940 was secured by a peace treaty with Romania, signed on February 10, 1947. Thus, the Soviet leadership

succeeded not only in fact, but also in legal settlement of the Bessarabian issue. It should be

noted that in his monograph M.I. Meltyukhov makes extensive use of both already published documents and the established historiography on this issue, as well as recently declassified Soviet archival documents, extensive quotations from which not only allow them to be introduced into scientific circulation, but also to substantiate his author's position in detail. It is gratifying that studies appear in Russian historiography that comprehensively and systematically consider the complex problems of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and its western neighbors of the interwar period. Only such scientifically conscientious and impeccable works are capable of resisting attempts to falsify the history of the 20th century.

Historical Perspective Foundation.

Introduction

Not a span to either enemy or friend!

N.M. Karamzin

Like most other regions of the Earth, Bessarabia - so with In the 19th century, the territory located between the Dniester, the Prut, the Danube and the Black Sea was called - in its history it has experienced many drastic changes. Replacing each other, the Cimmerians, Scythians, Sarmatians, Getae, Celts and Carps lived there, the southern part of the region was part of the Roman Empire for some time, the state of the Goths was here, the Huns passed, the Bulgarians, Avars, Hungarians, Pechenegs and Cumans roamed along the rivers Slavs settled. The interfluvium of the Prut and the Dniester was part of Kievan Rus, its northern part - in the Galicia-Volyn principality. From the 13th century these areas belonged to the Golden Horde, and then, in the second half of the 14th century., fell into vassalage from Hungary.

Gradually, between the Carpathians and the Dniester, a Moldavian principality developed, which included the northern part of Bessarabia, which in 1359-1365. freed from Hungarian dependence. As the Golden Horde weakened, the southern regions of the Prut-Dniester interfluvium from the beginning of the 15th century. became part of the principality, which since 1387 became a vassal of Poland. Only the mouth of the Danube with the port of Chilia located here remained the scene of a fierce struggle between Genoa and Venice, and then between Moldavia and Wallachia. In 1465, the Moldavian ruler Stefan III the Great finally entrenched himself in Chilia. Meanwhile, the strengthening of the Ottoman Empire led to the fact that since 1456 the Moldavian principality became its tributary. Moreover, the dependence gradually increased, and the attempt to get rid of the Turkish tribute, undertaken in 1473–1478, failed. During the outbreak of the war, the part of the interfluvium of the Prut and Dniester (Budzhak) with Kiliya and Akkerman adjoining the Black Sea in 1484 was annexed to Turkish possessions. Since 1478, the Moldavian Principality resumed paying tribute to the Ottoman Empire, and since 1501 it became its vassal, retaining internal autonomy. Later, at the end of the XVI - beginning

In the 17th century, certain regions of Bessarabia with centers in Tighina (Bender), Izmail, Reni and Khotyn were annexed to the Ottoman Empire, becoming a kind of outposts of Turkish rule in the region.

The relations of the Moldavian Principality with Russia were mainly ecclesiastical and occasionally dynastic in nature (in particular, the son of Ivan III was married to the daughter of Stephen III the Great). Only in the middle of the XVII century. With the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, the Moldavian rulers decided to use contacts with Moscow to free themselves from the Ottoman Empire. In February 1654, an ambassador was sent to Russia with a request to accept Moldavia into Russian citizenship. The Russian government supported this idea, negotiations began on the conditions under which the principality was ready to become part of Russia. However, the Russian-Polish and Russian-Swedish wars did not allow these plans to be realized. In 1674, Moldova again asked Russia for help in liberation from Ottoman domination and entry into Russian citizenship. In the then international situation, Moscow took a cautious position, although it promised some military assistance. New appeals to Moscow followed in 1684 and 1698.

Meanwhile, Russia was increasingly involved in the struggle with the Ottoman Empire for access to the Black Sea, which contributed to the preservation of the pro-Russian orientation of the Moldavian elite. In 1711, Peter I offered the Moldavian ruler D. Cantemir a "Diploma and points", according to which the Moldavian principality was accepted into Russian citizenship, and the throne of the rulers was assigned to the Cantemir family. However, the failure of the Prut campaign did not allow the implementation of this agreement, and the Moldavian Principality actually lost its autonomy. Subsequent Russo-Turkish Wars of 1735–1739 and 1769–1774 were also carried out on the territory of Moldova, strengthening Russian influence in the Carpatho-Danube region. At the same time, the influence of the Austrian Empire was growing in the Balkans, jealously following the successes of the Russian troops on the Danube and providing diplomatic support to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, when in 1770 Moldova again turned to St. Petersburg with a request to establish a Russian protectorate over the principality, Russia had to confine itself to the promise of patronage to the Danube principalities, which was enshrined in the Kyuchuk-Kainarji Russian-Turkish peace treaty of 1774. Accordingly, the Moldavian elite continued

offer St. Petersburg to take Moldova into Russian citizenship with the preservation of a certain autonomy. In May 1775, the

Austrian Empire obtained from Istanbul the transfer of the northwestern part of the Moldavian principality - Bukovina, to it for neutrality in the past Russian-Turkish war. In 1779, Russian consulates general were established in the Danubian principalities, which supervised the fulfillment by the Ottoman Empire of its obligations in relation to these territories. Gradually, Russian diplomacy managed to achieve the formalization of the autonomy of the principalities and its expansion. As a result of the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791. Russia received the left bank of the lower reaches of the Dniester and became a direct neighbor of the Moldavian Principality, whose elite did not stop turning to St. Petersburg with requests for help and patronage. New Russo-Turkish War 1806–1812 exacerbated the question of the fate of the Danubian principalities occupied by Russian troops. Local authorities again asked to be accepted into Russian citizenship. On September 30 (October 12), 1808, Alexander I obtained from Napoleon I a written consent to the annexation of these territories to Russia. However, the Russian-Turkish peace negotiations that began in 1809 showed that Istanbul was in no hurry to agree that "the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, together with Bessarabia, join the All-Russian Empire forever, so that from now on the Danube River will remain the border between the All-Russian Empire and the Ottoman Port. Deterioration

Russo-French relations required an end to the war with the Ottoman Empire. The victory of the Russian army near Slobodzeya revived the negotiations, especially since Russia decided to moderate its demands "by one Moldavia with Bessarabia. If the Turkish ministers find it extremely difficult to cede the entire principality, then be content with defining the border along the Seret River, continuing it along the Danube until it flows into the Black Sea. But still, Istanbul refused the agreement. Then on March 22 (April 3), 1812, Alexander I notified the commander of the Russian troops on the Danube, General of Infantry M.I. Kutuzov about the possibility, in the most extreme case, "to make peace by laying the Prut, at its confluence with the Danube, by the border." As a result, on May 16 (28), 1812, a peace treaty was signed in Bucharest, according to which Russia included

the interfluvium of the Prut and the Dniester to the Kiliya mouth of the Danube. Prior to that, the central and northern parts of Bessarabia were part of the vassal Moldavian principality, and the southern regions with the cities of Bendery, Akkerman, Izmail, Kaushany were the possessions of the Ottoman Empire.

In 1813, a regional government was created in Bessarabia with the participation of local boyars and Russian officials. On April 17 (29), 1818, the "Charter for the Formation of the Bessarabian Region" was issued, according to which, under the plenipotentiary governor appointed by St. Petersburg, the Supreme Council was established, which had the highest administrative and judicial power. Regional and local authorities were still in the hands of the Moldavian boyars. On February 17 (29), 1828, the Charter was canceled and Bessarabia became part of the Novorossiysk General Government. In the meantime, according to the Akkerman Russian-Turkish Convention of September 25 (October 7), 1826, the internal autonomy of the Danubian principalities was restored, and after the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829, under the Adrianople peace treaty, it was further expanded, in particular, Turkish troops were withdrawn from them. At the same time, the Danube Delta was annexed to Russia. Until 1834, Moldavia and Wallachia remained occupied by Russian troops and were ruled by the Governor-General P.D. Kiselev, whose activities were aimed at bringing the principalities closer together and carrying out some management reforms.

Again, the question of ownership of the territories at the mouth of the Danube arose during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, during which England, France and the Kingdom of Sardinia took the side of the Ottoman Empire against Russia. According to the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, Russia ceded the Danube Delta and Southern Bessarabia to the Ottoman Empire, which administratively was included in the vassal Principality of Moldavia, which at that time was not a subject of international law. According to the treaty, the Russian protectorate over the Danubian principalities was replaced by a collective protectorate of 7 powers (England, France, Austria, Russia, Prussia, the Ottoman Empire and Sardinia) and their autonomy within the Ottoman Empire was confirmed. In 1859–1861 On the basis of the unification of the Wallachian and Moldavian principalities, a new state arose - the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which since 1862

adopted the name Romania - also vassal dependent on the Ottoman Empire. In the context of a new

aggravation of the situation in the Balkans and the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. the question arose about the return of southern Bessarabia to Russia. According to the preliminary San Stefano Treaty of February 19 (March 3), 1878, in exchange for the return of South Bessarabia to Russia, Romania, whose independence was recognized by the Ottoman Empire, received Northern Dobruja with Constanta. However, the Romanian government declared that it would not recognize the act "concluded without us, against us and to our detriment". Accordingly, in an attempt to preserve Southern Bessarabia and obtain Northern Dobruja, Bucharest appealed to the great European powers, but no concrete promises were made. As a result, the Berlin Congress (June 1 (13) - July 1 (13), 1878) recognized the independence of Romania, provided that it accepts the territorial changes authorized by the congress (Southern Bessarabia changed to Northern Dobruja, while the Danube Delta remained with Romania) and will ensure the equality of all peoples—

and religious denominations inhabiting it[1] . The recognition of Romania's independence by the great European powers dragged on until 1880, when it was recognized by Germany, England and France, who sought economic concessions from her. On March 14, 1881, Romania became a kingdom, and the following year it began to propagate the idea of unity of Romanians in one state among the population of Austro-Hungarian Transylvania. Bucharest's dissatisfaction with France and Russia led him to focus on Germany, which was able to reconcile Austria-Hungary and Romania. As a result, on October 18 (30), 1883, a secret Romanian-Austro-Hungarian union treaty was signed in Vienna for a period of 5 years with a possible automatic extension for 3 years. On the same day, Germany joined this treaty, and on May 3 (15), 1888, Italy. In fact, it was about an alliance against —

Russia, in the event of the defeat of which Romania was to receive Bessarabia[2] . Gradually, the idea of creating a "Great Romania" by annexing the territories of Southern Dobruja from Bulgaria, Transylvania and Bukovina from Austria-Hungary and Bessarabia from

splitting Europe into two military-political blocs, Bucharest flirted first with one, then with the other. A new crisis in the Balkans allowed Romania to realize part of its territorial claims. During the First Balkan War (October 9, 1912 - May 30, 1913) Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria conquered almost all the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire, but the division between the winners of the conquered territories led to the Second Balkan War (June 29 - August 10 1913), during which Montenegro, Serbia, Greece and the Ottoman Empire fought against Bulgaria. Under these conditions, Romania demanded Southern Dobruja from Bulgaria for its neutrality in the First Balkan War and on July 10 began military operations against it. One corps occupied the territory of Southern Dobruja, and the main forces of the Romanian army began to attack Sofia almost without hindrance. Already on July 29, Bulgaria ceased resistance, and according to the Bucharest Treaty signed on August 10, Romania secured Southern Dobruja. As a result of all these events, Romania's relations with the countries of the Triple Alliance cooled and rapprochement with the countries of the Entente began. On the eve and at the beginning of the First

World War, the countries of the Triple Alliance offered the Romanian leadership Bessarabia for participation in the war on their side, and the Entente countries - Transylvania, Banat and part of Bukovina. However, Romania was in no hurry to enter the war, being content with the profits from the foreign trade that became more active under the conditions of the war. As the war dragged on, the opposing factions continued to fight for the involvement of the Romanian state in the war on their side. By the summer of 1916, it became clear that the countries of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire) were unlikely to win the war, in addition, the successes of the Russian troops on the Eastern Front created the impression that the Entente would soon win the war. Under these conditions, Bucharest obtained from the Entente countries consent to join Romania after the victory in the war of the southern part of Bukovina to the river. Prut, throughout Transylvania to the river. Tisza, all Banat to the river. Danube and preservation of Southern Dobruja. Under these conditions, on August 4 (17), 1916, an agreement was signed on the accession of Romania to the Entente.

The Entente headquarters considered two main options for using the Romanian territory for strategic purposes. First

provided for a counter strike from Dobruja and from Thessaloniki with the aim of withdrawing Bulgaria from the war, and then the Ottoman Empire. The second option proceeded from the possibility of moving through Transylvania to the central regions of Austria-Hungary. This required the concentration of a significant grouping of Russian troops in the south, which could bypass the fortified zones of the Austro-German troops on the territory of Romania. Oddly enough, both of these options, at the insistence of the Anglo-French leadership, were rejected, and Romania was given the opportunity to attack Austria-Hungary alone, only a small corps of Russian troops was introduced into Dobruja. On August

14 (27), 1916, Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary, and the next day the Romanian troops went on the offensive in Transylvania, which lasted until September 13 (26). During this time, the command of the Quadruple Alliance was able to transfer troops against Romania from other theaters of military operations and go on the offensive both in Transylvania and from Bulgarian territory. By October 14 (27) most of Dobruja was occupied. Meanwhile, in Transylvania, the Austro-German troops more and more successfully pressed the Romanian armies and by November 10 (23) reached the Rymnik-Slatina-Caracal front. On November 21 (December 4), the Austro-German troops occupied Bucharest and, advancing down the Danube, by the end of the year reached the line of Focshana - the mouth of the Danube. The Russian command was forced, saving an ally, to transfer 35 infantry and 13 cavalry divisions to Romania, which amounted to over 1/3 of the formations of the active army. Thus, the entry of Romania into the war only worsened the situation on the Eastern Front, lengthening it by almost 500 km[3] — .

The general dynamics of Russian-Romanian relations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was determined primarily by the different status of both states in the international arena. The Russian Empire was a great power, and Romania was one of the Balkan countries whose influence on the international situation was felt only at the regional level. It is clear that under these conditions, the territorial aspirations of the Romanian elite in relation to Russia remained in

at best unfounded dreams. However, under the conditions of the revolution that began in February 1917 and the collapse of the Russian Empire, these claims suddenly turned out to be quite achievable. This book tells about how Romania managed to occupy and annex Bessarabia, what consequences this had for the Soviet-Romanian relations of the interwar period, and how the Bessarabian issue was resolved in the summer of 1940.

In a certain respect, the Bessarabian issue was unique, since this territory was the only one of all the lands lost in the west of the Russian Empire, the rejection of which was never recognized by the Soviet government. In addition, the Romanian intervention of 1918 was not only the very first, but also the longest intervention in the history of the Soviet state. Therefore, historiography devoted to the Soviet-Romanian relations of the interwar twenty years could Soviet speak much more freely and clearly about the real interests of the Soviet Union in the Bessarabian issue. The liberation of the territory of Bessarabia from the Romanian occupation has always been recognized as the main goal of Moscow. However, since the Bessarabian issue was nevertheless of a local nature and could not have a decisive influence on Soviet foreign policy as a whole, a rather original picture emerged in the domestic historiography of the foreign policy of the USSR. If all other states in their international policy were guided by their own interests, then the Soviet Union was engaged only in demonstrating its peacefulness and fighting for peace. In principle, of course, it was admitted that the USSR also had its own interests, but usually they were spoken about so vaguely that it was almost impossible to understand the motives of Soviet foreign policy.

However, the rejection of such an ideological approach makes Soviet foreign policy as understandable as the policy of any other country. Consideration of the international situation within the framework of the historical and political analysis of the development of systems of international relations shows that the Soviet leadership in the early 1920s. faced with a difficult but rather traditional problem. During the years of the Revolution and the Civil War, Soviet Russia lost the positions won by the Russian Empire in the international arena and territories in Eastern Europe. In terms of its influence in Europe

the country was thrown back 200 years into the past. Under these conditions, the Soviet leadership could either agree to the regional status of the USSR, or re-start the struggle for a return to the club of great powers. Having made a choice in favor of the second alternative, the Soviet leadership adopted the concept of "world revolution", which combined the new ideology and the traditional tasks of foreign policy to strengthen the country's influence in the world. The strategic goal of the country's foreign policy was the global reorganization of the system of international relations, which made England, France and their allies the main opponents.

Of course, against the backdrop of such serious foreign policy goals, the problem of territorial demarcation with Romania was of purely subordinate importance. However, it should be remembered that the Bessarabian issue had a noticeable impact on the relations of the Soviet Union with the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. This, in turn, had a certain influence on Moscow's relations with the great powers. In Soviet historical literature, the Bessarabian issue was studied in a diplomatic aspect, while military events, with the exception of the Romanian occupation of the region in early 1918, were given incomparably less attention[4]. Now, when the historian is not bound by predominantly binding

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ideological dogmas and many archival documents became available, it is possible to study this problem more comprehensively, to show how Soviet diplomatic steps were reinforced by military measures in 1919 and especially in the summer of 1940. Therefore, one of the goals of this study is a more detailed and systematic description of the Bessarabian campaign Red Army in 1940 on the basis of available archival documents.

This problem remains relevant also because in Romanian historiography there is an obligatory unanimity on the issues of Romania's relations with the Russian Empire and the USSR. In the most general form, the Romanian version is presented in an interview with Romanian President I. Iliescu: "The image of Russia as an occupier has taken root in the perception of Romanians. After all, Romania had the misfortune to be at the crossroads of interests of three empires - the Ottoman, Austrian and then Russian. All of them tried to occupy the Romanian provinces. In 1812, Russia tears off half of its territory from Moldova.

territory and turns it into a Russian province - Bessarabia. Nevertheless, the Romanians participated in the anti-Ottoman war of 1877, in which Russia also fought for our independence from Turkey. True, in gratitude, Russia re-occupied the territory that Romania received after the Crimean War (three counties in the south of Bessarabia). Then there was 1940 and the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, according to which the USSR again occupies Romanian territory, not only Bessarabia, but also the north of Bukovina, which never belonged to Russia or the USSR ... All this remained in the memory of the Romanians. But now we are not putting forward territorial claims to anyone. We have advocated and advocate the development of relations with both the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. And with Russia, we must put aside all grievances, including the dissatisfaction of Russians and Ukrainians with the participation of the Romanian army in the war on the side of Germany . As a rule, to substantiate this

touching version, Romanian authors falsify real historical events in every possible way. In recent years, many events in the interwar history of the 20th century have been reassessed in Russian literature. This process also affected the study of Soviet-Romanian relations. However, unfortunately, often the main motive here is not the desire to deepen our knowledge of that period, but only the desire to indiscriminately denigrate Soviet foreign policy. For this, as a rule, abstract moral assessments are used, without taking into account the specific historical realities and the mentality of the era. Therefore, in our opinion, one should try to take an unbiased look at the Soviet-Romanian relations in their dynamics through the prism of the development of the Versailles system of international relations and the genesis of the Second World War. The author believes that every state has the right to pursue any foreign policy, so this study is not about blaming or justifying Soviet or Romanian foreign policy. However, this does not mean at all that in assessing this policy one should proceed only from the political situation. Moreover, it is the distant prospect that allows a more objective assessment of past events. In addition, one should not break the chain of events, which also distorts their perception. That is why, in our opinion, it is important to consider the Bessarabian question against the b

Thus, modern Russian historiography is faced with the task of comprehensively studying the path along which the Soviet Union managed to go from a pariah of the international community to the second superpower of the world. This will allow, on the one hand, to pay tribute to our ancestors, whose sweat and blood this path was watered, and on the other hand, it will give modern Russian society certain guidelines for the future. Of course, the solution of this problem will require long-term efforts and study of the development of international relations at different levels. An integral part of this problem is the bilateral relations of the Soviet Union with its western neighbors, the largest of which were Poland and Romania, which were the main basis of the anti-Soviet "cordon sanitaire".

PART ONE THE CONQUERATION (1917–1920)

By the beginning of 1917, the Romanian front was passing approximately along the line of the Eastern Carpathians - Fokshany - Brailov - the mouth of the Danube. The 9th, 4th, 6th Russian and 2nd Romanian armies operated at the front. Out of 137,903 sq. km of the territory of Romania, troops of the countries of the Quadruple Union occupied 99,845 square meters. km (72.4%). The last attempt of the Russian Romanian offensive was made on July 11 (24), 1917 in the Focsha direction, where the troops of the 4th Russian and 2nd Romanian armies broke through the enemy's front and liberated 30 villages, capturing about 4 thousand people and capturing 85 guns, but the failure of the offensive of the South-Western Front led to the fact that on July 12 (25) the Headquarters ordered to stop the attacks. For their part, the German-Austrian troops on July 24-26 (August 6-8) launched an offensive near Focsani and in the valley of the river. Oytuz, which resulted in a slight advance of the front to the north. In these battles, the loss of Russian troops killed, missing and wounded amounted to 25 thousand people, Romanian - 27.5 thousand people, the Germans lost 47 thousand people killed and wounded [6] . By mid-August, the fighting on the Romanian front subsided and the front stabilized[7] . By September 1917, the Romanian Front included 1,976,260 combatants and non-combatants of the Russian army and 458

revolutionary chaos

Meanwhile, the revolutionary events in Petrograd reached the outskirts of Russia, including Bessarabia, which was in the rear zone of the Romanian front. On March 8 (21), 1917, the overthrow of the autocracy was officially announced in Tiraspol, which was generally enthusiastically received by the local population. As throughout the country, the transformation of state institutions began: various law enforcement agencies were dissolved, provincial and district commissariats were created. At the same time, already on March 8 (21) a local Soviet arose in Bendery, on March 12 (25) - in Tiraspol, on March 13 (26) - in Chisinau. By the beginning of May 1917, Soviets were created in all counties of Bessarabia. Thus, in Bessarabia, as well as throughout the country, there was a dual power. Thus, the population got the opportunity to compare the programs and actions of different political forces. Already on March 19 (April 1), the Tiraspol Council introduced an 8-hour working day, and ignoring this resolution by the owners of enterprises led to the fact that the workers began to introduce it without prior notice. In the countryside, the peasantry pinned their hopes on the solution of the agrarian problem to the revolution. Actually, as well as throughout the country, in Bessarabia, already in the spring of 1917, the peasants began to secretly

share the land.

As in other national outskirts of Russia, in the context of the widespread popularization of the slogan about the right of nations to self-determination, along with social movements, a national movement began to form in Bessarabia. Initially, the slogan of creating autonomy within the Russian Federal Republic became the leading idea of the national movement. However, the national movements of that time were, among other things, a form of consolidation of certain social strata in the region. Therefore, the Moldavian National Party (MNP), created in the second half of March 1917, united primarily the Bessarabian landowners * interested in maintaining their land holdings. For their part, the Romanian authorities, from the point of view of which not Moldovans, but Romanians lived in Bessarabia, in the conditions of growing unrest in Russia, decided to intensify the propaganda of the idea of unity that had been going on since 1905

Romanian people within one state. Therefore, the Romanian press and Romanian agents in Bessarabia promoted in every way the idea of autonomy for the province, which, in their opinion, should have been the first step towards unification with Romania. At the beginning of April 1917, the Romanian embassy in Petrograd established contacts with some Bessarabian Moldavian intellectuals - I. Incults, P. Khalippa and others, who later arrived in Chisinau with a group of agitators (40-50 people)[9]. Part of the leadership of the MNP, since the official creation of the party on April 2 (15), 1917, insisted on the introduction of the Moldavian language in state institutions, advocated the solution of the agrarian issue only in the interests of the Moldavians, and gradually popularized the idea of unification with Romania.

The troops of the Romanian front, like the entire Russian army, were also drawn into the revolution. In May 1917, along with the general Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies, Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies were created at the front. ^{And} Moldavian officer deputies, ^{who} popularized the Romanian language as a common language for Romanians and Moldavians. That is, along with the social polarization in the army, there was also a national polarization of servicemen. True, the influence of these nationally oriented forces in Bessarabia was insignificant. On April 10–13 (23–26) at the provincial congress of folk teachers, representatives of the MPP failed to get their proposals to teach children in Romanian accepted. The congress spoke in favor of education in the Moldavian and Russian languages. Attempts by the MNP to win support from the Moldavian peasants also came to nothing, since for the overwhelming mass of the peasantry the representatives of the MNP were "bourgeois from Chisinau". Moreover, 4 propagandists for unification with Romania were killed by peasants[10]. During the 1st Bessarabian provincial peasant congress, which took place on May 21–23 (June 3–5), 1917, the program for solving the agrarian issue only for Moldovans was rejected. The congress spoke in favor of transferring the land to public ownership, for the national equality of all residents of Bessarabia and for its preservation as an autonomy within Russia[11]. As MPP members V. Cazacchia and V. Valuta correctly described the situation, "the Moldovan people consider us their enemies"[12].

At the end of May 1917, the MNP managed to hold a congress of Moldavian teachers and organize courses for Moldavian teachers the following month. However, the apparent Romanianization of the program outraged the students. This protest had a significant resonance, and the MNP had to remove from the Central Committee of the party two of the most odious members, the landowners P. Gore and V. Herz. Among the Moldavian nationalists, even during the revolution of 1905-1907, the idea to create "Sfatul Tsarii" (Council of the country) arose. Now, in the new conditions, this idea was again voiced by the MNP in April 1917. In the meantime, after the July events in Petrograd and the end of the dual power, the party began to form 10 cohorts (40 people each) of national detachments, which were led by the one created on July 23 (5 August) in Chisinau, the Central Moldavian Military Executive Committee. The Kishinev Soviet, headed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, supported this undertaking. The created "Moldovan battalions", together with the Cossack detachments, were involved in suppressing the most significant centers of the peasant movement. In August, with their help, they began to take away from the peasants the land they had previously seized. At the end of July, the chairman of the Central Moldavian Military Executive Committee, Ensign G. Pinteia, met with the Romanian Minister T. Ionescu in Iasi. The result of this meeting was an influx of agitators from Romania into

Bessarabia. At the same time, a delegation from the Bessarabian province arrived in Petrograd, intending to achieve its autonomy[13]. In Bessarabia itself, as well as throughout the country, against the backdrop of a growing crisis, the population was radicalized. August 27–31 (September 9–13) The II Provincial Peasant Congress spoke in favor of transferring land, water, forests and mineral resources to the public domain and supported the Bolshevik slogan "All land to the peasants!"[14]. In August-September 1917, Bolshevik organizations were created in Bessarabia and on the Romanian front, and the popularity of the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" For its part, the Central Moldavian Military Executive Committee refused to unite with the existing Soviets, and on September 24 (October 7) decided to begin the formation of national Moldavian units. The command of the Romanian Front and the Odessa Military District supported this initiative and seconded soldiers and officers to these formations -

Moldovans. On October 7 (20), the Central Moldavian Military Executive Committee decided to convene a Moldavian military congress, and although the Provisional Government of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief forbade its holding, the congress opened on October 20 (November 2) in Chisinau.

The congress was attended by about 600 delegates, most of whom were officers, although according to the then election norms, there should have been at least 7.5 thousand delegates from 250 thousand military personnel from Bessarabia. A group of prisoners of war of the Austro-Hungarian army of Transylvanian soldiers was invited to the congress, who began to proclaim toasts in honor of the Romanian king and sing national Romanian songs, which caused discontent among a significant part of the delegates. In the end, on October 21 (November 3), the congress spoke in favor of the creation of "Sfatul Tsarii" and for the autonomy of Bessarabia. It was decided to give 30 out of 130 seats in Sfatul Tsarii to the peasants, all other Soviets were to be liquidated or become purely professional organizations. The task was to form the Moldavian army, for which it was necessary to increase the number of cohorts from 16 to 100 and create the Moldavian cavalry. At the congress, 32 members of Sfatul Tsarii were elected, in whose elections a little more than half of the delegates participated, since the very idea of creating such a body was not very popular. Officially, "Sfatul Tsarii" was created "to prepare and implement the autonomy of Bessarabia" and was a temporary body until the convocation of the Bessarabian Constituent Assembly[16]. Accordingly, "Sfatul Tsarii", which began its activities on November 21 (December 4), "the main

acknowledged

the principle of the structure

Russia

How

of a federal democratic republic"[17].

Meanwhile, in Petrograd, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets took power into its own hands. On October 26 (November 8), 1917, the Military Revolutionary Committee (VRC) of the Petrograd Soviet sent out an order to the fronts outlining the Decrees on Peace and Land and the program of the Soviet government. Army councils and committees were asked to immediately take power into their own hands[18]. The next day, this order was published in the newspaper of the Council of Soldiers' and Officers' Deputies of the Romanian Front. On 1(14) and 3(16) November the Decrees on Peace and Land were published in Chisinau and on November 22 (5

December) The Chisinau Council adopted a resolution recognizing the decisions of the II All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the Council of People's Commissars (SNK)

of the RSFSR[19] . The Decree on Land caused a special joy of the local population. Accordingly, the Bessarabian landlords were categorically against such a solution to the agrarian issue, since by the end

In 1917 they lost about 2/3 of their land property. At the Moldavian military congress, a "revolutionary committee" was created to defend the Constituent Assembly. On October 27 (November 9), the Chisinau Revolutionary Committee was formed, and on November 4 (17) the Bessarabian Provincial Revolutionary Committee, which aimed at maintaining the power of the Provisional Government. This situation was taken advantage of by the leaders of Sfatul Tsarii, who unexpectedly received support from the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, although earlier these parties were against its creation. Members of the MNP, Moldavian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Cadets²⁰ turned out to be members of the "Sfatul Tarii", replenished by co-optation . Regarding the future of Bessarabia, there was no unity within the framework of Sfatul Tsarii. There were supporters of autonomy within Russia, state independence, unification with Romania or Ukraine. The only thing that united all of them was the rejection of Soviet power and its laws.

On November 3 (16), 1917, the Council of People's Commissars published the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia", which proclaimed: "1. Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; 2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination up to secession and formation of an independent state; 3. Cancellation of all and any national and national-religious privileges and restrictions; 4. Free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia"[21] . On November 7 (20), the Kiev Central Rada announced the creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) within the framework of the all-Russian federation[22] . Meanwhile, on November 8 (21), the Council of People's Commissars turned to the warring countries with a proposal to conclude peace without annexations and indemnities[23] . On November 9 (22), the Council

of People's Commissars of the RSFSR sent a telegram to the troops urging them to conclude a truce at the front[24] . The command of the Romanian Front, as well as the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, refused to carry out this order of the Council of People's Commissars, but the soldiers who k

newspapers, refused to fight. Realizing that it would be impossible to evade any action in the conditions of Petrograd's public offer of a truce, and fighting alone would be suicide, Infantry General D.G. Shcherbachev, who served as an assistant to the nominal commander of the Romanian Front, the Romanian King Ferdinand I, with the consent of the Romanian leadership and representatives of the Entente, on November 21 (December 4), began negotiations with the Austro-German command on a truce. It was assumed that either it would be possible to conclude a truce and use the Romanian troops and national formations to suppress the revolution in southern Russia, or the Romanian army would have to be withdrawn through Bessarabia and Ukraine to the Don steppes to unite it with parts of A.M. Kaledin. The problem was that Germany and Austria-Hungary, in order to put pressure on Romania, spread rumors about the impossibility of concluding a truce with the Romanian king Ferdinand, but in the end this issue was bypassed and on November 26 (December 9), 1917, an armistice was signed in Focsani Romanian front[25]. The truce between the RSFSR and the countries of the Quadruple Union in Brest [26] The cessation of fighting in Litovsk was signed on December 2 (15), 1917 on the Eastern Front, which allowed the German command to —

start transferring troops from there to other fronts. Thus, in September-25 divisions were withdrawn from the Eastern Front[27] December 1917 alone, The Soviet proposal for a truce and the start of negotiations between the RSFSR and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance led to the fact that the Entente countries decided to intensify their policy in Russia in order to restore the Eastern Front on its territory as support for various formations that announced the continuation of the war with Germany and its allies, as well as and preparations for the intervention of the Entente troops. Accordingly, the Entente supported the creation of governments on the national outskirts of Russia. In an effort to prevent the liquidation of the German Eastern Front, England decided to recognize Kaledin and push Rumania to cooperate with him.

The Romanian government generally supported these aspirations of the Entente. Already on November 8 (21), 1917, the Romanian ambassador in London offered the British leadership the participation of the Romanian army in the fight against the Soviets. On the same day, at a meeting with the British Prime Minister

Minister D. Lloyd George and Foreign Minister A. Balfour, the representative of the American President W. Wilson, Colonel E. House proposed "to advise Romania to cooperate with any allied fighting forces that are territorially closest to it" [28] . On November 10 (23), the President of the United States promised Romania for participation in the anti-Soviet intervention to support her claims to the territory of Russia at the upcoming peace conference. The French mission in Iasi was given the task of establishing contact with anti-Soviet movements in southern Russia. General Shcherbachev handed over to Romania armaments, ammunition and food stocks of the Russian Romanian Front for 16 million rubles, part of which was to be sent to Kaledin. On the territory of Romania, volunteer units were formed from the military personnel of the Russian army to be sent to the Don. On November 23 (December 6), the Central Rada of the

UNR, with the support of representatives of the Entente, announced the formation of a united Ukrainian front from the Southwestern and Romanian fronts, headed by General Shcherbachev. For the formation of national troops, a National Committee was created, which brought together representatives of the national organizations of the Romanian Front. On December 4 (17), the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR recognized the UNR, at the same time pointing out the inadmissibility of disorganizing the front, disarming Russian troops and supporting Kaledin's units and demanding that such actions be stopped within 48 hours. Otherwise, the Council of People's Commissars would have considered the Central Rada in a state of "war with Soviet power in Russia and Ukraine"[29] . On December 7 (20), 1917, the Romanian leadership decided to provide military assistance to the UNR. On December 10 (23), England and France agreed on the division of zones of influence in Russia: England got the Caucasus, Transcaucasia and the Don, and France - Bessarabia, Ukraine and Crimean[30] . To ensure communication between Romania and the UNR, the head of the French military mission in Iasi, General A. Bertelo, insisted that Bessarabia be occupied by their troops. The Inter-Allied Commission began negotiations with "Sfatul Tarii", who declared himself the supreme authority in Bessarabia, on bringing Romanian troops into the region to maintain order[31] . The First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, which met in Kharkov on December 12 (25), proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian So

clashes began between the Soviet detachments and the Haidamak units of the UNR.

In the meantime, the conference of the Bolsheviks of the Romanian Front, held on November 28-30 (December 11-13), decided to help the population of Bessarabia in the implementation of the Decrees of Soviet power and elected a front-line party committee, which on December 2 (15) created the Bolshevik Military Revolutionary Committee in Sokoly (a suburb of the city of Iasi). Under the leadership of the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars on the Romanian Front, a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee at the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief S.G. Roshal VRK in Sokoly on December 3 (16), 1917, relying on the support of the Sokolsky garrison, announced the taking of power on the Romanian front into their own [hands](#)[\[32\]](#) . As the influence of the Bolsheviks gradually covered more and more Russian military units, General Shcherbachev turned to the Romanians and representatives of the Entente for support, referring to the fact that he sent his most loyal troops to the aid of Kerensky. On the night of 4 (17) December, some of the members of the Bolshevik Military Revolutionary Committee were arrested. Under these conditions, the Military Revolutionary Committee announced the preparation of a rebuff to the National Committee. On December 6 (19) in Iasi, during negotiations with the Romanian command, it became clear that the Romanians would not allow the arrest of Shcherbachev and the dispersal of the National Committee. On December 7 (20), Shcherbachev invited members of the Military Revolutionary Committee to negotiate with the National Committee, guaranteeing them immunity. However, having pulled up loyal units, Ukrainian formations and 4 Romanian regiments to Iasi, Shcherbachev arrested the delegates of the Military Revolutionary Committee on December 8 (21). The next day, the chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee, Roshal, was shot, the Military Revolutionary Committee itself was dispersed, and the units supporting it were disarmed. Following this, the disarmament of other unreliable, from the point of view of the representatives of the Entente, Russian units began. To facilitate this operation, the Romanian authorities delayed food for the Russian units. The disarmed Russian servicemen were imprisoned in concentration camps, and to justify these actions, the version of robberies and pogroms allegedly perpetrated by Russia

In the meantime, on December 2 (15), 1917, Sfatul Tsarii, having received over 2 million lei from Romania [\[34\]](#) , adopted a declaration declaring Bessarabia a "Moldovan People's Republic, which is an equal member of the United Federal Russian Democratic Republic", until convocation of the People's Assembly

Republic "Sfatul Tseriy" (Chairman I.K. Inkulets) was declared the highest authority, and the Council of General Directors (Chairman P.V. Yerkhan), responsible to "Sfatul Tseriy" became the executive power. It was promised to solve the agrarian question on the basis of public property, and a number of statements of a general democratic character were made. Calling for the defense of the Russian Constituent Assembly, the authors of the declaration concluded that "only then will we save our land and keep our common homeland, the Great Russian Federative Democratic Republic, from final destruction!"[35]

On December 4 (17) in Chisinau, under the government of the Moldavian People's Republic (MPR), a French consulate was created, headed by R. Sarre, who declared support for Sfatul Tarii[36]. Through him, on January 2 (15), 1918, the local "government" received a letter from the French envoy to Romania, A. Saint-Oler, in which it was reported that the entry of Romanian troops into Bessarabia was in the interests of the Entente countries and "is an exclusively military measure aimed at to ensure the normal functioning of the rear of the Russian-Romanian front ... Thus, the introduction of Romanian troops cannot have any influence both on the current political internal situation of the country, and on

political future of Bessarabia"[37]. When this statement was published on January 24 (February 6), 1918, the new Prime Minister of the MPR, D. Chugureanu, accompanied it with the following conclusion: "Thus, the Romanian troops came to us not as conquerors and enemies, but as friends of the people"[38].

On December 10 (23), 1917, the II Congress of Soviets of Soldiers', Workers' and Sailors' Deputies of the Romanian Front, the Odessa District and the Black Sea Fleet (Rumcherod) opened in Odessa together with a group of peasant representatives. The congress supported the formation and policy of the Council of People's Commissars in Petrograd and adopted a resolution on insubordination to Shcherbachev and various "national" commissars. The re-elected Central Executive Committee of Rumcheroda was declared the highest Soviet power on the Romanian front[39]. On December 15 (28), the Rumcherod Front Department settled in Chisinau, which was supposed to create the headquarters of the Romanian Front, to help strengthen

Bessarabia and to fix the armies of the Romanian front on the line of the Prut and Danube rivers.

Romanian invasion

In early December 1917, separate Romanian detachments began to seize the border villages of Bessarabia. So, in Leovo, by agreement with Shcherbachev's headquarters, a small Romanian detachment was introduced to guard the grain warehouse, but the local Soviet rebuffed him, and, having lost an officer and 2 soldiers, the detachment retreated beyond the river.

[Rod\[40\]](#) . But on December 7 (21), a new Romanian detachment seized Leovo and demanded to extradite the activists, threatening to shoot every tenth inhabitant. In the end, the members of the executive committee of the local Soviet were arrested and shot[\[41\]](#) . Having received a message about the — ,

events in Iasi and Leovo [\[42\]](#), the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on December 16 (29), 1917, in a note, asked Romania for more detailed information about what had happened and warned that it would not tolerate "no reprisals not only against Russians, but also against Romanian revolutionaries and socialists" and "will not stop at the most severe measures

conspirators, accomplices of Kaledin, Shcherbachev and Rada"[\[43\]](#) . On — against the cour

December 4 (January 4, 1918), the Soviet government decided to strengthen the revolutionary units of the Romanian Front, and the commander-in-chief N.V. Krylenko ordered the Russian troops to withdraw from the territory of Romania to Bessarabia and "in the event of a collision with the Romanian troops, make their way with weapons in their —

hands"[\[44\]](#) . In its response note to Petrograd, the Romanian government stated that it did not have any information about the events in Leovo, and presented the events in Iasi as protecting the Romanian population from robberies by Russian troops arbitrarily leaving the front, while ties with Ukraine and Kaledin were explained by the need to purchase food to supply population and troops, including Russians[\[45\]](#) . On December 31 (January 13, 1918), Petrograd ~~protested~~ protested in connection with the arrests of Russian soldiers in the 49th Infantry Division and demanded "from the Romanian Government the release of those arrested, the punishment of those who made the arrests, the lawlessness and disorderly actions of the Romanian authorities and guarantees that such actions will not will repeat. Failure to receive a response to this request of ours within 24 hours will be treated by us as a new break and we will then accept

military measures, up to the most drastic ones . Because the the Romanian government did not react to these protests; on the night of January 1 (14), 1918, the composition of the Romanian embassy, headed by Ambassador K.I. Diamandi. However, at the request of representatives of all foreign embassies in Petrograd, those arrested were released the next day. They were again given the demand of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR stop the to .

arrests and release [47] Russian soldiers. For their part, the local Bolsheviks on December 13 (26), 1917 blocked the railways, forbidding the transport of goods to Romania. The Sfatul Tarii attempt to take control of the railways failed, as the Moldavian soldiers refused to act against the Russian revolutionary units. Then "Sfatul Tsarii" turned to Shcherbachev for support. The general ordered units of the 7th cavalry and 61st infantry divisions to be sent to Bessarabia to occupy the stations of Lipkany, Balti, Oknitsa, Ungheni, Chisinau, Bendery, Razdelnaya, Odessa, but this order was not carried out. Under these conditions, on December 8 (22), "Sfatul Tarii" appealed to the Romanian leadership with a request for military assistance[48] . It was the representative of "Sfatul Tarii" from Leovo who went to Iasi and asked the Romanian General Staff to equip military guards and send them to Leovo. Yerkhan convinced the Sfatul Tarii deputies that "we cannot rely on the Moldovan units that we have: they are Bolshevized. The only way out is to bring in foreign troops"[49] . The peasant faction "Sfatul Tarii" expressed support for the SNK of the RSFSR and even sent 3 representatives to Petrograd with a warning about the preparation of the Romanian occupation of Bessarabia. Thus, the internal state of "Sfatul Tsarii" does not allow us to speak of it as a single body. It is clear that under such

conditions, supporters of rapprochement with Romania had to act in secret from the rest of its members. On December 14 (27), representatives of Sfatul Tarii in Iasi again turned to Romania for help. They hoped to get help from HP as well. On December 19 (January 1, 1918), at a closed meeting of Sfatul Tsarii, it was decided to give

Board of General Directors carte blanche to invite foreign troops. True, even in the Board of Directors there was no unity on the question of who exactly should be invited. On December 21 (January 3, 1918), a telegram was sent to the Minister of War of Romania in Iasi with a request to send a regiment of Transylvanians from Kiev to Chisinau at the disposal of the Board of Directors: "According to the decision of the General Board of Directors of the Moldavian Republic, we ask you to order an urgent dispatch to Chisinau of a regiment of Ardyalians" [50] . On December 22 (January 4, 1918), the Board of Directors turned to Colonel d'Albia, the French military attache to the MPR, with a proposal to prepare an agreement "on inviting allied attaches and sending

instructors, for the correct organization of the troops of the republic"[54] .

Despite all the efforts and promotion of friendship with Romania, the INP has not been able to create a noticeable support for this program among the local population. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly, only 2.3% of the voters of Bessarabia voted for deputies from the MNP[52] . Even the Moldavian soldiers of the Republican army were opposed to the idea of secession from Russia. In Chisinau, the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Southern District and the executive committees of the Chisinau and Bessarabian Provincial Soviets on December 24 (January 6, 1918) created the Revolutionary Headquarters of the Soviet All-Republican Forces of the Bessarabian District, headed by E.M. Venediktov, to whom all Soviet detachments were subordinate[53] . On December 28 (January 10, 1918), Romanian and Ukrainian units captured Ungheni, massacring supporters of the Soviet regime. On December 29 (January 11), with the knowledge and permission of "Sfatul Tarii", 40 officers and 20 soldiers of the Romanian army arrived in the village of Lozovo, allegedly to buy food[54] . On the same day, "Sfatul Tarii" decided to invite the Romanians to restore order. However, information about this was leaked to the press and caused general discontent. Under these conditions, on January 1 (14), 1918, the Chisinau Soviet took power into its own hands, but Sfatul Tarii was not dispersed. During January 1918, Soviet power was established in the unoccupied regions of Bessarabia. On January 1 (14), 1918, the Front Department

issued Order No. 1, in which it ordered all authorities and institutions to strictly follow his orders, not to obey the orders of the Central Rada of the UNR, General Shcherbachev and other self-proclaimed bodies. All military and

the postal and telegraph front institutions Romanian was inside to evacuate Chisinau, and the front supply organs - to Bendery and go under the control of the Front Department. The detachments formed by the Front Department occupied the railway station and other important points in Chisinau. The military committees were tasked with restoring the army to protect "the cause of freedom ... under the authority of Soviet power." They were required to "take care of the termination of vacations, the suspension of the nationalization and demobilization of troops"[55] . Reporting on the political and military situation, the head of the Revolutionary Staff Venediktov suggested that the SNK of the RSFSR appeal "to the government of the Moldavian Republic so that it would refuse to send Romanian troops into Bessarabia." For its part, the Revolutionary Headquarters was ready, at the direction of the Council of People's Commissars [56] , to influence the Moldavian — .

government. January 6 (19) at about one in the morning. Upon learning of this, the Chisinau Soviet and the Front Department sent troops from the local garrison to the station. Trying to prevent the disarmament of the Transylvanians, the leaders of the MPR, Inkulets and Yerkhan, came to the station to persuade the soldiers of the Moldavian regiment to return to the barracks, arguing that the Transylvanians allegedly had no intention of fighting against the revolutionary organizations of Bessarabia, but were sent to the front. But the soldiers did not want to listen to them. After a small skirmish, the Transylvanians, having lost 5 people killed, were disarmed and arrested[57] .

Meanwhile, on January 4 (17), Romania decided to send troops to Bessarabia. On January 5 (18) Ukrainian, and on January 6 (19) Romanian troops crossed the river. Prut and began the occupation of Bessarabia. The Romanian troops sent to Bessarabia marched on Chisinau in three detachments. One of them was detained by the troops of the Front Department in Ungheni and driven out with heavy losses, while the other two moved to Chisinau and by the evening of January 6 (19) arrived at the Ghidighich station. The Romanian troops were met at Ghidighich and Kozhushna by Soviet detachments and at two o'clock in the morning on January 7 (20) retreated in disorder along the Strashensky highway, pursued by cavalry sent by the Front Department. Near the village of Trusheni, the Rom

turn onto the Ganchesht road, but, met here by the Soviet detachment, they turned to the Ghidighich station, and then retreated towards Ungen. On the same day, at the Korneshty station, the 4th echelon of the Romanian troops, who were accompanied by General Nekrasov, sent to Bessarabia as Shcherbachev's authorized representative in order for him to impress the Russian population with his presence, were surrounded by a railway battalion and partly taken prisoner, and partly retreated. The next day, Nekrasov and his adjutant were taken prisoner and shot by a local self-defense detachment and a detachment of soldiers from the Romanian Front.

The railway line from Chisinau to Straseni was dismantled in several places. On January 8 (21), a detachment of the 2nd railway region repairing it collided with an echelon of Romanian troops. During the heated battle, 40 Romanian soldiers were taken prisoner, and the rest retreated towards Ungheni. Captured Romanian soldiers said that they did not know where the command was sending them, "that they were caught, forcibly locked in wagons and sent away without explaining where and why" [58]. On the night of January 10 (23) in the south of Bessarabia, in Bolgrad, the Military Revolutionary Committee of the 6th Army managed to disarm the Romanian army that had arrived from Galati. As a result, ^[59]company the first Romanian invasion was repulsed, and Leovo, Reni, Vulcanesti and Cahul were liberated. After the first victories, the Front Department reported to Rumcherod that "the army is in order. There is no danger. The strength in Bessarabia is ours. The national-political organizations, without exception, recognized the Front Department as the supreme authority of the front. The front department sent an ultimatum and a protest to the Romanians about the introduction of troops and the liquidation of the —

headquarters. The Romanians are retreating"[61]. On January 6 (19), it became clear that the Sfatul Tarii leadership, which verbally declared that it was not involved in organizing the intervention, was in fact actively helping the Romanians. At a meeting of the presidiums of local Soviets and the Central Moldavian Military Executive Committee, when discussing the issue of intervention, it became known that three general directors of Sfatul Tarii traveled to Iasi to negotiate with the Romanian government on the entry of the Romanian army into Bessarabia. The audience condemned their actions and suggested that Incults and Yerkhan sign a telegram to Shcherbachev with a categorical demand for the withdrawal of Romanian troops from Bessarabia and an end to the intervention, to which they had to agree, fearing

accusations of complicity with the interventionists. A telegram was sent to the Romanian government and General Shcherbachev: "We are protesting against the entry of Romanian troops into the territory of the Moldavian Republic. We categorically demand that the sending of troops be suspended and that the troops that have already been brought in be immediately recalled. The introduction of Romanian troops into Bessarabia threatens with the horrors of civil war, which has already begun. Russian troops must be allowed

to pass without hindrance"[62] . The Front Department organized the defense of Chisinau. Military warehouses were opened, weapons from them were distributed to the population, from which Red Guard detachments were created. On the night of January 7 (20), Chisinau was declared under martial law and cordoned off by the troops of the Frontotdel, which outlawed Sfatul Tarii, directors, leaders of nationalist organizations and officers of the counter-revolutionary Moldavian regiments and decided to disperse Sfatul Tarii[63] . However, on the same day, with the help of the French military attache and the head of the Union of Land Owners of Bessarabia, the landowner P.V. Sinadino, the leaders of Sfatul Tsarii sent their envoys to Iasi asking for help. Some general directors also disappeared from the city[64] . Fearing arrests, the Sfatul Tsarii deputies, "hiding in the corners, watched the unfolding historical events from a safe distance"[65] . Appeal to the government of Romania on the introduction of troops into Bessarabia was in fact the business of private individuals. The trip to Iasi of these directors, their letters and telegrams about the entry of occupation troops into Bessarabia were necessary for the Romanian government in order to show in the face of Western European public opinion that the Romanian occupation troops had come to Bessarabia, allegedly at the call of the "legitimate" government. Accordingly, on January 12 (25), Romania notified the United States that, in agreement with the "government of the Moldavian Republic of Bessarabia and General Shcherbachev, and in order not to let the army die of hunger," Romanian troops occupied this region[66] . —

Convinced that it would not be possible to occupy Bessarabia with small forces, on January 7 (20), 1918, the Romanian command, with the consent of the representatives of the Entente, ordered the troops to cross the Prut River at several points and enter Bessarabia. The next day, the 11th Infantry Division under the command of General E. Broshtyanu crossed

Prut between Ungheni and Leovo, occupied Ungheni, Kainari, Poganesti and moved to Chisinau. The 13th Infantry Division was moving to the south of Bessarabia, through Cahul. Between them moved the 2nd Cavalry Division. At the same time, the 1st Cavalry Division under the command of General M. Skins moved to the north of Bessarabia. On January 12 (25), all these divisions were merged into the 6th Army Corps under the command of Divisional General G. Istrati[67]. On the way, the Romanian troops seized the railway facilities and food warehouses, dispersed the Soviets and peasant committees and shot their members, requisitioned food supplies from the peasants. All this caused the population to hate the occupiers and their local henchmen.

The reaction of the Bessarabian population to the events that took place is perfectly visible from the decision of the congress of peasant deputies of the Balti district. On January 14 (27), the congress adopted a resolution: "Taking into account that the regional body "Sfatul Tarii" did not include representatives of the entire working people, the majority of the composition of "Sfatul Tarii" consists of landowners pursuing a clearly imperialist policy, the Second Congress of Peasant Deputies of Balti county decided: 1. Not to recognize the authority of "Sfatul Tarii", which does not express

the will of the working people, and arrest the guilty members.

2. Recognize throughout the country the power of the Soviets, represented by the Council of People's Commissars, as a power that defends the interests of the entire working people.

3. Organize the power of the Soviets from the representatives of the peasants, soldiers and

workers. 4. Not to separate from Russia, but to go with her hand in hand with the entire Russian people, in order to eliminate all enemies of the people, whoever they may be.

5. Re-elect members of all organizations, from village and city committees to provincial organizations, inclusive, which oppose the working people.

6. Discussing all the danger threatening the revolution and the won freedoms, which comes from the invasion of the Romanians into the borders of the Russian Republic on the Bessarabian territory, send delegates to Petrograd ... with a request to help us in the defense of the country.

7. To ask the government of the People's Commissars to categorically protest before the Rumanian government against the gross interference of a foreign country in our internal affairs.

8. To oblige this congress to send people to the rest of the districts of Bessarabia to communicate our decisions with a request to join our resolution ... "The congress took up the

organization of defense against the invaders. It was decided to arm the peasants and create detachments of peasant youth, and for this, to issue weapons to the village committees for distribution among the population. In order to prevent the possibility of informing the Romanian command by hostile elements, the congress decided to turn off all the phones of the landowners and establish control over the telephone exchange[68] . Practically in all settlements of Bessarabia, self-defense detachments were created[69] .

Meanwhile, in Odessa, on January 7 (20), 1918, the plenum of the Central Executive Committee of Rumcherod decided "to consider itself in a state of war with Romania, to declare the mobilization of volunteer detachments and a transport flotilla in Odessa and Tiraspol, Kherson, Akkerman, Bendery and Odessa districts ... Accept measures for the internment of Romanian citizens and the sequestration of Romanian property"[70] . However, the next day, Rumcherod again discussed the issue of fighting the interventionists and, trying to resolve the conflict peacefully, decided to demand that the Romanian government withdraw its troops from Bessarabia. On January 10 (23), the CEC Rumcherod informed the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars that "Romanian troops invaded the Russian Republic, occupied the border points of Cahul and Leovo, made an attempt [to capture] Chisinau and some stations of the Bendero-Ungheni line. We entered into battle with our units. Thus, the Romanian government, without officially declaring war, began hostile military operations against the Russian Federative Republic. On the same day, a statement demanding "the immediate withdrawal of all troops from the boundaries of the Russian Federative Republic" and providing the Russian troops of the Romanian Front with an unhindered "exit in full armament and with all property from the borders of Romania, in accordance with the order of the Commander-in-Chief" was handed over to the Romanian consul, as well as to the British and French missions in Odessa [71] The next day, the Romanian consul informed Ru

the entry of Romanian troops into Bessarabia, and the consuls of the Entente countries announced that Russian-Romanian detachments were sent to Bessarabia to protect military depots[72] . It became clear that the invaders would have to fight. Without breaking off negotiations with the consuls, Rumcherod set about

organizing troops for the defense of Bessarabia. For their part, the Romanian interventionists also propagated the version that they came to Bessarabia to protect the food located here, allegedly purchased by Romania in Russia to supply the Romanian front. On January 12 (25), the commander of the Romanian army, General K. Prezan, issued a proclamation that his troops entered Bessarabia at the invitation of "Sfatul Tarii" in order to ensure the transportation of provisions to supply the Russian and Romanian troops on the Romanian front. The appeal stated that the rumors that the Romanian government wants to occupy Bessarabia, to take away the land from the peasants, and from the whole people - the political and national rights received as a result of the revolution, do not correspond to reality. "I declare to you publicly that the Romanian army wants nothing more than to establish order and the calm that it brings, to give you the opportunity to strengthen your autonomy and your freedoms, as you yourself decide. The Romanian army will not offend a single inhabitant ... of whatever nationality and whatever religion he may be. Immediately, after the establishment of order and tranquility, and as soon as there are guarantees that theft, robbery and murder will not resume, the Romanians will return to their home . And in the appeal of General Skina it was stated that the Romanian soldiers are carrying out "the mission of peace, aiming at liberty, equality and fraternity"[74] . On—

the same day in Chisinau, on behalf of the delegation that traveled to meet the Romanian troops, a message was published, according to which "the advancing Romanian-Ukrainian troops, according to the command, are aimed solely at protecting the railways necessary for the Russian, Romanian and Ukrainian troops standing on front, and the protection of warehouses and transports of provisions purchased within Bessarabia. The Romanians will not interfere in the internal affairs, and non-interference is guaranteed by France and other allies ... The issue of the entry of Romanian troops into Bessarabia is decided by Russian, Ukrainian and Romanian

command and allies. Rumors that someone called them are false. The Jassy Headquarters could not exist without the railroad, which has been occupied by the Bolsheviks for two weeks now, not letting anything through to the front. Here are the reasons for joining." The population was urged to calm down and surrender their weapons, everyone was guaranteed security, "but on the condition that there would be no action against the Romanians. Any speech will be severely punished . Of course, this was just a propaganda cover. As the Romanian Minister T. Ionescu later stated, "it was said that the troops entered Bessarabia to guard military depots. But the whole world knows that the troops sent to Bessarabia were sent to complete, when and as soon as possible, the final act of annexing Bessarabia. This is the truth . "[76]

On January 10 (23), Romanian troops approached Cahul and captured it, then massacring the city's defenders. On January 11–12 (24–25), after a short battle, the Romanians occupied Bolgrad. At this time, fighting broke out on the outskirts of Chisinau, where the Soviet detachments repelled the attacks of the Romanian troops moving from Straseni and Ganchest for three days. Help from the troops of the 6th Army did not come up, since the dispatch of units to Chisinau was disrupted by Shcherbachev's headquarters. As a result, on January 13 (26), Romanian troops occupied Chisinau, where the reprisal against the participants of the defense began. On the same day, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided: "1. All diplomatic relations with Romania are interrupted. The Romanian embassy and all agents of the Romanian government in general are sent abroad by the shortest route. 2. The gold fund of Romania stored in Moscow is declared inviolable for the Romanian oligarchy. The Soviet government assumes responsibility for the safety of this fund and will transfer it into the hands of the Rumanian people. 3. The former commander-in-chief of the Romanian Front, Shcherbachev, who rebelled against the revolution, is declared an enemy of the people and outlawed . On January 14 (27), 1918, General Broshteanu officially entered Chisinau and a Romanian military parade took place, which was cautiously greeted by the

population[78] . January 22 (February 4) "due to the fact that the Romanians fraudulently got into Russia, occupied Bessarabia, plundering villages and cities in it, in view of the fact that the Council of People's Commissars, having exhausted all possible means, interrupted all relations with Romania

Rumcheroda decided to consider himself in a state of war with Rumania"[79] . On January 24 (February 6), the troops of the Romanian Front and the Odessa District were ordered to "immediately provide armed resistance to the Romanian military detachments that entered Bessarabia, as well as in any other area, when the Romanian troops try to disarm the Soviet troops or seize military material and equipment" [80] . From the outgoing detachments and units of the Romanian Front and local volunteer detachments on the outskirts of Odessa, the formation of a Special Army (commander - P.S. Lazarev) began, which included separate units and detachments from the soldiers of the 4th and 6th armies: 5- th and 6th Zaamur horse regiments, 1st Dniester infantry regiment, cavalry detachment G.I. Kotovsky, three light batteries (12 guns), a howitzer division (11 guns), an armored detachment, a sapper battalion and small units. These troops were concentrated in the Tiraspol region, in Parkany, Grigoriopol, Dubossary and Slobodzeya there were small garrisons, and the banks of the Dniester were guarded by mounted patrols. South of Chebruchi (25 km south of Tiraspol) to the Black Sea, a detachment of the Army Committee of the 6th Army was deployed. In total, these troops numbered

about 5-6 thousand people (including 1500 bayonets and 1200 cavalry)[81] . Stubborn battles unfolded at Bendery. Soviet troops retreated to the city from near Chisinau, and detachments were formed from the local population. One of these detachments, near the village of Kainari, captured and disarmed a Romanian detachment of 844 people advancing from Reni. When on January 15 (28) the Romanians approached Bendery, on the hills, in the north-west of the city, they were met by self-defense units, which repelled their attacks for several days. Only on January 20 (February 2) the Romanians captured Bender, but the struggle for the city continued. Member of the defense of Bessarabia E.G. Vasilevsky later recalled: "We were forced to retreat to the left bank of the Dniester, where battles unfolded not only with the Romanian invaders, but also with local counter-revolution and banditry. Red Guard detachments from Odessa and Nikolaev began to arrive on the banks of the Dniester. Armed detachments were formed from local workers and peasants to defend the Soviet borders from the invasion of the Romanian boyars and Petliurism ... weapons were drawn

Bessarabia"[82] . The leadership of the Front Department, the Chisinau and Bendery Soviets gathered new forces to the Dniester.

January 23 (February 5) "Romanians began to cross the Dniester to our side. This was the reason that a shootout broke out between the Romanians and our troops. After a little pressure from our troops and with the help of our artillery [...] at 8 o'clock in the morning we managed to take the city of Bendery. The Romanians began to retreat at a rapid pace towards Chisinau" [83] . The partisan detachment of Kotovsky occupied the Bendery fortress. The population of the city also rose against the invaders. However, having brought up reinforcements, the Romanians again bombarded the city and began the assault. The shelling caused an explosion of the ammunition depot, and the shells flying from the explosions hit the echelon with chemical shells. Under these conditions, the Soviet troops left the city. Having captured Bender on January 25 (February 7), the Romanians crossed the bridges and occupied several villages on the left bank of the Dniester. In these battles in January 1918, the Romanian units lost 141 people (including 3 officers)[84] . In the city, the invaders committed robberies and cracked down on those who supported the Soviet troops. Stocks of grain were taken from Bendery and the surrounding villages to Romania[85] . An unstable balance was established at the front. The Romanian command was afraid of the Soviet offensive, and the Soviet command was afraid of the Romanian strike towards Odessa. Therefore, with the mediation of foreign consuls, the parties entered into negotiations and from 12.00 on January 26 (February 8) concluded a truce for 48 hours.

The most stubborn resistance to the Romanians was provided in the south of Bessarabia, where self-defense units were also created. On January 10 (23), 1918, at an emergency meeting of the Congress of Peasants' and Workers' Deputies of the Budzhak City Self-Governments, held in Akkerman, it was decided not to recognize the authority of Sfatul Tsarii and fight against the invaders who had invaded the territory of Bessarabia. Mobilization was carried out in the Akkerman district. By the evening of January 15 (28) a detachment of UNR troops entered Akkerman, but the next day, the Soviet units arrived in time and drove the Gaidamaks out of the city, pushing them back 30-40 miles[86] . Receiving reinforcements and ammunition from Odessa, Akkerman's defenders were able to hold out until the beginning of March 1918.

Disagreements in the Izmail Soviet led to the fact that the defense of the city was headed by the Union of Front-line Soldiers, numbering several hundred soldiers and sailors of the port. When on January 21 (February 3) the Romanians approached Ishmael, they were met with cannon and rifle fire. The resistance of the defenders of the city was stubborn. But the invaders began to pull ships to the Kiliya mouth of the Danube to Izmail and began shelling the city from the side of the river. For four days there were battles near Izmail and in the city, only on January 24 (February 6) the Romanians managed to capture the city. Breaking into the city, the invaders massacred those of its defenders who did not have time or did not want [to leave](#)^[87]. The defenders of Ishmael retreated down the Danube to Kiliya, where self-defense units were also created. Romanian sailors provided assistance to the local population in the defense of the city. Organized by a revolutionary committee headed by G. Stroiï, on January 14–15 (27–28) Romanian soldiers and workers seized the military and civilian ships of the Romanian fleet that were here, raised red banners on them and helped defend the city for 10 days. January 25 (February 7), after

the city was captured by the invaders, its defenders went to Odessa. A strong rebuff was given to the invaders near Vilkov on the Kiliya branch of the Danube. On the evening of January 26 (February 8), the messenger ships of the Danube Flotilla, who were on patrol, fired at the Romanian posts in the town of Periprava. The next day, the Romanian monitors of the 2nd Naval Division fired on the city and the roadstead, on which there were transport ships. The gunboat "K-15" returned fire and held back the onslaught of the enemy for an hour. During this time, auxiliary vessels left the raid, and other gunboats took positions advantageous for firing. The fire of the Soviet ships damaged one Romanian monitor and shot down a coastal correction point, the rest of the enemy ships retreated up the Danube. On January 27-28 (February 9-10), two Russian gunboats provided artillery support to the local self-defense detachment in Zhebriany. On January 30 (February 12), a detachment of 200 Baltic sailors arrived in Vilkovo, headed by a member of the Supreme Russian-Romanian Collegium for Romanian and Bessarabian affairs, military commander A.G. Zheleznyakov. The next day, troops landed on one of the islands

ships and allowed the evacuation of Vilkov to begin in an organized manner. On February 15, the Romanian units captured Vilkovo, and the Detachment of the Danube River Forces began to move to Nikolaev and Kherson. Due to the impossibility of evacuation on the Danube, submarine No. 3, the Odessa river minelayer, the Yulia minesweeper, 8 river gunboats, a messenger ship and a number of auxiliary ships —

were left[88] . In the north of Bessarabia, on January 22 (February 4), units of the 1st Romanian Cavalry Division were fired upon on the outskirts of Falesti, and General Skina, who was driving a car with his adjutant, was taken prisoner by a self-defense detachment of the village of Obrezha. The prisoners were going to be sent to Balti, but the approaching Romanian cavalrymen freed their commander. At 15 o'clock on the same day, the Romanian detachments were fired upon by machine-gun and artillery fire 2 versts south of the city of Balti, which forced them to retreat. Enemy horse patrols that broke into the city along another road were partially destroyed, and partially retreated. Only by 3 p.m. on January 23 (February 5), after a fierce battle in the city, the Romanians occupied Balti, where arrests and executions of "unreliable" elements began[89] . On January 24 (February 6), a Romanian detachment entered Soroca, engaged in the requisition of food. On January 30 (February 12), Yampol was occupied by the Polish legion stationed in the area, which provided support to the Romanians[90] . In mid-February 1918, the division of General Skina moved along the railway to Edinet and Ocnita. The detachments defending here, created from the troops of the 8th Russian Army and due to the mobilization of local volunteers, were forced to gradually retreat to the northeast to the Dniester [91] of the Austro-German intervention in Ukraine, the — . After the start troops of the 8th Army, in which demobilization moods prevailed, began to be assigned to Yekaterinoslav. With the entry of the Romanian troops into Bessarabia, the leadership of

Sfatul Tarii felt out of danger. On January 24 (February 6), a declaration was adopted, according to which the MPR was declared "from now on and forever independent", since the UNR declared independence, cutting off Bessarabia from Russia. "Sfatul Tsarii" was declared the supreme body of the country, and the government - the Council of Ministers - was created by him. It was again announced about the speedy convocation of the People's Assembly and the solution of the agrarian question. According to the declaration,

With the arrival of fraternal Romanian troops on the territory of our republic, a situation has been created in the country that is conducive to peaceful construction in all areas. The Rumanian troops have as their sole purpose the protection of the railroads and grain supplies for the front. The Romanian troops on the territory of the Moldavian Republic have no other purpose. All the rumors that they came to conquer our country and to establish their control here are not true ... "The guarantee of this" is the guarantee of France, in agreement with England and America, as well as the statement of the representatives of Romania "[92]. However, the MPR remained an unrecognized state. By the

beginning of February 1918, Romanian troops occupied the major cities and railway stations of Bessarabia. The central regions of the region were occupied by the 1st cavalry (headquarters - Balti) and 11th infantry (headquarters - Chisinau) divisions, and the southern regions - by the 2nd cavalry (headquarters - Cimislia) and 13th infantry (headquarters - Bolgrad) divisions [93]. However, in rural areas, the Romanian presence was insignificant, and no one recognized their authority. This situation was reflected in the III Bessarabian provincial peasant congress, which opened in Chisinau on January 18 (31). The Sfatul Tarii leadership hoped to subordinate the congress to their influence and achieve the adoption of a resolution approving the introduction of Romanian troops. However, the congress spoke out against the intervention and condemned the actions of Sfatul Tarii. The elected presidium, on behalf of the congress, addressed the representatives of the Entente countries in Iasi with a protest against the Romanian occupation. Upon learning of this, the Romanian command on January 22 (February 4) broke up the congress, arresting and shooting 45 delega

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In the meantime, the situation in Ukraine changed and at the peace talks that began on December 9 (22), 1917 in Brest-Litovsk, during which it became clear that no one was interested in general declarations on the rejection of annexations and [95] indemnities. The delegation of the Quadruple Union insisted on the transfer of 150 thousand square meters. km of Russian western lands. Such an openly annexationist program forced the Soviet government to play for time. At the request of the delegation of the Quadruple Union on December 28 (January 10, 1918), representatives of the UNR were admitted to the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. On December 20, 1917 (January 2, 1918), the Council of People's Commissars suggested that the Central Rada begin negotiations on the settlement of relations, which never took place, since Germany decided to play on the contradictions between Petrograd and Kyiv. On January 11 (24), 1918, the UHP declared its independence, which was immediately recognized by Germany. As a result, on January 27 (February 9), a UNR peace treaty was signed with the countries of the Quadruple Union, according to which Kiev received the Kholm region and was supposed to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary in the first half of 1918 with 60 million poods of bread, 2,750 thousand poods of meat, 400 million eggs and other agricultural products and industrial raw materials. Having concluded an agreement with the UNR, Germany in the evening of the same day put forward an ultimatum on the signing of the

proposed peace treaty by the Soviet delegation. In response, at the evening meeting on January 28 (February 10), the head of the delegation, L.D. Trotsky said that Russia was ending the war, but would not sign peace, and would demobilize the army. At first, the impression was that the countries of the Quadruple Alliance would tacitly agree with this Soviet formula. The Soviet delegation reached Brest-Litovsk, and the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief ordered the demobilization of the army. However, the expansion of the Civil War in Ukraine and the failure of the UNR troops led the Central Rada on January 30 (February 12) to turn to Germany for support. Under these conditions, on February 18, the German troops resumed the offensive along the entire front [96] On February 24-28, the Austro-Hungarian troops also went on the offensive, occupying Novoselitsa and Khotyn on the same day. They soon occupied the Ocnita station, where they made c

concluded between the Romanian and Austro-German command, the northern part of Bessarabia (Khotinsky and part of Soroca districts) was occupied by Austro-German troops. Accordingly, General Skina received an order not to occupy this territory and leave the Chernivtsi-Novoselytsya-Oknitsa-Mogilev-Podolsky railway at the disposal of the Austro-German army. Through the north of Bessarabia, the troops of the 25th Army Corps of the Austro-German troops moved to Kiev, through the central regions to Rybnitsa, Birzulu and Odessa - the 27th Austro-Hungarian Corps, and through Bender to Odessa - the 52nd German Army Corps. As a result, on March 3, 1918, the Soviet

government had to sign a peace treaty in Brest-Litovsk, proposed to it by the countries of the Quadruple Union. According to the agreement, the RSFSR recognized the independence of Finland and the UPR and had to withdraw its troops from their territory, as well as from Estonia and Livonia. The western border of Soviet Russia was established along the line Riga - Dvinsk - Druya - Drysvyaty - Mikhalishki - Dzevinishki - Dokudova - r. Neman - r. Zelvyanka - Pruzhany - Vidoml[97]. The Entente did not recognize this treaty, and on March 6, 1918, British troops landed in Murmansk. By March 3, the German-Austrian troops in Ukraine advanced to the Kamenetz-Podolsk-Vinnitsa-Cherkasy-Kyiv line and continued the offensive.

While the Romanian troops continued to seize Bessarabia, Romania negotiated peace with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. Having an army of almost 700,000, consisting of 15 infantry, 2 cavalry and 4 reserve divisions, on January 15 (28), 1918, Romania informed the Entente countries about the possibility of concluding a separate peace. Naturally, the allies on January 20 (February 2) notified her of their confidence that Romania would continue to fight the common enemy. On January 25 (February 7), the commander of the German-Austrian troops, Field Marshal A. Mackensen, demanded that the Romanian government announce its readiness to enter into peace negotiations within four days. In Iasi, on January 26 (February 8), the government of General A. Averescu was created, and on February 1 (14) peace negotiations began in Bucharest. On February 18, during a personal meeting with Mackensen, Averescu received assurances that nothing threatened the Romanian king, and Romania would be able to maintain its troops in E

At the same time, the preliminary conditions for peace negotiations were handed over to the Romanian side: 1. Not to resume wars with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance; 2. Dismiss the Entente officers from the Romanian army and accept a German liaison officer in the Romanian General Staff; 3. Support the export of agricultural products from Ukraine; 4. "The entire Romanian army gets a free hand for operations against the Bolsheviks or against the Petrograd government until the latter signs peace with the Central Powers and Romania. It will be supported, if it becomes necessary from a military point of view, by units of the allied governments .

On February 24, the first official meeting of the delegations of the parties took place. Trying to achieve a softening of the terms of the agreement, the Romanian side referred to the fact that "the historical vocation of the Romanian people is and will be to remain a natural rampart between the Carpathians and the mouths of the Danube against the Slavs"[99]. In addition, the Romanians pointed out that Bessarabia cannot be compensation for Dobruja, since Romania is deprived of access to the sea. But such statements, of course, did not affect the position of the delegation of the Quadruple Alliance, which demanded that King Ferdinand appoint the pro-German A. Margiloman as prime minister of the Iasian government. However, while the Romanian leadership was deciding what to do next, the term of the German ultimatum expired, and on February 28 the German command announced the termination of the truce. True, it agreed to extend it for a day if Romania agreed to the immediate demobilization of 8 of its divisions and to the passage of German-Austrian troops

through Moldavia and Bessarabia to Ukraine. In response, the Romanian side on March 1 announced its consent to negotiations on the basis of mutual concessions, but the German side put forward a new ultimatum, demanding that Romania unconditionally accept all the conditions of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance by 12:00 on March 2. Otherwise, hostilities will be resumed. Since a positive Romanian response was received later than the specified time, the German side on March 3 announced the resumption of hostilities, but, taking into account the consent of Romania already received, the countries of the Quadruple Alliance demanded to sign a preliminary agreement

final treaty on the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. As a result, on March 5, 1918, in Buft near Bucharest, a preliminary agreement was signed between Romania and the countries of the Quadruple Union, according to which:

1. Romania ceded Dobruja to the Quadruple Union.
2. The powers of the Quadruple Alliance pledged to provide Romania with a trade outlet to the Black Sea through Constanta.
3. Romania generally agreed to the Austro-Hungarian demands for the correction of the Austro-Hungarian-Romanian border.
4. Romania recognized the economic requirements.
5. Romania undertook to immediately demobilize 8 divisions and entrust the demobilization to the Romanian and German commands. The rest of the Romanian army was subject to demobilization after the restoration of the Russo-Romanian peace.
6. Romania agreed to the immediate withdrawal of its troops from Austro-Hungarian territory.
7. The Romanian government undertook to support with all its might the transportation of troops of the powers of the Quadruple Alliance through Moldavia and Bessarabia to Odessa.
8. Romania undertook to dismiss all Entente officers who were in the

Romanian service. 9. The treaty entered into force immediately. No later than 14 days Romania is obliged to conclude a final peace treaty[100].

In the meantime, the successful advance of Soviet troops in Ukraine, the formation in Odessa of the Supreme Collegium for Combating the Romanian and Bessarabian Counter-Revolution, in whose hands the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR concentrated all foreign policy issues of the Odessa region, and the arrival in Odessa of H.G. Rakovsky "with the task of driving the Romanian counter-revolutionary forces from Bessarabia and causing a revolutionary movement in Romania" [101] led to the fact that on February 15 negotiations with the Romanians were interrupted. The Romanian side was presented with an ultimatum on the immediate evacuation of the Romanian troops from Bessarabia, on the extradition of all the Russian military property captured by them, on the dispersal of Russian and other national counter-revolutionary detachments, on the extradition of General Shcherbachev, on the punishment of those responsible for the murders and executions of Russian military personnel. Otherwise, the document stated, hostilities would be opened "to protect the Russian revolution"[102].

On February 16 hostilities resumed. However, the attempt of the Red Black Sea-Danube flotilla to break into the mouth of the Danube near Vilkovo, as well as the attempt of the Soviet troops to capture Bendery, ended in failure[103]. The Romanian attempt to bypass Tiraspol from the south led to battles at Karkmaza and Palenque. On February 17, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR transferred the Northern Army of M.A. to the Supreme Collegium for Combating the Romanian and Bessarabian Counterrevolution. — Muravyov, [104] which was transferred from Kiev to Odessa by rail. On February 19, Muravyov assumed "high command over the revolutionary troops operating against Romania", deciding to attack Iasi from three directions: from Mogilev-Podolsky, from Rybnitsa and from Bendery. On February 20, by order of the Soviet command of the Romanian Front, the left bank of the Dniester to the line Tashlyk - Veseli Kut, Razdelnaya - Odessa, as well as the Bendery and Akkerman counties of Bessarabia were declared under martial law. On February 21, all Soviet troops located on the territory from Galati to Sevastopol were united into the 3rd — .

revolutionary army under the command of P.S. Lazarev [105] On February 26, between Rybnitsa and Slobodka, the troops of P.V. Yegorova collided with the Romanian detachment, which crossed the Dniester, and defeated it with a combined blow. On February 28, "in the Rybnitsa direction, the revolutionary troops occupied the right bank of the Dniester with a dashing blow, overturned the Romanian [occupiers] and advanced 15 versts; captured 18 active guns, a large number [27] of machine guns"—and liberated Rezina, Soldanesti and other villages[106]. However, the occupation of Zhmerinka on March 3 by Austro-Hungarian and Ukrainian troops forced the Soviet troops to retreat across the Dniester. In the south of Bessarabia, an attempt by the Romanians to force the Dniester on March 1 near the village of Troitsky was repulsed with the help of the local population, but the Soviet units also retreated beyond the Dniester, leaving Akkerman on March 8[107]. The total losses of the —

Romanian troops during the hostilities in January-March 1918 amounted to 488 people (killed - 25, wounded - 312, missing - 151) [108]. The difficult position of Romania in negotiations with the countries of the Quadruple Union, the failures of the Romanian army on the Dniester

representatives. In addition, the Soviet authorities in Odessa arrested Romanian political and military figures who were in the city, whom the Romanian government sought to return to Romania. For their part, the Soviet representatives, who believed that "circumstances were favorable for us: the revolutionary ferment in Romania, the general indignation of the Bessarabian population, especially the peasants, against the Romanian occupation, the unwillingness of the Romanian soldiers to fight and the small number of Romanian forces in Bessarabia", were forced from -for the "catastrophic situation as a result of the Austro-German-Ukrainian offensive" also agree to negotiations[109] . Under these conditions, the diplomatic representatives of

the Entente in Iasi on February 21 instructed the Italian envoy in Romania, C. Fasciotti, to send the Soviet government an official note on their behalf, which stated that the intervention in Bessarabia "represents a military operation without any political character, undertaken, undoubtedly, with humanitarian goal is to guarantee the supply of provisions to the Russian and Romanian troops and the civilian population "[110] and suggested that the Romanian command and the Soviet authorities begin negotiations in Odessa with their mediation. On February 24, the Council of People's Commissars of the Odessa region informed the representatives

of the military allied missions in Odessa of their conditions:

1. The Romanian government will make a formal statement that the Romanian army will clear Bessarabia, and first of all Bendery and Zhebriany; that the occupying Romanian army will be reduced to 10,000 men within two months, who will guard the Romanian warehouses and railway lines; that the police protection in the cities and towns will pass into the hands of the local militia; that as the Romanian troops were evacuated, "Russian military forces" would take their place; that the Romanian command will renounce any interference in the internal political life of Bessarabia and will not make arrests and perform the functions belonging to the local elected authorities. "Romania undertakes not to take military or other hostile actions and not to support them in relation to the Russian Federation of Soviets."

2. The entire balance of products in Bessarabia, after satisfying the needs of the local population and Russian military units, will be destined exclusively for Romania.

3. A commission will be formed from representatives of Russia, Rumania, France, England and the United States to resolve all disputes between Russians and Romanians. In the event that the Romanian army retreats to Russian territory, "it will find shelter and food there." If parallel actions begin against the Quadruple Alliance, then "direct contact will be established between the Higher Military Command of the Russian Soviet Army and the Romanian Command"[111] .

The Romanian side generally accepted this Soviet proposal, but made some changes to it. The wishes of the Romanian government were as follows:

1. All articles of the above proposal are accepted, except for the condition placed in article 1, requiring the immediate evacuation of Bendery.

2. The

Romanian government proposed to make a complete exchange of "all Russian prisoners in Romania for Romanians in Russia", and to release all Russians interned in Romania, and Romanians in Russia. 3. The proposal to

create an international commission was accepted, but Russians and Romanians were excluded from it. The commissions were to operate in Odessa, Kyiv, Moscow, Petrograd, Iasi and Galati. 4. The Romanian

government demanded the return of all funds and food taken from the inter-allied purchasing commissions in Russia, and the direction of food to Romania. It also sought permission for the allied purchasing commissions to continue in Russia the purchase of food for the Romanian population, which could not be purchased in Bessarabia[112] . The Soviet side agreed with these proposals, and on March 5,

1918, the following declaration was signed in Odessa: "The conditions of the Government of Romania, introducing some changes to our peace proposals, have been accepted. From the moment the Romanian Government confirms the receipt of this document, we will consider that peace between Russia and Romania has been restored . Together with

Soviet representatives signed the declaration, acting as an intermediary, Colonel of the Canadian Army D.V. Boyle, who, together with Captain Hill, on behalf of the Romanian ambassador in Petrograd, was able in November 1917 to take part of the Romanian gold [fund from Moscow to Iasi](#) [114] . In addition, on the same day, a protocol was signed: "The Supreme Autonomous Board, Rumcherod, the Council of People's Commissars of the Odessa Region, the Executive Committee of Soviets declare that they consider the military conflict between Russia and Romania settled on the basis of the conditions proposed by us in our response of February 24 1918, and on the basis of changes made by the Romanian Government, according to a declaration signed by Gen. Averescu - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian Kingdom. At the same time, we take note of the declaration of Mr. Colonel Boyle that the exchange of Russian prisoners for Romanian ones extends to all prisoners without exception, by virtue of which

we sign the present protocol "[115] . On the same day, the Romanian government in Iasi signed the "Agreement between the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and Romania", which committed itself to "cleanse Bessarabia within two months" and contained all the conditions indicated above. On March 8, the agreement was transferred to the Soviet side through intermediaries,

~~and~~ on March 9, the Soviet representatives also signed [116] . According to Averescu's telegram of March 8, "His Romanian Government takes into account the collective declaration of the Supreme Autonomous Board, Rumcherod, the Council of People's Commissars of the Odessa Region, the Executive Committee of Soviets and the High Command of the Revolutionary Army of the South Russian Front of March 5, 1918 [...] and considers that the conflict has been settled as of today"[117] . Accordingly, on March 12, Soviet troops on the Dniester —

received an order to stop hostilities and wait for the departure of the Romanian troops from Bessarabia[118] . The treaty was of great importance for Soviet Russia, as it was the second international act after the Brest-Litovsk treaty in which it was recognized as a sovereign power, and the first treaty with a country that was part of the Entente. Explaining his decision to sign an agreement with the RSFSR, Aver

has not disappeared, and she will recover. We, a small power, should not take advantage of this state of paralysis in which neighbor"[119] . However, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Arion, Averescu was simply afraid of Russia, but she "will not be reborn again", and the Bolsheviks should not be afraid[120] .

The capture of Ukraine by the German-Austrian troops created an advantage on the side of the Romanian interventionists in Bessarabia. The occupation of the left bank of the Dniester by the German-Austrian troops and the occupation of Odessa on March 14-15, 1918 cut off Bessarabia from the RSFSR. Soviet troops, Red Guard and partisan detachments were forced to retreat[121] . Under these conditions, Romania was not going to fulfill the agreement concluded on March 5–9, 1918, but took further steps to secure this region for itself. Of the entire Soviet-Romanian treaty, only the clause on the exchange of prisoners and internees was fulfilled. On March 19-24, 1918, in Sulina, 92 Romanian senators, members of parliament and an officer were exchanged for 73 officers and soldiers of the Russian army from the Romanian camps. As I. Kondurushkin, the former elected commander of the 4th Army, later recalled, "it was enough to look at the Romanian senators brought from Russia during our exchange in Sulina: round rich muzzles, top hats, canes, shirt-fronts, mountains of luggage, and compare us with them: dirty, ragged, shoddy, overgrown with hair, ripped off to the last extra pair of soldier's footcloths, three months without a bath or fresh linen to say: "What beasts are the Bolsheviks and what enlightened Europeans are the Romanian boys!"[122]

Annexation of Bessarabia and Treaty of Bucharest

In the meantime, peace talks between Romania and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance resumed on 6 March. On March 9, the Romanian delegation was presented with a list of demands from the countries of the Quadruple Union. In order to make the Romanians more accommodating, they were promised support in the annexation of Bessarabia. "We are ready to provide our diplomatic support to Romania in order to obtain Bessarabia, and in this case, Romania will be able to gain much more than to lose," Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister O. Chernin said on February 27 to the Romanian King Ferdinand. Horstman, a representative of the Austro-Hungarian headquarters, told Margiloman the same thing during the negotiations: "We will help, if necessary, even with troops, so that you capture Bessarabia. You fight the Bolsheviks in Bessarabia, and we will fight them in the —

Ukraine. We have the same interests." [123] . For agreeing to the annexation of Bessarabia by Romania, the German command demanded the voluntary transfer of all Romanian artillery to Germany. In a conversation with German diplomats on March 29, 1918, Margiloman "said to Yuolman: now give us freedom of action in Bessarabia. He replied, smiling, with a wave of his hand, meaning: I have nothing against it. I suggested to Chernin that our destroyers located on the Danube be placed at the disposal of Admiral Hoffmann, who asked them for mutual action at Ochakov against the Bolsheviks. Chernin was delighted with this proposal . When discussing the issue of the occupation of Bessarabia, an agreement was reached that the Khotinsky district would remain occupied not by the Romanian, but by the Austrian troops and that the Austro-German procurement authorities would be able to seize grain from the peasants of that part of Bessarabia that was

occupied by Romania. Thus, during the negotiations, it became clear that Germany and its allies would not object to the seizure of Bessarabia by Romania. Under these conditions, the Romanian leadership decided, even before concluding an agreement with the countries of the Quadruple Union, to make the accession of Bessarabia to Roman

that the representatives of the Entente countries are also supporters of the accession of Bessarabia to Romania, the Romanian government decided to expedite the formal resolution of this issue.

For its part, the leadership of the MPR in mid-March found out the favorable attitude of the representatives of the Entente to the planned annexation of Bessarabia to Romania. The conversation of the President of the MPR, Incults, with the French representative in Iasi, Saint-Oler, on March 15 showed that there would be no objections from the Western allies of Romania. "He questioned me for a long time about Russia," Inkulets wrote, "and I expressed to him my following point of view: the allies could greatly help the formation of small states, like Ukraine, Georgia, Poland, states that would always be grateful to France." As for Bessarabia, Sainte-Oler considered it necessary that it become part of Romania: "Join as soon as possible"[125]. On April 2, the President and Prime Minister of the—

MPR, who visited Iasi, were informed that, with the consent of the Quadruple Alliance and the Entente, Romania was going to annex Bessarabia. On April 5, they were given a specific plan of "conditional accession", which was supposed to be turned into a transitional step towards the proclamation of the final accession of Bessarabia to Romania. Both senior officials of the MPR approved this intention and went to Chisinau to prepare the corresponding decision of the "Sfatul Tarii", in which only 86 deputies were ready to vote "correctly". Margiloman, who arrived in Chisinau on April 8, ordered a meeting of Sfatul Tarii to be held on April 9 to vote for the accession of Bessarabia to Romania[126]. The Romanian leadership believed that the "voluntary" accession of Bessarabia to Romania would—remove the problem of fulfilling the agreement with [the RSFSR\[127\]](#).

As General Skina later recalled, "according to a pre-designed program, the meeting of "Sfatul Tsarii" was to begin at 11 and end by one in the afternoon: after the vote, Prime Minister Margiloman should be received at a solemn meeting and read the message of the king. But hour after hour passed, anxiety begins to seize the head of government and those accompanying him ... Finally, they inform that you need to be patient, because the discussion

quite hot, but senseless character. In the end, after seven hours of waiting, the head of government is invited to the Sfatul Tsarii meeting room... We cannot forget the painful impression that we had from the official accession ceremony on March 27 [April 9], 1918"[128] . The declaration on ~~the~~

accession of Bessarabia to Romania provoked a protest from many members of Sfatul Tarii. The peasant faction, which for the most part consisted of Moldovans, refused to vote for this declaration. She stated that the peasants did not want to secede from Russia, that Sfatul Tarii did not have the authority to resolve this issue, and that only the question of allied relations with Romania could be discussed at this meeting. The issue of accession could be decided by the Constituent Assembly or a national referendum [129] . Deputies representing other nationalities also opposed the annexation of Bessarabia to Romania. The MP, speaking on behalf of the Bulgarians, stated that the Bessarabian Bulgarians and Gagauz also believe that Sfatul Tsarii is not competent to decide this issue and that the Bulgarian and Gagauz

MPs will not vote for accession. But the Sfatul Tarii leadership and supporters of unification with Romania answered these statements that they were in vain, since Romania would turn Bessarabia into its province anyway, and, trying to intimidate the peasant faction, they said that if the Bessarabian peasantry refused to support the Romanians' claims to Bessarabia , then they will enter into an open alliance with the Bessarabian landowners, and in this case the situation of the Bessarabian peasants will worsen. Deception and the threat of armed reprisals in case of protest, and at the same time demagogic promises of agrarian reform in case of support for the claims of the occupiers, forced the majority of Sfatul Tarii members who were against joining to abstain from voting. As the well-known Romanianizer of Bessarabia O. Gibu later admitted, "apart from a small number of deputies, no ~~one~~

even thought about separating their province from Russia and joining it to Romania"[130] . The means of influencing the deputies was also the announcement of an oral roll call, despite the demands

army, the building "Sfatul Tsarii" was cordoned off by troops. But even in such conditions, 86 deputies (53%) voted for accession, 3 voted "against", 38 abstained, and 35 left the hall and did not vote[131] . As a result, on April 9, 1918, the declaration "Sfatul Tarii" was adopted, according to which "the Moldavian Democratic Republic (Bessarabia) within its borders between the Prut, Dniester, Danube, Black Sea and the old borders with Austria, torn off by Russia from old Moldavia one hundred and superfluous years ago, now by virtue of historical rights, c. By virtue of brotherhood by blood and nationality, and on the basis of the principle of self-determination of peoples, from now on and forever unites with its motherland Romania" while maintaining autonomy[132] .

Speaking on April 10 at a meeting of the peasant faction, deputy Kokirle said: "We, gentlemen, traitors to peasant interests, have not justified the bright hopes that the peasantry has placed on us! What shall we say to our fathers and brothers? How can we look them in the eyes? After all, there can be no question of land and will!! All the holy conquests of the great Russian Revolution were buried, if not forever, then for a long time. As for myself, I will say that I greatly regret my act!" Then deputy Savchuk spoke: "I, gentlemen, have never spoken in our faction, and now I cannot keep silent: when I learned that the parliament voted for a union with Romania, then all those people who gave their best years appeared before my eyes in the service of the Revolution; I imagined their corpses rotting in Siberia. I hear their reproach that we so easily gave up all those great conquests for which they

sacrificed their lives . "—

On April 10, in a letter to Incults, the Romanian king Ferdinand wrote: "A wonderful dream has come true. I thank the Lord God from the bottom of my heart for the fact that in such difficult days I had a chance to experience the joy of the return of the Bessarabians to their motherland. I am sincerely grateful to you and Sfatul Tarii, whose patriotic efforts contributed to this success." On April 22, a royal decree confirmed the decision to unite Bessarabia with Romania, and the "distinguished" Inculets and Chuguryanu received ministerial positions without portfolios in the Romanian [134] government

Upon learning of the Sfatul Tarii decision, the Soviet leadership announced on April 12 that "the attempt of the Romanian oligarchy to annex Bessarabia is ... not only a brazen violation of a solemn contractual obligation, but also a violation of the will of the entire population of Bessarabia"[135]. On April 18, in a note to the Romanian government, Moscow pointed out that Margiloman's statement on the annexation of Bessarabia to Romania "is not only a challenge to the Russian Federative Soviet Republic, but also a flagrant violation of the agreement concluded by your predecessor with Russia on the cleansing of Bessarabia within 2 months." This decision is devoid of "any international legal force whatsoever. Forced accession to Romania does not destroy the unity and solidarity of the working masses of Bessarabia and

Russia"[136]. But the UNR also laid claim to Bessarabia. As early as July 18, 1917, Kiev declared that "Ukraine stretches from the Carpathians to the Caucasus and that Bessarabia is its integral part"[137]. On April 20, 1918, the UNR government protested against the annexation of Bessarabia to Romania, and on May 11 broke off diplomatic relations with it and imposed economic sanctions on the Dniester, lifted only after Romania turned to Germany. In the summer of 1919, the government of Romania, despite the proposals of the Entente to support Denikin's army, preferred to assist the UNR, since it was interested in the existence of a buffer state between Bessarabia and Russia, which would prevent the reunification of the region with Russia under any regime in the latter. In exchange for the promised support of Bucharest in the supply of weapons and ammunition, the Petliura government of the UNR on July 26, 1919 recognized

Bessarabia as part of Romania[138]. Meanwhile, on May 7, 1918, the Margiloman government signed a peace treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, which consolidated the regime of colonial exploitation of Romania and turned it from a sovereign state into a dependent country. According to this treaty, Romania lost Dobruja, the southern part of which, with a small increment, went to Bulgaria, and the rest passed into the joint possession of the powers of the Quadruple Alliance. The port of Constanta and the Constanta-Cernavoda railway line fell into German hands. Romania transfe

6 thousand sq. km of Austria-Hungary. In total, Romania lost almost 30 thousand square meters. km of territory, and received Bessarabia (44.5 thousand sq. km). The treaty provided that the European Commission for the Administration of the Danube Mouths, set up at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, would be replaced by a new commission in which Germany, Austria-Hungary and their allies were to take precedence. Customs policy and trade along the Danube were to depend on the powers of the Quadruple Alliance. Each country included, according to this agreement, in the new Danube

Commission, received the right to keep two warships in Galati and Braila. According to the plans of the German command, Romania to the river. Seret was supposed to be under the control of the German occupation forces. On the territory from Seret to the Dniester, the German command deployed the Romanian army, which was supposed to have German officers with it. After the ratification of the treaty, during additional negotiations, the term for the evacuation of the occupying troops will be determined, the number of which was determined at 6 divisions and "economic formations" maintained at the expense of Romania. According to the agreement, the Romanian army was limited to 20 thousand people in infantry, 9 thousand in artillery and 3.2 thousand in cavalry, reduced to 8 divisions. All other heavy weapons and machine guns were handed over to warehouses in the occupied territory, but under Romanian protection. In addition, 2 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions and several battalions of chasseurs operating in Bessarabia remained "as part of the wartime [states] until, as a result of the military operations carried out by the allied — powers in Ukraine, the borders of Romania will no longer be in danger"[139] . In fact, their number was not regulated in any way,

which allowed the Romanian command to keep almost 200 thousand people in the army. Romania was obliged to transfer to the hands of Austria-Hungary and Germany, in ownership or lease for 90 years, places along the banks of the Danube, suitable for the construction of commodity and coal warehouses, shops, loading facilities, repair shops and railway lines. The countries of the Quadruple Union leased the oil fields of Romania for 90 years. At the same time, the monopoly on the trade in Romanian oil and oil products passed in

transferred to Austria-Hungary on a long-term lease for a meager fee. At the same time, Austria-Hungary was allowed to have a railway on the territory of Romania from the border to Turnu Severin. Similar enterprises in Dobruja were transferred to Germany under the same conditions. Romania had to pay for all requisition bonds issued by the powers of the Quadruple Alliance in the occupied Romanian territory for the entire duration of the war (in the amount of 1,300 million lei).

The total amount of indemnity that Romania had to pay exceeded 5 billion lei. The forests and timber industry of Rumania fell into the hands of the German monopolies. The treaty turned Romania into an agrarian appendage of Germany. Until 1926, Romania had to supply all its agricultural products only to Germany at predetermined low prices. The Romanian government was told that all Romanian grain reserves were passing into the hands of the Germans, and Romania could be supplied from Bessarabia. "The acquisition of Bessarabia returns you 10 times more than what you lose," said the head of the German delegation, R. Kulman, to Margiloman[140]. The occupied Romanian territory became the object of open robbery. In total, —

during the occupation period, 2,161,905 tons of food and fodder, 83,000 horses, 220,500 cattle, 317,000 pigs, 1,483,000 sheep, 41,000 goats, 1,450 donkeys and mules, 1,140,809 tons of oil, 57,475 tons of iron and metals, 93,945 [141] tons of salt, 201,153 tons of timber. Although the Peace of Bucharest was approved on June 28 by the Chamber of Deputies, and on July 4 by the Romanian Senate, it never entered into force, since it was ~~not~~ signed by the king. This, however, did not prevent the Romanian authorities from compensating their losses at the expense of Bessarabia. Only during the first two months of occupation in Bessarabia, about 25 thousand people died[142]. On July 1, 1918, a

state of siege was introduced in the region, and on August 4, it was ordered to introduce the ~~Romanian~~ [language for signboards and posters](#)[143]. Even the Romanianophile N.A. Alexandri believed that "throughout the ~~country~~, a groan stands from end to end: lawlessness, mockery, mockery such as have not been, perhaps, from a century. The times of tsarist absolutism seem almost like paradise. Under these conditions, the proverb popular in Bessarabia becomes clear: "Romanians are not

nationality, but profession. During the 18 months of the Romanian occupation, Bessarabia became much more attached to Russia than during the 100 years of Russian domination. The brutal occupation regime, robberies, requisitions, repressions aroused in the Bessarabian population a desire to fight the Romanian invaders[145]. As V. Mayborodov, who visited Bessarabia in the spring of 1919 as part of the French troops, recalled, the population unanimously scolded the Romanians, and one Moldavian peasant expressed a common opinion: "Some gypsy came and it seems that he is my brother, and what kind of brother he is, when I am a Russian person. The measures of the Romanian occupation authorities "russified the Moldovan population rather than the Russian government over the hundred years of its rule" - all the locals tried to speak Russian. And if on the left bank of the Dniester the Romanians were waiting for liberation from the Bolsheviks, then the Bessarabians were waiting for the Bolsheviks to be liberated from the Romanians[146]. In all districts of Bessarabia there were underground cells, partisan groups and detachments. That is, in fact, there was a small war with the Romanian troops in the region. "The situation is difficult," the influential Romanian historian N. Iorga admitted in his diary. Peasants hate order. Even 10% of the population does not have the proper feelings for us..."[147]

"Greater Romania"

Meanwhile, on August 8, 1918, the Entente troops launched the Amiens operation, during which they managed to break through the German front, which meant the final turning point in the war on the Western Front. It became clear to the German command that it would not be possible to win the war. On September 15, the Entente troops launched an offensive on the Thessaloniki front. Bulgaria surrendered on September 29, Turkey on October 30, and Austria-Hungary on November 3. Under these conditions, on November 9, the Danube army of the Entente crossed the Danube at Nikopol, Zhurzhev and Sistov and entered Romanian territory. On the evening of the same day, the new Romanian government of General K. Coanda demanded that Field Marshal Mackensen withdraw German troops from Romania within 24 hours^[148]. On November 11, Germany

signed an armistice - the First World War ended. During the beginning of the revolution and the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Romanian national movement also declared itself. On October 18, 1918, a declaration on the sovereign rights of the Romanian people of Transylvania was read in the Budapest parliament. On October 31, the Romanian National Council of Transylvania was formed in Arad, which announced its refusal to comply with the orders of the Hungarian government. In the second half of November, elections were held in Transylvania for the Grand National Assembly, which opened on December 1 in Alba Iulia. On November 23, the Romanian army entered Transylvania and occupied it up to the line of the upper reaches of the river. Mures. On December 2, having received permission from the French command, the chief of the Romanian General Staff, General Prezan, ordered the troops to be sent to the central regions of Transylvania, where they were met as defenders from the withdrawn German troops who were robbing the local population. It is clear that Hungarian-Romanian relations have worsened. In Arad, there were clashes between Romanian troops and Hungarian self-defense units, and French units had to be sent there, which also occupied Banat, and on December 10, 1918 entered Szeged. On December 24, the 6th Romanian Army occupied Cluj, and by mid-January 1919 reached the line Sziget - Nagybanja - Zilakh - Chucha - Vashkoh^[149] In this situation, the National As

Romania, but demanded that Bucharest carry out electoral and agrarian reforms. The

situation in Bukovina was more complicated. On October 27, 1918, the National Assembly of the Romanians of Bukovina was convened in Chernivtsi, which created the National Council and the Executive Committee, headed by J. Flondor, who promoted the idea of joining Romania. In response, the Ukrainian population held a National Council in Chernivtsi on November 16, which spoke in favor of unification with Ukraine. The situation in the city worsened. However, the 8th Romanian Infantry Division (8,073 troops) of General J. Zadik from the 4th Army Corps, introduced into Bukovina on November 18–24, “settled” this problem, and the General Congress of Bukovina, convened on November 28, consisting of 74 local Romanians, 7 Germans, 6 Poles and 13 Ukrainians loyal to Romania made the “correct” decision to “unconditionally join” Romania^[150] .

On November 18, the Austro-German troops left Northern Bessarabia. The Romanian Prime Minister Marghiloman “telegraphed an order to cross the neutral border in the north of Bessarabia and occupy it to Khotyn with the army and civil authorities ... It was decided to take all the empty places and consider as such the places previously occupied by the troops that had demobilized or driven out the officers.” The 1st cavalry division from the 5th Army Corps moved to the Khotyn district from the Balti district of Bessarabia, and other units from Romania across the Lipkan bridge to the Larga station and to Khotyn, which was occupied by them on November 23, 1918. The commandant of Khotyn, Major G Popescu ordered the population to surrender all weapons, including hunting rifles, gunpowder, shot and knives. By the same order, all Russian signboards were ordered to be removed everywhere until November 28. The population was obliged to pay taxes to the invaders. Food requisitions began. A kilometer zone was created along the Dniester, into which residents were

forbidden to enter^[151] . Already in the autumn of 1918, Romania tried to get the Entente countries to recognize the 1916 agreement on the transfer of Transylvania, Bukovina and other territories of the former Austria-Hungary to it. However, the Entente countries, referring to the conclusion by Romania of a separate peace with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, declared that the agreement of 1916 had lost its force and the c

claims will be re-examined at the Peace Conference. Back in July 1918, the "National Romanian Committee" was created in Paris to promote the "true sentiments and interests of the Romanians", headed by N. Titulescu, according to whom "we [Romanians] are part of the Entente guard in the East, that old guard, who always follows her without grumbling, we are those who love without demanding love in return, we are those who believe without pretending to go to [paradise](#) for it". Of course, these beautiful words should have been backed up by concrete actions in order to force the peace

conference to heed the opinion of Bucharest. Expecting to achieve the recognition of Bessarabia by Romania at the forthcoming peace conference in Paris, the Romanian government hastened to violate the

act of April 9, 1918 on the autonomy of Bessarabia. In November 1918, the Romanian authorities decided to stage an act of recognition of the unconditional annexation of Bessarabia to Romania in "Sfatul Tarii". Preparations for the abolition of the April 9 act were carried out by the General Commissar of Bessarabia, General A. Voitoyan, without spending too much money and time. He expelled from Bessarabia those Sfatul Tarii deputies who were clearly opposed to the annexation of Bessarabia to Romania, and on December 6 he invited the rest to his place and addressed them with the following words: "I invited you to talk to you as a Romanian with the Romanians, find out your desires and aspirations and explain to you the present state of the Bessarabian question. The entire conversation must remain between us. We Romanians can swear, but no one should know about it. We must come to "Sfatul Tarii" with ready-made solutions. According to the March 27th [April 9th] act you have provincial autonomy, now you must renounce it. We need a renunciation of autonomy in the face of a peace conference. We must come there united and not give any reason for criticism ... You, for example, - Voitoyanu turned to deputy N. Alexandri, - I know that you hesitated all summer, and I hope that now everything is clear to you and your hesitation will stop, which are explained by the Russianification provocation, because otherwise we will have to take special measures

On December 8, 1918, at 2 pm, without a preliminary announcement in the press and without notifying the deputies, Khalippa, the chairman of Sfatul Tsarii, posted an announcement on the door of the Sfatul Tsarii building that the meeting was to open at 4 pm on the same day. The meeting was opened despite the fact that only a few dozen deputies were present, mostly from the "Moldavian bloc". Speaking on behalf of the peasant faction, V. Tsyganko protested against the illegal convocation of Sfatul Tsarii and stated that due to the lack of a quorum, this session could not be competent. Deputy I. Pascalutsa made a similar protest. However, the majority of those present were supporters of the occupiers, and they voted for the session to be open. The same "majority" (48 deputies with a quorum of 54), rigged by Khalippa and Voitoianu, elected a presidium from among themselves.

The next day, the deputies who did not participate in the presidium elections protested and, after refusing to re-elect the presidium, left the meeting. Only the agrarian issue was on the agenda of Sfatul Tsarii, so after the break, the departed deputies returned to the meeting room. The meeting began at about 20.00 and by 1 o'clock in the morning tired the deputies, whose number gradually decreased. At 2.30 am "at the end of the reading of the bill, without any warning, the presiding Khalippa read a resolution about the desire to join Bessarabia to Romania without any conditions, the destruction of the autonomy of Bessarabia. There were 46 deputies [out of 162] in the meeting room. Some of the deputies applauded, drowning out the question of the chairman: "Who is against, who abstained?" "Adopted unanimously," said the presiding Mr. Khalippa. Representatives of some of the deputies of the peasant faction, protesting, ask for the floor to make a statement. The presiding Khalippa does not give a word, and the act of the greatest national importance is considered to be decided in the complete absence of a quorum (46 deputies, of which a part, headed by deputy Vuchushkan, expressed their protest). The General Commissar General Voitoianu, who was then called by telephone, immediately read the royal decree on the closing of the session of Sfatul Tsarii upon his arrival. It happened already at five and a half [in the morning](#) . After that, as modern Romanian authors note,

“having fulfilled the mission for which it was actually created”, “Sfatul Tsarii” was disbanded^[155] .

This is how the declaration of December 10, 1918 was adopted:

“Following the unification with mother Romania of Bukovina, Transylvania, Banat and the Hungarian regions inhabited by Romanians within the borders of the Danube and Tisza, “Sfatul Tarii” announces that Bessarabia renounces the conditions of unity, established on March 27 [April 9], being sure” that in Romania everyone will be provided with a democratic regime. Therefore, without waiting for the convocation of the Romanian Constituent Assembly, “Sfatul Tarii” “annuls all the conditions of the act of March 27 and announces, without any conditions, the accession of Bessarabia to Greater Romania”^[156] . However, a

group of deputies of the already dissolved regional council “in the

interests of exposing unprecedented and unacceptable political blackmail, violence a

drew up an act that they consider all the decisions of the session

“Sfatul Tsarii” on December 8-10, 1918, “in view of the obvious offenses committed, bordering on deceit, invalid, illegal and with all their energy they protest against the renunciation of autonomy, as against an act of violence against the will of the peoples inhabiting Bessarabia”^[157] .

Fighting in Ukraine and Hungary

In November 1918, the military-political situation in the south of Russia changed significantly due to the defeat of Germany and the end of the First World War. The withdrawal of German troops from Ukraine led, on the one hand, to the creation on November 13 of a new government (Directory) of the UNR, which moved to Kiev on December 14, and on the other hand, to the issuance of a decree on the restoration of Soviet power in Ukraine by the government of the Ukrainian SSR on November 29 [158] .

At the same time, on November 16–23, 1918, a meeting was held in Iasi of representatives of England, France, Italy, the USA, Romania, Sfatul Tarii, the UPR and a number of anti-Bolshevik Russian public and political figures, who appealed to the allies with a call to send Entente troops to the south of Russia. On November 21, the allies decided to support the UNR against the Bolsheviks, to occupy Odessa, Sevastopol, Kyiv and Kharkov. Accordingly, already on November 25, English ships arrived in Sevastopol, and on November 27, French ships arrived in Odessa. On November 27, the UNR asked the Entente to send their representatives and troops to Kiev and Odessa to Kiev and occupy the railway connecting them[159] . The Romanian leadership was ready to transfer 188 guns, 900 machine guns, 120 thousand rifles, ammunition and other equipment of the former Russian Romanian Front to the local formations of the Volunteer Army [160] On December 9, the goals of the Entente intervention were .

determined: to protect their interests and save Ukraine from the actions of the Bolshevik forces from North. To do this, it was necessary to capture bases on the Black Sea and move from them and from Bessarabia to the basins of the Dnieper and Don[161] . On December 17, a French infantry division landed in Odessa. On January 20, 1919, Greek troops began to arrive in the ports of the Black Sea. In the meantime, by the beginning of January 1919, the troops of the Soviet Ukrainian Front entered Kharkov and reached the approaches to Chernigov, Konotop, Sumy, Akhtyrka, Merefa, Zmiev and Kupyansk. Chernigov and Bakhmach were occupied on January 12, Poltava on January 19, Yekaterinoslav on January 26. January 16 UNR declared war

RSFSR, but the local population greeted the Red [Army with great enthusiasm](#)[\[162\]](#)—

The military-political changes in Ukraine increased the hopes of the Bessarabian population for a speedy liberation. Various underground groups began to prepare for action against the Romanian occupiers. The most significant event at this time was the uprising in the Khotyn region. On the night of January 19, a partisan detachment under the command of G. Barbuts, with 5 guns and 30 machine guns, crossed the Dniester and occupied the Ataki place north of Khotyn, defeating the Romanian unit stationed there. The local population spontaneously came out in support of the partisans. In the first days of the uprising, the rebels occupied most of the county, and on January 23 they liberated Khotyn from the Romanians. However, disagreements in the Directory created to lead the uprising led to the fact that for the most part the uprising remained unorganized. Most of the members of the Directory advocated the creation of the People's Democratic Republic of Lesser Bukovina, which would be an autonomous part of the UNR. On January 22, the Directory addressed a note to England, France, Italy, Germany, the USA, Austria, the Ukrainian People's Republic and the RSFSR, in which "on behalf of all the affected Bessarabian people" it brought "to the attention of your government and people what the Romanian government has done to all the Bessarabian people unprecedented violence. [...] Having thrown off the yoke of tsarism on an equal basis with other peoples, Bessarabia felt that a ray of freedom shone for her too. But at a time when freedom had become an inalienable property of all peoples, when it remained to enjoy the fruits of freedom, the imperialist state of Romania, neighboring Bessarabia, imposed a heavy yoke on Bessarabia, annexing [it] to itself, in the words of the government of Romania, "for eternity", without having there is absolutely no right or basis for this, and beyond the will of the Bessarabian people. This yoke is being thrown off by the people themselves...". The Directory asked these countries to help the Bessarabian people "to hold a referendum and only v state"[163] . —

The senior lieutenant of the English fleet, who arrived in Khotyn on January 22, was used as a liaison with European countries.

M. McLaren, who was involved by the rebels in investigating the atrocities of the Romanian troops in the village of Nedoboucy[164] . After reviewing the situation on the ground, McLaren said: "Now I see and can testify how the population joined Romania and what it endured if it decided to revolt." Naturally, the 8th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions were thrown against the rebels. Having coordinated the situation with the UNR government, the Romanian command launched an attack on Khotyn on January 27. The troops destroyed and burned the villages, shot anyone suspicious or able to bear arms. The Khotyn uprising had a significant resonance in Europe and caused certain fears in Bucharest. Much later, I. Antonescu recalled this situation: "In 1919, we almost lost Bessarabia through the fault of General Davidoglu, who destroyed seven villages and killed a lot of people. It is known that for this reason the peace conference in Paris took up the revision of the Bessarabian question in order not to give us Bessarabia, because we are savages . On February 1, Romanian troops recaptured Khotyn. During the suppression of the uprising, 15 thousand people suffered to one degree or another, of which, according to official Romanian data, more than 5 thousand died. More than 54 thousand local residents fled to the left bank of the Dniester[166] . The losses of the Romanian troops amounted to 369 —

people (killed - 159, wounded - 93, missing - 117)[167] .

Meanwhile, the Soviet troops of the Ukrainian Front continued their offensive towards the Dniester. On February 1, the Ukrainian Red Army entered Kremenchug and Brovary, on February 5 - in Kyiv, on February 7 - in Elisavetgrad, on February 10 - in Cherkassy, on February 20 - in Fastov. True, this rapid advance of the troops of the Ukrainian Front towards Odessa and Tiraspol turned out to be completely unexpected for the Soviet command. It turned out that the UNR troops opposing the Soviet units were not ready for real battles. They partly went over to the side of the Red Army, and partly went home. So, the detachment of ataman N.A. Grigoriev, on February 2, he went over to the side of the Soviet troops, was reorganized into the 1st brigade of the Zadneprovskaya division and turned out to be the main force advancing in the direction of the Black Sea coast. The detachments of the French, Greek, Polish and Volunteer a

local Bolsheviks. Moreover, France was generally inclined to withdraw its troops, which constituted the main force in southern Russia, to their

homeland. On March 14, 1919, the commander of the Ukrainian Front, V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, set the troops of the Kiev Group of Forces the task of "accelerating the liquidation of the Petliura gangs and reaching the Dniester, occupying Mogilev, and developing operations to the east to the Kamenets Podolsk line. Concentrate the 2nd [th] division [in the area] Rybnitsa - Balta - Olgopol. It is desirable to prevent the destruction of the Zhmerinka-Balta route for the hasty transfer of the cavalry brigade to Balta. Organize the northern part of Bessarabia to cover the crossing on the Dniester and the subsequent attack on Chisinau. There will be a special order about the latter . "[168] On March 17, the commander of the Ukrainian Front, by his order No. 405, informed his troops: "It has been decided to advance on Odessa. The Kyiv group - a barrier from Galicia, access to the Dniester, the occupation of crossings from Mogilev to Rybnitsa inclusive. The organization of the uprising in Bessarabia is a barrier against Rumania. Strike with a strong group [on] Chisinau - Bendery - Tiraspol. Kharkov group - to concentrate Golty - Voznesensk, attack on Odessa under the cover of units occupying Khristinovka - Uman, advancing [on] Zyatkovtsy

"[169] . On March 7, 1919, Soviet troops entered Berdichev and Kazatin, on March 10 - in Kherson, on March 14 - in Nikolaev, on March 15 - in Zhitomir and Uman, on March 18 - in Vinnitsa, on March 20 - in Zhmerinka, on March 30 - in Vapnyarka . By the end of March 1919, the line of the Ukrainian front, which included 88.7 thousand people (of which about 40 thousand bayonets and cavalry), increased from 550 km to 1000 km[170] By the evening of March 30, 1919 , by front Novaya Ushitsa - Mogilev-Podolsky - Yampol, the 1st separate Bessarabian brigade was deployed, transferred on April 24 to the 1st—

Ukrainian Soviet Army[171] . Meanwhile, on February 26, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente decided to create a neutral zone between Hungary and Romania from Transcarpathia to the Danube. However, the Entente did not have troops that could be sent there, so on March 16 it was decided that Hungarian units would be withdrawn from Transcarpathia, and Czech and Romanian troops would enter there. On March 20, a note demanding that the consent to the withdrawal of troops be communicated within 24 hou

resigned, and on March 21, the Social Democratic and Communist Parties of Hungary formed a coalition government, which proclaimed the Soviet Republic. The Entente did not have troops that could be sent to Hungary, while Romania had an army of almost 200 thousand people, reduced to 18 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, of which 4 infantry divisions were in Transylvania, and 3 infantry and 2 cavalry - in Bessarabia. Therefore, on March 22, England declared to Romania that it was ready to help with the supply of a 100,000-strong army. France supported this idea and promised Bucharest the help of the French Expeditionary Force and the troops of Czechoslovakia[172]. Under these conditions, the Romanian leadership saw its chance to achieve in Paris the realization of its territorial claims. Already on April 16, Romanian troops moved west and by May 3 reached the river. Tisza from the Carpathians to Szeged, occupied by the French units. The Hungarian government turned to Moscow for support.

As early as March 21, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops I.I. Vatsetis pointed out to the commander of the Ukrainian Front: "In recent weeks, your military units have automatically moved along the line the least resistance in the south and south-west direction, for which you spend the last reserves, "and this in the conditions when in the Donbass" a general battle began, on the outcome of which our dominance in the south depends "[173]. Having received information about the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, on March 23, Vatsetis suggested that the Soviet government, "if you approve," report to Budapest a plan of joint military operations: "1. Establish a common front between Hungary and the RSFSR through Bukovina. 2. Move the Hungarian Soviet troops from Bukovina to the rear of the Petliura troops advancing from Galicia to Kiev"[174]. On March 26, the commander-in-chief demanded that Antonov-Ovseenko "suspend the development of actions in the direction of the Romanian border, as well as to the shores of the Black Sea, and transfer all excess troops from there against Petlyura's troops" for their final defeat. "Your advance in the western direction must be brought to the borders of southeastern Galicia and Bukovina. The latter is necessary in order to establish close direct contact with the Soviet troops in Hungary. [175] On March 27, the — commander of the Ukrainian Front informed the commander-in-chief that

"I can't stop the offensive, since Odessa has almost been taken and special southern formations have been sent there"[176].—

In March 1919, the troops of the advancing Ukrainian Front were reorganized: the Kiev, Odessa and Kharkov groups of ~~troops were created in its composition~~[177]. On April 7, the Odessa Group of Forces (commander N.A. Khudyakov) included a separate brigade of Bogunsky, the Southern brigade of Bohun, the Peshekhonov brigade, the 1st consolidated regiment, the 15th Ukrainian Soviet regiment, two batteries of the 2nd separate brigade, 1 th brigade of the Zadneprovskaya division of Grigoriev, the special purpose cavalry regiment of Besspalov and the Voznesensky regiment. The troops of the group were given the task of "continuing the pursuit of the retreating enemy to Bessarabia and driving him out ~~of~~ the Dniester estuary"[178] . By order of Antonov-Ovseenko No. 47 of April 15, the Odessa Group of Forces was reorganized into the 3rd Ukrainian Soviet Army as part of the 1st brigade of the Zadneprovskaya division, the Bohunsky brigade, the Popov cavalry division, the Bessarabian rebel units and the 5th cavalry regiment, which should have been reduced to 5 th and ~~6th~~

Ukrainian rifle divisions[179] . On April 2, in the operational summary of the troops of the Kharkov direction, it was indicated that "Romanians were first noticed in the Odessa direction, who tried to advance with the support of their ~~artillery~~ and two tanks, but were repulsed"[180] .

Meanwhile, the Franco-Greek troops were evacuated from Odessa, and on April 6, Grigoriev's units entered the city. On April 7, Antonov-Ovseenko ordered the troops advancing towards Odessa and the Crimea: "Your task is to defend and secure the coast, capture the Dniester line up to and including Rybnitsa. [...] Bring the rest of the division into a division, except for Grigoriev. Grigoriev to send at the disposal of Dybenko with three regiments for clearing the Crimea. The latter, if ~~there~~ are no obstacles to occupying the Dniester line"[181] .

April 8 southwest of Odessa at st. Benefits were ~~fighting~~ with the Romanian troops, retreating to the estuary[182] . A report dated April 8 reported that "the French infantry units, having left Odessa, are retreating to Akkerman in marching order. Enemy ships, having left the port, ~~stand~~ in a distant roadstead. The guns are aimed at the city"[183] . On April 12, Soviet troops again occupied Zhytomyr, which was recaptured from them for a ~~short~~ time by the troops of the UNR, and on April 17 they entered Kamene

Tiraspol, Ovidiopol, April 20 - Dubossary, April 23 - Lighthouses, ensuring uninterrupted water supply to Odessa. In the

meantime, a plan of operation against Romania was being developed at the headquarters of the Ukrainian Front. As early as April 6, an operational note was prepared, which stated that "due to political and social conditions, the Romanian kingdom is an opponent of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. Hungary is at the moment our ally and is offering its military forces for the struggle against the capitalist states. We have been given the task: to invade the borders of Romania, relying on our right flank to Hungary and pushing the Romanians to the sea. To accomplish this task, Soviet troops must first of all reach the Dniester from Kamenetz-Podolsk to the Black Sea. "For the offensive of the invasion of Romania" four groups are being created. The first group should occupy Bukovina, the second - to advance from Mogilev-Podolsky to Ocnita and Balti, "from where, along the highway, immediately launch an attack on Iasi on a wide front." The third group from the region of Rybnitsa - Dubossary - Tiraspol, having crossed the Dniester, "occupies the line of Iasi - Chisinau and the main city of Russian Bessarabia - Chisinau." The fourth group from the Razdelnaya-Odessa region, having crossed the Dniester in Tiraspol, Ovidiopol, Akkerman and "supporting the Rybnitsa-Balti group by occupying Chisinau, is developing an offensive along the railway to Leipzigsкая and from the station. Novokaushany at st. Kagalnik for communication with a group advancing from Ackerman to Guru Chilingider and the river basin. Chilingider [Chelegider]. By the indicated period, all groups should be on the line Suceava - Folticheskoy [Felticheni] - Iasi - Chisinau - Leipzigsкая - Brien, Gura Chilingider - Zhebryany [Zhebriyany] on the Black Sea coast. At the end of this offensive, the Red

Army will link up with the troops of Soviet Hungary, who will advance through Kyr Libaba and Kampulung-Moldovenesk to Suceava-Botosani. Later it was assumed that "an offensive along the line of Iasi - Vaslui - Focsany - Rymnik - Ploiesti - Bucharest, a demonstration along the Leipzigsкая - Galati - Brailov - Bucharest line with access to the Danube with a joint attack of the Hungarian Soviet troops along the Kronstadt [Brashov] - Ploiesti - Bucharest and a demonstration of the fleet at Costengi [Constanza] will inflict such

a decisive blow to the Romanian kingdom, that it will burst at all seams. Ukrainian and Hungarian Soviet troops take Bucharest, Bessarabian troops occupy Galati, Bolgrad, Reni and Izmail. As a result, "the entire territory of Bessarabia within its former state borders must be cleared of Romanian troops"[185] .

A draft operational order was prepared for the 3rd Ukrainian Soviet Army, from which it was required: "Having made the crossing at Dubossary across the river. Dniester with a simultaneous demonstration at Bendery and Akkerman, hiding behind a flank movement to Iasi, keeping in touch with the advancing rebels in the northern part of Bessarabia and Moldavia, occupy Chisinau and, advancing deep into Bessarabia, with a gradual movement from Chisinau to the south, take into the flank of the enemy resisting at Bendery - Akkerman, and push him to the Black Sea and the Danube. Coming out to connect with our northern units advancing deep into Bessarabia, take Falchi [Falchiu], the crossing on the Prut and further occupy Focsani and southern Romania, where to get in touch with the Soviet troops of

Bulgaria "[186] . According to a more detailed note, the troops of the 3rd Army were to carry out demonstrative actions on the Dniester near Criulian, Grishriopol, Bendery, Chebruchi and Akkerman. It was necessary to cross the river at Bodului-Voda [Vadului-Voda], from where the troops would move towards Chisinau. Having occupied the city, "the main forces [...] must continue the offensive on the crossing over the Prut near the town of Leovo" and "at the same time, sending an auxiliary column to Ia

his.

II. Having occupied Leovo and [Tsy]ganka, cross the Prut and occupy Falchi [Falchiu].

III. The troops who demonstrated at Bendery and at Chebruchy, on the Dniester, cross the Dniester and, having taken all measures to preserve the bridge during the offensive, follow to st. Leipzig, keeping in touch with the main column along the way of their march, and connect with the column following from Ackermann to Leipzig. The column from Ovidiopol to follow to Kiliya and Izmail, guarding the Black Sea coast from any encroachments of the landing force.

IV. By this time, take Falchi [Falchiu], the right column - Iasi, and the left flank, through the Leipzig, - Galati. Coastal column - Izmail - Kiliya - Vilkov.

V. Having occupied Falchi [Falchiu], advance the main column through Bursula to Birlad and further to Tekuch - Fokshany - Buzya [Buzau] - Urzicheni, crossing the [r.] Ialomitsa, Bucharest, Zhurzhevo [Dzhurdzhu] until connecting with the Bulgarian Soviet troops.

VI. The right column from Iasi to advance on Pashkany and, having united with the Bessarabian troops, be in the reserve of the main column . On April 21,

Vatsetis, informing the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR about the entry of the Red Army into Galicia, asked the government "how admissible this advance is from a general political point of view, what task is set for this advance, and what final line the troops should take"[188] . On April 22, Lenin replied that "advance into part of Galicia and Bukovina is necessary for communication with Soviet Hungary. This problem needs to be solved faster and more firmly." Two main tasks were set before the troops of the Ukrainian Front: 1) "to help the Donbass" and 2) "to establish a strong connection by rail with Soviet Hungary"[189] . Accordingly, the next day, Vatsetis set the task for the Ukrainian Front to connect with Hungary and speed up assistance to the troops of the Southern Front [190]

On April 22, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Soviet Army reported that "the entire left bank of the Dniester from Beloch [in] 20 versts north. Rybnitsa to the mouth with crossings in our hands. The Petliura gangs have gone beyond the Dniester, some of them have been disarmed. Romanian units broke into Galicia. 3 Romanian monitors fired at Ovidiopol and the coast of the estuary to Bugaz, smashed and took away all the boats and barges in this area"[191] . On the evening of the same day, the operational report of the army reported: "There are no changes at the front. During the retreat of the enemy, we captured 24 guns, 14 rolling stock, 8 locomotives, 6 thousand shells, 100 thousand cartridges, 3 thousand rifles without locks, 6 cars and many other property near Bendery . On April 25, the command of the 3rd Army reported that "the Romanians are trying to enter into negotiations, wanting to distract us and concentrate their forces. Other than that, no change." [193] "On the night of April 30, the enemy, with a force of up to one battalion, crossed the Dniester and tried to occupy the villages of So-lobodzeya and Olykhoy. A counterattack by Ploskovtsev and the cavalry [194] division of Popov was thrown into the river "

Dniester Front

The exit of Soviet troops to the Dniester revived the hopes of the Bessarabian population for an early liberation from the Romanians. The French command was convinced that the local population was hostile to the Romanians. Romanian soldiers, under the influence of the explanatory work of the Romanian communists, became more receptive to Bolshevik propaganda. The soldiers of the 56th Romanian regiment rebelled and killed the officers, but this performance was suppressed[195]. According to Soviet intelligence, "Romanian officers are of the opinion that if the Bolsheviks start to attack, then they will have to clear all of Bessarabia, since without the help of the French they cannot resist"[196]. —

Favorable conditions were created for the liberation of Bessarabia. On April 13, the commander of the Ukrainian Front ordered the 1st Ukrainian Soviet Army "on the extreme right flank to concentrate the Bessarabian units in order, by special order: a) to assist the group of Comrade Khudyakov in the campaign against Romania; b) a campaign through Bukovina and Ugorshchina to get in touch with Soviet Hungary"[197]. On the same day, the commander of the 3rd Army received an order: "Get ready to vigorously attack Romania. From the north, the rebels, subordinate to [commander of the 1st Army] Matsiletsky before contact with you, will tie up the enemy. You strike through Dubossary - Chisinau, from where the auxiliary detachment - Iasi, and the main force - to the south behind enemy lines and to connect with our advancing from Bender and Akkerman. By this it is possible to save bridges and disorganize the enemy. Then the Prut crossing in the middle reaches and access to the line of the river. Seret. You will receive a detailed order"[198]. On April 20, while in Odessa, Antonov-Ovseenko ordered the need to organize the Romanian Soviet units and establish contact with the Bulgarians and the Turkish revolutionary layers, who were determined to fight the Romanians. "Your movement into Bessarabia," he pointed out to Khudyakov, "must be accompanied by the rise of Bulgaria against Rumania." Appropriate assistance was to be provided through the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR[199].

The troops of the 3rd Army began to prepare an offensive. On April 24, the commander of the 3rd Army issued Order No. 02, which stated that "the task of the Ukrainian Front is to clear Bessarabia and energetically prepare for an attack on Romania with access to the river. Seret, so that with the assistance of the rebels of the northwest and Dobruja, who sympathizes with us, together with the Soviet troops of Hungary and Bulgaria, to establish the power of the proletariat in Romania. The task of the 3rd Army is to ensure crossings on the Dniester River, to cross to the western bank of the Dniester River with the capture of important nodes of resistance in Bessarabia, continuing to disorganize the enemy; liberate Bessarabia and establish Soviet power there; continue to protect the Black Sea coast." The commander ordered the division commander-5 t. Peshekhonov: "Having secured the crossings on the Dniester River from the village. Rybnitsa inclusive to the mouth of the river. Dniester, take and hold the line of Chisinau, art. Bessarabian (st. Leipzig), st. Artsis (village 'Brie-ska), the mouth of the river. Kogilnik, for which, having captured the Chisinau road junction with the city of Chisinau, with an energetic blow to the south in the direction of st. Leipzig to capture the railway junction at the station. Artsis, in order to prevent the enemy from escaping from under Ackerman. [...] To take all preparatory measures for the fulfillment of the designated task, which to begin no later than May 1 of this year. Conduct reconnaissance before the front, sending forward special agitation detachments

with the aim of raising uprisings behind enemy lines. The 6th Rifle Division, commanded by Grigoriev, remained in the reserve of the 3rd Army[200] . On the same day, by his order No. 0157, Khudyakov demanded from the inspector of army engineers: "In view of the upcoming movement of our troops to Bessarabia and further to the borders of Romania, it is necessary [: a)] to arrange and secure crossings on the Dniester (building and repairing bridges, building tete-de-ponov, etc.); b) repair of old and construction of new roads both in depth and along the front for unhindered movement and rapid deployment of troops; c) the supply of troops with all the necessary means for the production of engineering work. On all these issues, I ask you to give a report as soon as possible on what has been done and what you intend to do ... "[201] At the same time, similar orders were given to the heads of artillery, for

The 1st Ukrainian Soviet Army ordered the commander of the 1st armored train of the Odessa railway junction to be ready, together with a detachment of 400-500 people, for an offensive through Bugaz to Akkerman, which should have been taken into contact with the Soviet cavalry —

operating near Bender[203] . On April 25, employees of the headquarters of the 3rd Army were sent to Kiev and Moscow to obtain maps of Romania, Bessarabia and the former Odessa military district[204] . In Odessa and along the left bank of the Dniester, the command of the Ukrainian Front deployed military units created from Bessarabians and international regiments, in which, along with soldiers of other nationalities, there were many Romanians. In the Dubossary region there was a Bessarabian reserve battalion and several partisan detachments (Ploskovsky, Slobodzeya, etc.), a Bessarabian reserve battalion was stationed in the Tiraspol region, and the 1st Bessarabian regiment was stationed in the Ovidiopol region. All these units were part of the 3rd Ukrainian Soviet Army. On May 2, on their basis, the formation of the 1st B

The intentions of the government of the Ukrainian SSR are clearly visible from a conversation over a direct wire between its chairman Rakovsky and an unnamed interlocutor on April 28, 1919: "As a political demonstration that would accompany our offensive against Bukovina and Bessarabia, we can send a note to Romania and its allied guarantors. The Russian-Romanian treaty of March 5 last year could become the central point in this note. It constitutes for us a convenient direct basis for military operations against the Romanians, the object of which we will make Bessarabia, and in fact the overthrow of the Romanian bourgeoisie and the unification of their corpses with Hungary. This political demonstration will lift the mood in Hungary. We are preparing an operation against the Romanians, using explicitly international and Bessarabian elements in such a way that it will not be to the detriment of the implementation of Vladimir Ilyich's directives. I personally believe that we will carry out our operations in Bukovina and Bessarabia under a local firm, without advertising ourselves. For Bessarabia, a Bessarabian government has already been prepared in Odessa, the composition of which we will discuss today and which consists of

Bessarabian comrades . On April 28-30, the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Bessarabian Republic was created (chairman I.N.

Krivorukov), which on May 8, 1919 published a manifesto stating that Bessarabia, being a Soviet Socialist Republic, is part of the RSFSR as its integral part. "All laws, orders, resolutions and directives of both the Romanian government and its agents and the Board of Directors [Sfatul Tarii] and its agents are considered illegal and cannot be enforced. All factories, factories, banks, large trading enterprises and quarries are declared the property of the Republic. "All the lands of the landlords with all living and dead inventory must be taken away and transferred to the organs of Soviet power ... for further transfer to the peasants free of charge ... and all large-scale and kulak land ownership is destroyed. [...] All contractual obligations of workers and peasants towards landowners and capitalists are considered non-binding. All national groups of Bessarabia now enjoy full autonomy..." The Provisional Government declared that after the expulsion of the occupiers it would convene a Congress of Soviets in Bessarabia, to which it would transfer power. It called on the working people to oppose the occupiers and join the ranks of the Soviet [troops\[207\]](#) . On May 1, 1919, the governments of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR delivered an ultimatum to the Romanian

government, which reminded them that, according to the agreement of March 5–9, 1918, the Romanian side undertook to withdraw its troops from Bessarabia, but did not do so. Therefore, the Soviet governments are ready to "put an end to the violence and defiant actions of the Romanian Government. Not wanting to shed the fraternal blood of the Rumanian workers and peasants acting under compulsion, both Soviet Governments address the Rumanian Government with the following proposals: 1. The immediate evacuation of the Rumanian troops, officials and agents from all of Bessarabia and the freedom

of the Bessarabian workers and peasants to establish their own power;

2. Bringing to the people's court all the perpetrators of the crimes committed against the Bessarabian workers and peasants and the entire population of Bessarabia;

3. Return of all military property belonging to Russia and Ukraine, seized by Romania;

4. Return to the inhabitants of Bessarabia of everything taken away and property confiscated from them.

The Russian and Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Governments expect within 48 hours, starting from the first of May at 10 p.m., a clear and precise answer on the acceptance of their proposal; otherwise, they will consider themselves to have complete freedom of action in relation to Rumania"[208] .

On May 2, the government of the Ukrainian SSR sent a note to the government of Romania, in which it drew attention to the fact that "Bukovina, which had the prospect of liberation from any class and national oppression, became the prey of the greedy Romanian military and civilian oligarchy." The Ukrainian SSR protested and offered "Romania to declare within 48 hours its consent to immediately evacuate Bukovina with its troops. The specified term expires on May 4 at 2 o'clock . On May 4, at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR, it was decided to come to the aid of Soviet Hungary[210] .

The Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Ukrainian Soviet Army appealed to the population of Bessarabia to fight against the Romanian invaders, which, in particular, said: "The banner of the social revolution has swept the whole world, from Hungary to France. The revolutionary workers and peasants of the Ukraine, having freed themselves from the yoke of their oppressors and restored the power of the people, the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, decided to come to the aid of their exhausted sister, Bessarabia. We have launched an attack on Bessarabia - to help you. Tiraspol is in our hands. On the points of our bayonets we carry the banner of victory, the banner of the struggle for a better future, the struggle for land, for the rights of the working people. The old world is giving way to a strong, poor class of peasants and workers. The thrones of the executioners of kings have been shaken, and the hour is near when red flags will rise in black Chisinau, Iasi and Bucharest - the banners of freedom of the working people of the whole

world . The enemy forces in Bessarabia were estimated by the beginning of May at 10 thousand people (including 4-5 thousand infantry), a small detachment of cavalry and 45 guns[212] . The troops of the 3rd Army on May 1 totaled 29,887 people, 199 machine guns, 85 guns, 12 armored trains and 12 aircraft[213] . Meanwhile, on May 1, fighting broke out on the Dniester.

"The Romanians are advancing along the front from Nezavertailovka to Mayak. There are t

parts with machine guns. This position is occupied by the Transnistrian Soviet regiment, temporarily seconded [to] the 5th Tilegulsky regiment, consisting of 1500 people. There are only 500 rifles, no cartridges. We ask you to immediately send 1,000 rifles and 100,000 Russian cartridges by truck to Mayaki. While we hold the enemy. Urgent need for ammunition"[214] . In the morning report of May 1, it was reported that "on the Transnistrian front, the Romanians tried to cross the Dniester, but were repulsed with heavy losses"[215]. According to a report dated May 2, "Romanian reconnaissance detachments trying to cross the Dniester River near Nezavertailovka were repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire. On the rest of the front, no change . "[216] On May 2, —

Khudyakov notified Antonov-Ovseenko that a lead train with the appropriate equipment was needed to restore the Bendery bridge. If a quick restoration of the bridge is not possible, "it is necessary to build a temporary bridge for the movement of light artillery and carts." On the same day, he ordered to start collecting floating equipment on the Black Sea coast for the construction of a floating bridge across the Dniester [217] . Moreover, a survey of the Bendery bridge showed that its restoration would require powerful equipment and at least 3 weeks of time[218] . The commander of the Ukrainian Front, who visited units of the 6th Infantry Division on April 22–23 and 29, pointed out to the commander: "You are making a big mistake by not letting Grigoriev forward; do not leave him in the rear, give him the task of crossing Dubossary, Kishinev, Leipzig and part of Falchi [Falchiu]. The Fifth [Division] will join the Leipzig division. The right flank will be covered by Dmitriev's partisan detachment, which you will send first of all to intercept the routes from Iasi to Gush [Khushi and] Dokolin. The left flank is the fishermen of the branches of the Danube, who must be raised by special detachments, through them agitating Bulgaria "[219] . On May 3, the Belarusian brigade was ordered to be ready in 3 days to "set out as —

directed"[220] . On May 4, the Commander-in-Chief indicated to the command of the Ukrainian Front that "it is necessary to strengthen the forward line along the Dniester near Karkmaza - Bendery - Rybnitsa and Mogilev on the Dniester, making extensive use of your previous positions"[221] . On the same day, Antonov-Ovseenko informed Vatsetis that "due

By the government of Ukraine in Romania, the Ukrfront will face new combat missions, as a result of which the creation of a reserve in the north is delayed. To this, the commander-in-chief replied that "no active tasks against Romania have yet been set for the Ukrfront"[222]. The command of the Red Army increasingly came to the conclusion that protracted fighting in the Donbass would decide the fate of operations in southern Russia, and the Ukrainian Front was required to transfer free units to the Donbass[223]. On May 5, Vatsetis again turned to Antonov-Ovseenko, demanding that, in addition to the forces necessary for operations in Bukovina, he should send all other troops to the Donbass[224]. Meanwhile, on

May 3, Khudyakov reported to Antonov-Ovseenko that "all orders for the offensive of the troops have been given. The reorganization of the troops is completed. Changing the mission will confuse the given orders and may lead to the failure of the offensive. Grigoriev only does what he sends demands for an incredible amount of equipment and uniforms, without giving any information about the actual and combat strength of the division. Your instructions regarding the partisan detachment of Dmitriev and the fishermen of the Danube will be carried out. Grigoriev will be used as a reserve in the beginning operations. Letting Grigoriev in the first place will delay the execution of the operation"[225]. In response, on May 4, the commander of the Ukrainian Front

replied that "it is better to slow down the operation for a day or two than to risk the rear. Grigoriev has 15,000 combatants ... Grigoriev will go forward in a completely different way. You need to personally push it. There are no guarantees in his trustworthiness, you cannot let him hesitate. It is necessary that he speak

immediately."[226] According to a report dated May 3, "it is calm on the front of the 3rd Army. Reconnaissance and preparations are being made for the offensive, which will begin on the 6th in the morning. Grigoriev in Alexandria, his 1st brigade in Elisavetgrad, 4th regiment at station. Auxiliary and 5th regiment at the disposal of the division chief-5. [...] Our right flank is the town of Rybnitsa"[227]. On May 5, Antonov-Ovseenko informed Khudyakov that, according to intelligence, the Romanian army consisted of 5 army corps. Of these, 3.5 are advancing on Hungary, the 5th corps (9th, 10th infantry divisions, 3rd, 5th cavalry brigades) in Bessarabia, the 3rd (5th, 6th, 12th I infantry divisions) - on the river. Seret. The Romanians are expecting a Soviet offensive at Dubossary. In Hungary, the Romanians reached the river. Tisza, and the Czechs captured

On May 5, the 1st Army received an order from the commander of the Ukrainian Front No. 964/lk, which stated that "May 6, Khudyakov begins operations against Romania in the direction of Chisinau. You need to immediately start strong demonstrations throughout your section of the Dniester, meaning an offensive through Khotyn - Novoselytsia - Dorohoi, to cut off Bukovina and capture the routes to Iasi and the passages of Dorna, Vatra and Kirlibaba [Kyrlibaba] through the Carpathians "[229] . On May 6, the commander of the Ukrainian Front notified Khudyakov: "Your order No. 02 of April 24 has only been received today. It is not good to give an exact combat order 10 days in advance. Your order does not provide for an auxiliary movement towards Iasi to cover the advance to the south. I repeat, Grigoriev's units must be moved forward and it must be borne in mind that a quick movement of a special detachment will capture the crossings on the Prut - a further movement to Seret is ahead . The next day, Antonov-Ovseenko informed the commander-3 that "the situation in Hungary has deteriorated sharply. It is unacceptable to delay the offensive. Quickly move Dmitriev, then Grigoriev. Tomorrow I'm leaving for Odessa" [231] .

On May 7, People's Commissar of the Ukrainian SSR N.I. Podvoisky issued Order No. 396, according to which "by decision of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, our armies go on the offensive against the Romanian White Guards – the executioners of our brothers in Bessarabia..."[232] . On May 8, he reported to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic that two divisions, the International and Bessarabian, were being formed "with the special task of providing assistance to Hungary, the liberation of Bessarabia"[233] . However, their formation was delayed[234] . On May 9, Rakovsky, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, in a telegram to the commander of the Ukrainian Front, the 3rd Army and the 6th Infantry Division, reported that on May 3 Hungary offered Romania to make peace. Bucharest agreed on the condition that all Hungarian troops be disarmed, all weapons, uniforms, food and other property should be transferred to the Romanian army within 10 days. All railway materials east of the Tisza, 1800 steam locomotives, 31,100 wagons, all ships on the Tisza are transferred to Romania, within three days the Hungarians must transfer 4 armored trains, 800 serviceable vehicles, a fortress on the right bank of the Tisza, which was to become the western border of Romania. "The Hungarian Workers' and Peasants' Government re

monstrous conditions and declared that he would fight to the last drop of blood. The government of the Ukrainian SSR promised Hungary its help. "By advancing on landlord Romania, we not only liberate the Ukrainians and our other brothers, the workers and peasants of Bessarabia and Bukovina, but also forestall the danger that threatens Soviet power in the Ukraine, against which the Rumanian White Guard generals, intoxicated by the victory over the Hungarian workers and peasants, will rush. Hurry up. Every lost minute will help the enemy to take the initiative into his own hands. There must be no room for hesitation . "[235]

On May 9, Antonov-Ovseenko, by his order No. 885, brought to the attention of Khudyakov and Grigoriev that the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR had presented an ultimatum to Romania demanding that Bukovina and Bessarabia be cleared. The government of Eastern Galicia was invited to enter into negotiations on the establishment of a demarcation line and border. "In this situation, a great responsibility will fall on you, on the troops of Nachdiv Grigoriev and other parts of the 3rd Army - you must deliver a blow that will free the Ukrainian Soviet Republic from the formidable danger from the Romanian boyars, these agents of allied predation, now in a hurry to strangle Soviet Hungary , then to rush to the Soviet Ukraine. Explain this to your troops, inspire them to a feat. Let them understand that the work begun in Odessa must be carried through to

the end . "[236] On May 9, the commander of the Belarusian brigade received an order from the morning of May 10 to go to Ovidiopol[237] . However, on May 7–9, having received an "operational order to march on the Bessarabian positions" near Balta, Grigoriev's units, on the basis of which the 6th Rifle Division was formed, who were on vacation in the Alexandria region, mutinied, "during the movement, parts of it, impregnated banditry, began to rob, rape. Grigoriev himself declared himself hetman of Ukraine[238] . In this situation, the commanders of the 1st and 3rd armies on May 10-1 were ordered "to continue the preparation of the offensive in Romania [and in Bukovina], but to postpone the offensive itself"[239] . Accordingly, on May 10, Khudyakov ordered the commander of the 5th Infantry Division "to continue preparing an offensive against Romania, while the offensive itself is temporarily postponed." The troops were tasked with defending themselves against the rebellious units of Grigoriev, who was outlawed[240] . Since May 12, Soviet troops have been drawn into

covered the central regions of Ukraine, pulling over 14 thousand bayonets and 600 sabers[242] . On

May 12, Rakovsky, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, informed Vatsetis that "Grigoriev's adventure thwarted the offensive we were preparing against Bessarabia, which we were preparing without harming the Donets Basin. We have placed Hungary in a difficult position and ourselves in an undesirable position . Nevertheless, the fighting on the Dniester continued. On May 12, according to the morning operational report of the 3rd Army, "our valiant red troops broke through the Romanian front. At the village of Chebruchi, 25 versts south of Tiraspol, they crossed to the right bank of the Dniester, pursuing the enemy for 10 versts, capturing weapons and horses . However, the reports for the following days do not contain information about the development of this offensive, since the Soviet troops returned to the left bank of the Dniester. Explaining to the commander-in-chief what happened, Antonov-Ovseenko reported on May 17: "The newspapers exaggerated. There was a raid, a big maneuver was supposed, but it was thwarted by Grigoriev's uprising. I do not refuse actions against Romania. International and Bessarabian parts for this; there are not enough cartridges, we a

According to the evening report of May 16, "the Romanians fired 6 artillery shots at Dubossary, but after our battery fired at the premises of the Romanian headquarters [and knocked out 3 enemy guns], the fire was stopped"[246]. On May 17, the commander of the 1st brigade of the 6th rifle division, Nedoluzhenko, reported that at 22.00 on May 16, the Romanians fired 16 shells at Rybnitsa, there were casualties. "Against Dubossary, the activity of the enemy is noticeable. The Red Army soldiers are showing nervousness due to the lack of artillery. I ask for an urgent order for the immediate dispatch of artillery to Slobodka" [247] The morning report of May 18 reported that "on the Bessarabian front, the Romanians shelled Rybnitsa with artillery fire. In the area of Dubossary, the enemy is digging trenches"[248] . According to the evening report of May 22, "on the Bessarabian front, our units crossed the Dniester and are 20 versts from Chisinau"[249] . On the same day, Antonov Ovseenko pointed out to Khudyakov: "The news that you are taking Chisinau is not entirely clear. You have to be extremely careful. After all, we have practically no strength, no cartridges either, the supply is weak, Grigoriev is not finished. Better engage in intense reconnaissance and do not get involved in serious battles . This, however, did not prevent

to the commander of the Ukrainian Front on May 24 to report to Moscow: "We launched an offensive in the direction of Chisinau, our units are now 7 versts from Chisinau. This offensive is being carried out by units, which were only stopped by this from joining Grigoriev" [251]

On May 23, I. Gorelov, chairman of the district military commissariat, reported from Yampol: "For the second day, the Romanians are bombarding Yampol, making absurd and impossible demands, to which we give a categorical refusal. Residents leave the city, as there is no way to stay in it. Not a single shot is fired from our side, resistance will be offered only if the Romanians begin to cross over to our shore. The city has a garrison of the 1st Bessarabian regiment in the amount of 259 bayonets, 8 machine guns and 1 gun. An acute shortage of Russian cartridges and machine-gun belts. We ask for further instructions . "[252] On the whole, according to the report of May 23, "no change on the Bessarabian front"[253] . The evening report of May 25 reported—that "on the Bessarabian front, enemy artillery fired on Dubossary"[254] . Considering the worsening position of the Red Army in the Donbass, on May 26, Vatsetis ordered "to go on the defensive in the western part of the Ukrainian front from the Dniester and Galicia", to allocate troops to the Southern Front and suppress the rebellion of Grigoriev [255]

On May 25, the governments of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, with their note, recalled that Romania had seized and used at its own discretion the property of the Russian troops of the Romanian Front and located in Bessarabia. A significant part of the captured was sold or placed at the disposal of the whites. "Now that it has become clear to the Rumanian Government that the end of its shameful rule over the Bessarabian workers and peasants has come to an end, before its retreat it has set itself the goal of plundering all of Bessarabia." The Soviet governments of Russia and Ukraine, "reserving the right to bring to trial by a revolutionary tribunal" the perpetrators of the robberies, "disclaim any responsibility for the further fate of various valuables" brought from Romania to Russia during the First World War[256] . True, as Antonov-Ovseenko later admitted, "the situation developed in such a way that, despite our resolute intentions, we were forced to

be limited to pompous declarations and trifling military demonstrations"[257] .

The evening report of May 27 reported that "on the Bessarabian front, partial battles in the Bendery region"[258] . According to the evening report of May 28, "on the Bessarabian front, the enemy troops staged a rally at which a resolution was passed not to resist the Soviet troops. Reconnaissance units in the amount of 127 Red Army soldiers crossed the Dniester at 3 o'clock in the morning and captured the Bender fortress with a quick and energetic strike, captured 600 Romanians and French. Later, under the onslaught of superior units, ours crossed back to the left bank of the Dniester, taking the prisoners with them. The appearance of Soviet soldiers in the city led to an uprising of the local population. The rebels seized the city center, railway station, depot and other enterprises. The French command ordered to suppress the uprising, but many French soldiers refused to obey the order and began to fraternize with the rebels. Nevertheless, the French command managed to bring up artillery and, with the help of Algerian riflemen and Polish legionnaires, shell the city and suppress the uprising. On May 29, the city was declared in a state of siege, and executions and persecution of all suspected of sympathizing with the Reds began[260] .

On May 28, Antonov-Ovseenko, in accordance with the directive of the commander-in-chief of May 26, ordered the troops "to maintain a defensive position on the outer front"[261] . However, the Soviet-Romanian clashes on the Dniester continued. The morning report of May 29 reported that "on the Bessarabian front, scouts were being searched and a gunfight was taking place in the Bendery region"[262] . According to the evening report of May 29, "on the Bessarabian front, during an airplane raid on Bendery, our pilot dropped several pounds of proclamations," and "in the Dubossary-Bendery region, there was a gunfight"[263] . According to the morning report of May 30, "on the Bessarabian front there was a skirmish in the Bendery region" and "in the Dubossary region there was a partial firefight"[264] . The evening report of May 31 reported that "on the Bessarabian front in the Dubossary region, partial rifle and machine-gun fire, enemy attempts to cross the Dniester River are successfully beaten off by our artillery. Enemy aircraft carry out enhanced reconnaissance along the entire front. In Bende

our units went on the offensive in the sector of Starye Lipkany, Parkany, Tarnovka, which is [in] 8 versts northwest of Tiraspol "[265] . The morning report of June 1 reported that "on the Bessarabian front in the area of Starye Lipkany, Parkany, rifle and machine-gun firefight"[266] . On June 4, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Trotsky, issued Order No. 104 on disbanding the Ukrainian Front and forming the 12th Army from the troops of the 1st and 3rd Ukrainian Soviet armies, and the 14th Army from the 2nd Ukrainian Soviet Army[267] . On June 13, — Antonov-Ovseenko also gave the corresponding order, and the new commander of the 12th Army, N.G. Semyonov ordered all the troops of the former 3rd Army to be reorganized into the 45th and 46th Rifle Divisions[268] .

The operational reports of the Soviet troops on the Dniester indicate that the battles with the Romanian troops continued. June 5 "on the Bessarabian front in the Bendery area there was an artillery skirmish"[269] . On June 7, "the enemy shelled the station and the city of Tiraspol with artillery fire"[270] . On June 9, 25-versts northwest of Tiraspol, in the Krasnogorka area, the enemy in 5 boats tried to cross to the left bank of the Dniester and push back our outpost, but was repulsed, the situation was restored[271] . As the commander of the 3rd brigade of the 5th rifle division Chernikov reported on June 10, "the Romanians have crossed the Dniester and are attacking Krasnaya Gorka [Krasno-gorka] in the area where the 5th Tilegulsky regiment is located. The absence of Russian cartridges and machine guns makes it possible for the enemy to develop an offensive, but I have taken the most urgent measures to eliminate this offensive. In view of the complete disorganization of the Tiraspol garrison and some units stationed at the fronts in this area, and the absence of people in these units who would be in their places when necessary, because the real ones are not in their places. There are isolated escapes of Red Army soldiers from positions, and the above-mentioned units are not part of our brigade ... "[272]

The evening report of June 10 reported that "in the area of Krasnaya Gorka [Krasnogorka], the enemy launched an offensive. He crossed to the left bank of the Dniester, where he entered into battle with our outpost, which does not make it possible to move forward. Measures have been taken to eliminate the attack. In the Kuchurgany-Bendery region, the enemy is seen preparing to repair the railway bridge. Between Krasnaya Gorka [Krasnogorka] and Kuchurgany there is a rare rifle

shootout"[273]. Clashes with the Romanians in the area of Krasnogorka continued until June 14, when there was a lull. On the same day, a Romanian aircraft dropped 7 bombs on Tiraspol[274]. June 15–16 at [275] . 19
In Tiraspol, there was an artillery-rifle skirmish .

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On June 1, 1919, the enemy troops in Bessarabia were estimated at 40.5-42 thousand bayonets and 2.4-2.8 thousand sabers, 88-100 guns, 18 armored cars[277] . The withdrawal of French and Greek troops from the region led to a reduction in enemy forces. According to Soviet intelligence, on June 20, the enemy forces in Bessarabia were estimated at 26.8 thousand bayonets and 1.7 thousand sabers[278] . As of June 15, the 3rd Ukrainian Soviet Army had 27,791 people, 285 machine guns and 48 guns[279] . On June 22, "Romanians fired artillery at the villages of Slobodzeya and Karagach, 15 versts south of Tiraspol." On June 23, the Romanians bombarded Tiraspol with artillery fire. On June 24, Romanian artillery fired on Giderim and Vykhatintsy, and a group of scouts with machine guns tried to capture the village of Zhura, but was recaptured by Soviet troops[280] .

In his report to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on the situation on the fronts, Vatsetis on June 24 indicated that "the most important task of the former Ukrainian Front at the present time is: a) defense on the borders of Romania; b) covering the direction to Kyiv [...]; c) restoration of ties with Soviet Hungary"[281] . However, the development of the situation on the Southern Front, where on May 17–19 the troops of Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin went on the offensive in the Donbass and, having broken through the front, began to move deep into Ukraine, making these tasks of the 12th Army irrelevant. By the beginning of July, Denikin's troops reached the Dnieper. In July, UNR troops and Galician units launched an offensive from Galicia. Soviet troops on the Dniester were under threat of encirclement and retreated to Zhitomir at the end of August.

Bessarabian question at the peace conference

Meanwhile, on January 18, 1919, a peace conference opened in Paris. In his speech at the conference on February 1, Romanian Prime Minister I. Brătianu listed the territories that should have been annexed to his country - Transylvania, Bukovina, Bessarabia and Dobruja. True, the Entente countries, referring to the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1918 and Romania's withdrawal from the war, refused to recognize the agreement of 1916, but the Romanian leadership quickly realized that anti-Soviet statements, and most importantly, deeds, could change the situation. Therefore, Brătianu asked the Entente to give Romania the opportunity to "resist Bolshevism not only in its own interests, but in the interests of all of Europe and even, without exaggeration, in the interests of world civilization." Of course, it was more convenient to defend world civilization not on the Prut, but on the Dniester[282]. For its part, on February 7, 1919, the government of the Ukrainian SSR sent a radiogram addressed to the chairman of the peace conference, J. Clemenceau, in which it declared "an energetic —

protest against the predatory imperialist Romanian landowner government" and recalled the agreement concluded on March 5–9, 1918 in Odessa through the mediation of representatives of the Entente. This treaty "remains a solemn international act, binding not only the Romanian government, but also the powers of the Accord, especially since during the occupation of Bessarabia by the Romanian troops, the diplomatic representatives of the powers of the Accord declared that it was purely temporary and military in nature." In addition, the conference was reminded that "the congress of the peasants of the Bessarabian Republic, which met in Chisinau from January 18 to January 22, 1918 ... unanimously spoke out against the Romanian occupation. [...] Having experienced the advantages of their own power, the Bessarabian workers and peasants will never reconcile with the power of the Romanian landowners and capitalists...". The Ukrainian Soviet government "will not stop at any means to free workers and peasants of Bessarabia from the yoke of the Romanian oligarchy, that it will not allow power to be established in the tormented and devastated Bukovina,

opinion, hated by the Romanian people [283]. It is clear that such an themselves, was of no interest to anyone in Paris, as well as quite accessible information about the massacres of the Romanian invaders with the

local population in Bessarabia. To study all questions related to the territorial claims of Romania, the Council of Ten formed a commission of experts, chaired by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tardieu, composed of representatives of the USA, England, France and Italy. On February 8, the Commission on Romanian Affairs came to the conclusion that without the participation of Russia, the issue of Bessarabia could not be resolved, and since there was a possibility of victory for the troops of Admiral A.V. Kolchak, the solution of the Bessarabian issue should have been postponed. On February 22, at a meeting of the Commission, Brătianu stated that "we cannot imagine the existence of the Romanian people without the Dniester, just as we cannot imagine it without the Danube and Tisza, in order to separate it from the Slavic element ... Bessarabia is the entrance to our house ; if it is in the wrong hands, it may endanger our hearth . "[284] However, a certain part of the wealthy circles of Bessarabia considered it possible, in the event of a White victory in Russia, to return the region to its composition. As early as December 1918, a number of delegates were sent to Europe to propagate this idea. On March 9 and 22, 1919, the leaders of the Russian White movement addressed the Paris Conference with a statement stating that the status of the peoples of Russia "cannot be determined outside and without the consent of the Russian people", and the right of f territory[285]. —

Under these conditions, the Commission on Romanian Affairs on March 22 recommended that Romania settle the issue of its borders with each neighboring state. On April 23, Brătianu, instructing Foreign Minister M. Ferehide, who replaced him at the conference, reminded him that "the fight against the Bolsheviks on our two fronts is a great danger at the present time. Our future borders also depend on the results of this struggle . On April 28, Ferehide sent a memorandum to the Allies with a proposal to authorize the occupation of Budapest by the Romanian troops, which "will make it impossible for the Hungarian and Russian Bolsheviks to cooperate," as well as them with the Maximalists in Germany.

“It is impossible,” the Rumanian minister substantiated his position, “for Europe not to be aware of the burden lying on Romania—to serve as a necessary barrier to aggressive Bolshevism”[287] . Among the conditions set on May 26 for Kolchak to be recognized as the “ruler of Russia” was the demand to recognize the Paris Conference's right to “determine the future fate of the Romanian part of Bessarabia”[288] . In this case, it was about the northern part of Bessarabia, while its southern regions were to become part of Kolchak's Russia. In his reply to the allies, Kolchak indicated that he was ready to discuss this problem, but the final decision rested with the Constituent Assembly[289] .

On July 2, 1919, during the discussion of the Bessarabian question at the conference, a wish was expressed to hold a plebiscite in Bessarabia. Naturally, the Romanian representatives spoke out categorically against holding a plebiscite, referring to the fact that the majority of the population had already clearly expressed itself in favor of unification with Romania. As Brătianu stated, “in principle, I am against any plebiscite in Bessarabia, since Bessarabia, firstly, is Romanian both from a historical and ethnic point of view, secondly, it, in conditions of complete freedom, expressed a desire to unite with Romania, in- thirdly, a plebiscite would help to maintain an atmosphere of uncertainty and unrest.” Knowing that the Entente needed Romanian troops to suppress the revolution in Hungary, the Romanian Prime Minister decided to take an active position. “Russia occupied Bessarabia in order to reach Constantinople. The moment Constantinople ceases to be the goal of her foreign policy, then all her interest in Bessarabia will also disappear. I would agree to a plebiscite in Bessarabia on the condition that the major powers also hold plebiscites in their territories . As a result, it was decided to postpone the solution of the Bessarabian issue in view of the international position of Russia[291] .

On the same day, Brătianu sent a memorandum to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Paris Peace Conference, which met under the chairmanship of the French Foreign Minister Tardieu, stating that “Romania, at a time when hostilities ceased more than 7 months ago for the rest parts of Europe, is in a state of declared

wars with their Russian and Hungarian Bolshevik neighbors"[292] . In addition, on May 24, the 8th Romanian Infantry Division entered Eastern Galicia and occupied the Pokuttya region. Formally, the Romanian troops were a neutral force in the Polish-Ukrainian war and were used to disengage the troops of the parties. True, Romanian neutrality had a noticeable pro-Polish bias. After Poland occupied all of Eastern Galicia by July 17, and the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris adopted on August 1 a preliminary decision on the northern border of Bukovina, which transferred its entire territory to Romania, Romanian troops were withdrawn from Eastern Galicia on August 18. The Polish-Romanian border finally received international recognition on March 15, 1923, when the Conference of Ambassadors recognized Poland's sovereignty over Eastern Galicia[293] . Meanwhile, on August 3–4, 1919, —

Romanian troops occupied Budapest. In this situation, the Romanian government demanded that Hungary disarm all armed forces, establish Romanian control over the Hungarian railways, transfer to Romania 50% of railway equipment, 600 vehicles, 50% of the river fleet, 30% of livestock, 30 thousand wagons of grain, draw a border along the river . Tisza and transfer the entire territory of the Banat to Romania. But the Entente was not going to allow unauthorized actions of Bucharest. Therefore, the Romanian government was threatened with financial sanctions and demanded that it act only with the consent of the West. On November 15, the Entente countries sent an ultimatum to Bucharest, in which they demanded that Romania sign the Treaty of Saint-Germain and the act guaranteeing the rights of national minorities "without discussion, reservations or conditions." As a result, on November 16, 1919, the Romanian troops left Budapest, and by November 22 they were — .

withdrawn to the east bank of the river. Tisza [294] In September 1919, Romania sent a Bessarabian delegation to Paris, which in every possible way promoted the progressive nature of the accession of Bessarabia to Romania and supported the point of view of Bucharest regarding the uselessness of a plebiscite [295]. On December 10, Romania signed the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which secured Bukovina for it, but Romanian troops still remained in Hungary. On December 29, 1919, the Romanian Parliament adopted a law on the

hoped to push Romania to take joint action with Poland against their eastern neighbors, and on January 20, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Entente declared its readiness to recognize Bessarabia as part of Romania. In response, Bucharest announced its readiness to defend Europe from "new dangers"[297] . As the successes of the Red Army grew, the opinion of the conference leaned more and more in favor of the direct transfer of Bessarabia to Romania.

Peace proposals from Moscow and the Paris Protocol on Bessarabia

At this time, Soviet troops again began to enter the Dniester line. On January 19, 1920, the Red Army entered Mogilev Podolsky. The commander of the grouping of Denikin's troops retreating to Odessa, General N.N. Schilling turned to Romania with a request for assistance in the evacuation of refugees and troops to Bessarabia, but received no answer[298]. As early as January 27, the High Command of the Red Army wrote in its report to the Council of Worker-Peasant Defense: "The situation occupied by Romania, subject to the influence of the Entente on it, which really affects the adoption of measures to prepare a shelter for the remnants of the Volunteer Army and refugees from the Right-Bank Ukraine, is not at all clear and can significantly complicate our offensive to the Black Sea and the borders of Bessarabia . On February 7-8, 1920, Soviet troops occupied Odessa .

[300] On February 9, the commander-in-chief of the Red Army S.S. Kamenev gave the order to the commander of the Southwestern Front A.I. Egorov: "In the types of national policy, I order: The offensive of the troops [...] should continue only to the river. The Dniester, by no means crossing it either by forward or reconnaissance units, even if the retreating units of the Volunteer Army and the Galicians, pursued by our troops, having crossed the Dniester, retreated to Bessarabia . Accordingly, on February 11, Yegorov set the troops of the 14th Army the task of "going to the line of the river. Dniester, from Mogilev-Podolsky to the mouth of the Dniester Estuary, and occupy the right-flank parts of the N [ovaya] Ushitsa - Kamenetz-Podolsk - Studenitsa area. After occupying the indicated line, the units of the army go on the defensive without crossing the river. Dniester neither advanced nor reconnaissance units"[302] . On February 12, he confirmed this task: "the elimination of the remaining enemy units along the left bank of the Dniester, the occupation of the Dniester line from Mogilev-Podolsky to the mouth of the Dniester and then the transition to the defense along this line, by no means allowing even reconnaissance parties to cross the Dniester f

From Odessa, Soviet troops moved in three columns to the Dniester - to Ovidiopol, to Tiraspol and to Dubossary. On February 13, 1920, units of the Red Army under the command of Kotovsky occupied Tiraspol and Parkany and reached the banks of the Dniester in this area. On the same day at Akkerman, the remnants of the Volunteer Army units were defeated and captured, which, hoping to leave for Bessarabia, retreated from Odessa to the Dniester, but were not allowed to cross the river by the Romanians. On February 18, the entire left bank of the Dniester from Rybnitsa to the Black Sea was occupied by Soviet troops. The Bessarabian Red Army men persistently demanded the entry of Soviet troops into their native land. Along the Dniester, units of the 60th and 41st rifle divisions of the 14th army were deployed, which on February 26 were ordered "to go on the defensive, strengthening possible ~~crossing~~ points"[304] . On February 15, the Romanian troops in Bessarabia were estimated by Soviet intelligence at 5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions (about 25 — IN thousand bayonets and 1.5 thousand cavalry)[305] . By April 1, 1920, the 14th Army of the Southwestern Front had 37 [306] 922 people. The success of the Soviet troops on the outskirts of Odessa and the Crimea required a significant effort, and the military situation on the Southwestern Front did not favor the advance of the Red

Army into Bessarabia. In February 1920, Soviet-Romanian soundings took place in Denmark with a view to a possible start of peace negotiations. February 9 M.M. Litvinov in a conversation with the Romanian representative D.N. Ciotori stated that "the Soviet governments of Russia and Ukraine are fully prepared to discuss both the territorial and financial claims of the Romanian government with the aim of achieving peace between the three interested parties as soon as possible"[307] . Privately, Litvinov agreed that the Bessarabians had the right to self-determination, and that the Romanian valuables in Russia should be returned[308] . On February 16, Chioteri was informed that Moscow was "ready to immediately begin negotiations" on these issues[309] .

For its part, the Romanian government notified Ciotori on 20 February that "the proposal for peace must come from the Bolsheviks, since we do not consider ourselves at war with them. Peace must be a mutual recognition of the actual situation in accordance with the norms of international law and politics. Negotiations to establish economic relations immediately

will follow the restoration of political peace on the basis of reciprocity and with the guarantee that they will avoid interfering in our internal affairs. The message of the General Staff on this matter indicates that nine divisions are approaching the Dniester. Is it not with hostile intentions? Could you make the Bolsheviks offer peace in the same way as they offered it to other neighbors?^[340] On February 25, the Romanian Prime Minister A. Vaida-Voevod again pointed out to Ciotori: "Demand a public offer and save the values. Try to organize the repatriation of prisoners. The main thing is to get a public offer of peace as soon as —

possible. February 24, 1920 People's Commissar of the RSFSR G.V. Chicherin sent a radiogram to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the following content: "The successful military operations of the armies of both Soviet republics, Russian and Ukrainian, created an urgent need for Russia and Romania to enter into negotiations in order to regulate relations between the two peoples by mutual agreement and establish peaceful relations between them, useful and beneficial for both parties. The Russian Soviet Government believes that all disputes between the two countries can be settled through peaceful negotiations and that all territorial issues can be resolved amicably. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, therefore, addresses the Romanian Government with a formal proposal to start peace negotiations—

and asks to indicate to it the place and time for the meeting of representatives of both states. For its part, the government of the Ukrainian SSR also sent a radiogram to the Romanian government on February 26, stating that it was addressing the Romanian government "with the same formal peace proposal. [...] The Soviet government, a constant supporter of the peaceful resolution of all conflicts between peoples, constantly uses every opportunity to resolve all misunderstandings with Rumania by peaceful means. Proof of this are the favorable results of the negotiations between the Soviet Ukrainian — authorities and the Romanian Government, interrupted by the German an

an agreement between the Land of Soviets and Romania, concluded at the beginning of March 1918, in which Romania undertook to withdraw its troops

from Bessarabia. The Romanian leadership was in no hurry to respond to these appeals, since it was more important for him to clarify the position of England and France regarding Romanian territorial claims. The Entente countries did not have a unanimous opinion regarding possible Soviet-Romanian negotiations. France was against these negotiations, Italy was in favor, and England believed that there would be no harm from them. In any case, England and France were interested in maintaining their influence in Romania and their control over the mouths of the Danube. Therefore, on March 3, 1920, the prime ministers of England, France and Italy decided: "Taking into account the general wishes of the population of Bessarabia, the Moldavian character of the region from a geographical and ethnographic point of view, as well as arguments of a historical and economic nature, the main allied powers spoke in favor of joining Bessarabia to Romania"[314] . However, an official document on this issue will be signed after the Romanian troops are withdrawn from Hungary[315] . —

Having familiarized himself with this decision of the Entente, the Romanian Prime Minister sent a telegram to Moscow on the same day, in which he reported that "Romania has completed its national unification" and "desires in peace and in friendly relations with its neighbors to establish the basis for its future economic and political development ". Since Romania "adheres to the principle of refraining from interfering in the internal affairs" of Russia and Ukraine, it accepts a "formal proposal to start peace negotiations" and will later announce the place of a possible meeting of representatives of the parties[316] . On March 5, Vaida-Voevod instructed Chiotori to obtain peace proposals from the Soviet representatives, which would contain "the recognition that Bessarabia belongs to us ... The valuables must be returned in full. The issue of prisoners will be settled. We recognize any government that is recognized by the Russian people . "[317]

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On March 7, Chiotori reported to Bucharest the results of his conversations with Litvinov, who had renounced the unilateral declaration of belonging to Bessarabia, since it was precisely this question that should

become the basis of negotiations, as well as the issue of Romanian values. Chiyotori himself believed that "they want to enter into negotiations, as this will strengthen their political position" [318]. On March 8, Chicherin sent a note to Bucharest, in which he proposed the place of possible negotiations, in which the Ukrainian SSR would take part, Kharkov [319]. Response radiogram the Romanian government has proposed as a venue negotiations Warsaw [320]. On March 17, Chicherin indicated that the RSFSR could not negotiate in Warsaw due to hostilities ongoing with Poland, and again offered Kharkov as a place for negotiations [321]. However, the resignation of the government of Vaida Voevoda on March 13 led to the termination of discussions on the possibility of holding Soviet-Romanian negotiations [322]. In April 1920, the Romanian army

was finally withdrawn from Hungarian territory. On June 4, 1920, the Treaty of Trianon was signed, which determined the western borders of Romania, which received Transylvania, Maramures, Crisana and eastern Banat. As a result, taking into account Bessarabia, the territory of Romania increased from 137,903 sq. km to 294,967 sq. km, and the population - from 8 to 16 million people, of which more than 25% were non-Romanians. During the fierce battles on the Soviet-

Polish front in the summer of 1920, the Entente tried to push Romania to intervene in the war on the side of Poland, but the widespread anti-war and revolutionary sentiments in Romanian society and the fear of being defeated and losing Bessarabia led to the fact that Romania took a wait-and-see position. Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership, concerned about the possibility of Romanian intervention in the Soviet-Polish war, continued to try to draw Bucharest into negotiations. On June 16, Moscow offered Romania negotiations on the passage of former prisoners of the Austro-Hungarian army across the Dniester [323]. According to Trotsky's note to the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated June 19, he considered the moment a good one "for a solemn proposal

Romania peace talks" [324]. This proposal was supported by I.V. Stalin, but on June 29 the Politburo decided to "postpone the offer of peace to Romania." True, discussions on this issue in the Soviet leadership did not subside [325]. Representatives of the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR continued unofficially even the position of Romania. On July 1, Chiotori informed the new

Romanian Prime Minister Averescu about a preliminary conversation with the Soviet delegation in London, during which it became clear that the Soviet side was afraid of Romania's intervention in the Soviet-Polish war. Ciotori said that Romania was not going to violate its position of complete neutrality, and asked that Moscow also adhere to this principle in relation to Bucharest. Soviet delegates L.B. Krasin and N.K. Kolyshko was offered to conclude, if not a peace treaty, then at least "some kind of agreement." Naturally, the Romanian representative again pointed out the need to return the Romanian valuables in the RSFSR[326] . On July 7, Litvinov again reminded the Romanian diplomats in Denmark that "the Soviet governments of Russia and Ukraine are fully prepared to discuss both the territorial and financial claims of the Romanian government with a view to concluding peace as soon as possible", as well as to continue negotiations "on the exchange of prisoners of war and civilians" [327] . In the end, the Soviet leadership revised its position, and on August 5, the Plenum of—

the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided to resume efforts to reach an agreement with Romania. On the same day, an official note was sent to Bucharest. Referring to newspaper reports that the Romanian government did not receive a response from Moscow in mid-March 1920, the Soviet side recalled that on March 17 a telegram was sent to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a refusal to negotiate in Warsaw and a proposal to hold them in Kharkov . Be that as it may, "the Russian Government is ready to resume the exchange of opinions with the Romanian Government ... and, just as before, is imbued with the desire to hold a peace conference" at which "all questions of a territorial and economic nature" could be discussed. Kharkiv was once again proposed as a place for negotiations, but at the same time Moscow was ready to discuss another place for negotiations[328] . On August 9, the Romanian government, referring to the fact that England had invited him to participate in possible peace negotiations between Russia and neighboring countries in London, announced that it was waiting for further proposals from England[329]

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For its part, on August 29, Moscow, referring to the example of negotiations with Finland and Poland, again proposed to Bucharest

direct bilateral negotiations[330] . At that time, the Soviet government was concerned that, in the face of the defeats of the Red Army on the Polish front, the danger of Romania's entry into the war increased again. Therefore, on September 4, Chicherin suggested that Litvinov, who was in Copenhagen, meet "with representatives of the Romanian government" and inform "them that we are not beaten at all and are strong enough to beat the Romanians if they oppose us." However, since the RSFSR wants to avoid war; "It is more advantageous for Rumania itself to come to an agreement with us about Bessarabia right now and talk with us about the gold fund"[331] . In the future, Romania continued to insist that Moscow return her valuables, and the RSFSR insisted on the need to start —

negotiations[332] . On September 8, Romania announced its desire to restore centuries-old good-neighborly relations with Russia and promised to report soon on how to achieve this[333] . However, for a month there were no new messages from Bucharest. Then, on September 29, Moscow again offered Bucharest to start negotiations "on territorial and financial issues of interest to both sides"[334] . It was not until October 8 that Averescu informed Chicherin that Romania had never taken any hostile actions against the RSFSR and that "a real state of war with Russia had never existed, either in fact or legally," since the Soviet ultimatums of May 1–2, 1919 "was not followed by any a formal declaration of war, nor an attack by organized military forces." Romania is ready to start negotiations with the RSFSR, but first of all would like to know on what basis these negotiations will be conducted[335]. In its response of October 13, Moscow also showed miracles of diplomatic resourcefulness and, expressing its readiness for negotiations to resolve all controversial issues, asked Bucharest if it was ready for negotiations and whether Kharkov could become the —

place for these negotiations[336] . On October 21, Romania reiterated its willingness to negotiate, but indicated that there were no contentious issues on its part. Therefore, Moscow was required to specify exactly which issues the Soviet government considers controversial[337] . In response, Moscow on October 27, expressi

negotiations, pointed to the fact of passing through the Romanian "territory of the military forces going to connect with the Crimean counter-revolutionary rebels." Thus, the existence of controversial issues was again stated without their specific indication[338] . Information about the passage of troops through Romania for the army of P.N. Wrangel relied on the publications of the Russkaya Gazeta published in the Crimea, which reported on August 15 that a 5,000-strong detachment under the command of General N.E. Bredov. Back in early February, this detachment retreated from Odessa along the Dniester to the north and went to the location of the Polish troops, where it was interned. According to Bredov, the treatment of the internees was not very good, but when the Red Army went on the offensive, the Poles became kinder. From July 9, trains began to be sent through the territory of Romania to Reni and Galati, from where they were —

transferred by steamers to [the Crimea\[339\]](#) . Meanwhile, on April 14, 1920, a draft treaty on Bessarabia was prepared in Paris. However, the United States refused to sign it and, despite the persuasion of the European allies, on August 10 declared "full respect for the Russian borders"[340] . Behind these diplomatic disputes was the rivalry between England and France with the United States for control of Romanian oil. As a result of the redistribution of German capital in Rumania, the distribution of foreign capital in her oil industry has changed radically. If in 1914 the most significant investments belonged to Germany (27.3%), the Netherlands (24.3%) and England (23.6%), then in 1920 England took the first place (30.6%), The Netherlands (24.3%) and [France](#) (12.1%), while the share of American investments remained at the same level[341] . Naturally, the United States sought to prevent "Romania from giving oil concessions to other countries through agreements contrary to their interests," but this was not achieved. Therefore,

Washington decided to refrain from signing a document recognizing Bessarabia as part of Romania. On September 9, 1920, speaking at a meeting of the Council of Ten, the Italian delegate Titoni noted that if Romania does not receive treaty rights to Bessarabia, then it is quite obvious that Russia, when it recovers, will certain

the need for Western allies. Thus, the Bessarabian issue was a convenient opportunity to strengthen the influence of the Entente countries in Romania[342]. In October 1920, Romania proposed a plan to create an association of Eastern European countries - the Little Entente, which could include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929 - Yugoslavia). This idea was approved by England and France, which at that time were actively creating a "cordon sanitaire" in Eastern Europe.

As a result, on October 28, 1920, the main allied powers signed the Paris Protocol, according to which:

"England, France, Italy, Japan and Romania, believing that in the interests of general peace in Europe it is important now to ensure sovereignty over Bessarabia that meets the wishes of the population and guarantees ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities due protection; believing that

from the point of view of geographical, ethnographic, historical and economic, the annexation of Bessarabia to Romania is fully justified;

believing that the population of Bessarabia expressed a desire to see Bessarabia annexed to Romania;

Considering, finally, that Romania has voluntarily expressed its desire to give firm guarantees of freedom and justice, without distinction of race, religion or language, in accordance with the treaty signed in Paris on December 9, 1919, to the inhabitants of the Romanian Kingdom within its former borders, as well as to the inhabitants of the newly annexed territories, decided to enter

into this agreement. 1. The High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize the sovereignty of Romania over the Bessarabian territory lying between the present border of Romania, the Black Sea, the course of the Dniester from its mouth to the place where it is cut by the former border between Bukovina and Bessarabia and this former border.

2. A commission composed of three members, one of which will be appointed by the Principal Allied Powers, one by Romania and one by the Council of the League of Nations, instead of Russia, will be formed within 15 days after the entry into force of this treaty to determine on the site a new frontier line of Romania " .

Romania will assign its citizenship to all the inhabitants of Bessarabia, who were under the authority of the Russian Empire. Former Russian subjects living in Bessarabia were granted the right of option in favor of Russia within 2 years after the entry into force of the treaty.

"7. The High Contracting Parties recognize that the mouth of the Danube, called the Kiliya branch, must come under the jurisdiction of the European Danube Commission. [...] 8. Romania will

assume responsibility for the proportional part of the Russian state debt falling on Bessarabia and all other financial obligations of the Russian state, in the form in which it will be determined by a special convention between the main allied powers and Romania ...

9. The High Contracting Parties shall invite Russia to accede to the present treaty as soon as there is a Russian government recognized by them. They reserve the right to submit to arbitration by the Council of the League of Nations all questions that might be raised by the Russian government in respect of the details of this treaty, it being agreed that the boundaries defined in this treaty, as well as the sovereignty of Rumania over the territories included in them, cannot be brought up for discussion. The same will apply to all matters that might

occur later when it is used.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the signatory powers. It will enter into force only after the deposit of these ratifications" in Paris [343] Having learned about— .

the signing of an agreement in Paris recognizing Bessarabia as part of the territory of Romania, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR on November 1, 1920, they declared that "they cannot recognize as having any or the force of an agreement relating to Bessarabia, which took place without their participation, and that they in no way consider themselves bound by an agreement concluded on this subject by other governments .

On November 10, Romania rejected accusations of passing armed forces hostile to the Soviet government through its territory. Regarding the protest against the annexation of Bessarabia, it was pointed out that "this province, as Romanian as the rest of the kingdom, from which it was separated by an act of arbitrariness

1812, reunited with the Motherland of her own will, expressed by her representatives. Since this accession is recognized by the great powers, "the question of the reunification of Bessarabia with Romania is finally closed, and the Romanian Government does not intend to discuss it in the future. It only remains for Romania and Russia to clarify among themselves the secondary issues that cause any change in sovereignty and which are in principle settled by the said agreement. If Moscow so desires, it may apply to the Council of the League of Nations "with regard to particular questions related to this reunification, without, of course, touching upon the question of the borders and sovereign rights of Romania, which are henceforth not subject to discussion." The Romanian government again asked to be informed what particular issues the Soviet side considers disputable[345] .

Part Two THE SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE (1921–1939)

peace or war

By the end of 1920, large-scale hostilities in European Russia had ceased. In the second half of October 1920, the fighting on the Soviet-Polish front ended, and on November 17, Soviet-Polish negotiations began in Riga. Formally, a truce was concluded between the parties, which had yet to be turned into a full-fledged peace treaty. It is clear that Moscow tried to normalize relations with Romania, which was getting closer and closer to Poland. Now the main problem of the Soviet government was the neutralization of the remnants of the anti-Soviet forces that had retreated to the territory of Poland and Romania. On November 23, the Soviet government sent a note to Romania, in which it noted that during the fighting in the Mogilev-Podolsky region, the detachments defeated by the Red Army "crossed the Dniester in order to find refuge in Bessarabia, where the Romanian authorities accepted officers and carts, refusing only soldiers." Moscow expressed the hope that the Romanian government would intern these officers[346] .

On November 24, in a note to the Romanian government, Moscow reported that "the former General Wrangel, the leader of the Crimean rebels, now defeated, intends to transport the remnants of his army to Constanta and prepare a new attack on Russia on Romanian territory." Based on Bucharest's repeated statements about maintaining neutrality, the Soviet government counted on its "resolute opposition to Wrangel's intentions and hopes that any attempt on his part or on the part of other rebels to violate the neutrality of the Romanian territory will be suppressed by all means at your disposal"[347] . On November 28, the Romanian side stated that it had "no information about General Wrangel's violation of the neutrality of Romania, expressed in the transportation of troops to Constanta or in the preparation of an attack on Russia on Romanian territory." Moreover, Romania could never allow such a violation of its neutrality. "As for the armed forces that crossed into the territory of the Romanian Kingdom through the border line

Dniester, these troops have been disarmed by us and the soldiers, as well as officers, have been interned"[348] .

At the same time, the representative of Romania at informal talks in London, D. Ciotori, had several conversations with the Soviet representative, L.B. Krasin, who stated that "the Soviet government has accurate information that Romania would be disposed to provide asylum to Wrangel and his officers and even allow the restoration of the army of this general on its territory." If this happens, then Moscow will certainly regard it as "an act hostile to Russia." In response, Ciotori recalled that since the beginning of the Russian revolution, Romania has been pursuing a policy of "neutrality and good neighborliness", so such an assumption is completely absurd. Then Krasin drew the interlocutor's attention to the fact that Moscow tends to believe that Romania harbors "secret intentions against Russia, since it does not agree to start peace negotiations for anything and under any condition." It is clear that Ciotori tried to refute these fears, referring to the peace-loving policy of Bucharest. Krasin pointed out that a possible transfer by Romania of "military materials and equipment left over from the Russian armies on the Romanian front to Wrangel or other enemies of the Bolsheviks" would be regarded by Moscow as a provocative act. Ciotori stated that until Romania "receives the compensation due to her both for material values and for her valuables held in Russia", she will not transfer anything to anyone. Then Krasin turned to the issue of Bessarabia and stated that "the protest of the Soviet government regarding the signing of the treaty on Bessarabia was made only formally and [is] a matter of pride." Therefore, "the Soviet government ... is disposed to recognize the unification of Bessarabia

with Romania only on the condition that peace negotiations between Romania and Russia begin immediately." However, according to Ciotori, this statement was a bluff, since "the Russians will not recognize and will not join for anything to the treaty on Bessarabia signed in Paris, for the following reasons: a) they think that as soon as Romania receives their signature, she will never agree to discuss peace with Russia again; b) the signing of this treaty would mean that the Moscow government

submitted unconditionally to the decisions of the Entente, which, however, it does not recognize and with which it is at war. The Romanian diplomat himself believed that there was a threat to Romania from the east and believed that “the only way to stop the actions of the Russians against us would be to accept their proposal to start peace negotiations, declaring that Romania reserves the right to put forward its conditions at a peace conference. Then it would be possible to raise the— .

question of Bessarabia the way [we wish](#).”[349] On December 12, the Romanian government, recalling its positive response to the Soviet request to prevent Wrangel troops from entering Romanian territory, asked about the reasons for the “concentration of Russian troops on—the Dniester border”[349]. 350] . On December 14, Moscow again reminded Bucharest of its proposal for peace talks, where the whole range of issues of interest to both sides could be considered, and requested information on the number of internees on Romanian territory[351] . On December 16, the Romanian side announced that it had interned 440 soldiers and 150 officers with 4 guns and 50 horses in total, and recalled its request regarding Soviet troops near the Dniester[352] . On December 24, the Soviet side notified Bucharest that the deployment of Soviet troops near the Dniester was connected with the conditions for their quartering and that it “had no aggressive intentions—

towards Romania”[353] . In December 1920, the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front submitted a report to the commander-in-chief of the Red Army on the tasks of defending Soviet territory in the event of a war with Poland and Romania in the spring of 1921. It was proposed to prepare defensive lines on the outskirts of the largest railway junctions and build the Kiev fortified area with an advanced defensive line along the river. Grouse. From the side of Romania, the Dniester was to become the advanced defensive line, and the rear - the river. Southern Bug. It was also necessary to create fortifications on the outskirts of Odessa and advanced strongholds in Kamenets-Podolsk, Staraya Ushitsa, Mogilev-Podolsky, Yampol, Rybnitsa, Dubossary, Tiraspol and near Soroca. This task was facilitated by the fact that the construction of a number of these points began in the summer of 1920. In addition, it was necessary to strengthen t

armored trains. On the Southern Bug, it was necessary to build fortifications at the largest

crossings[354] . According to Soviet intelligence, on December 15, 1920, the Eastern Army of Romania (headquarters - Iasi, commander - General A. Lupescu) was stationed in Bessarabia and Bukovina as part of the 2nd Army Corps (3rd, 4th infantry divisions; deployment - Chisinau, Orhei), 3rd Army Corps (5th, 6th Infantry Divisions; deployment - Chisinau, Galati) and 4th Army Corps (2nd, 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions; deployment - Iasi, Balti, Chernivtsi, Roman). Soviet intelligence believed that in the event of mobilization, the Romanian Eastern Army, consisting of 8 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry brigades, would have up to 200 thousand people, 1 thousand guns, 4 thousand machine guns and 25 tanks[355] . According to Soviet intelligence, in the period January 1 - February 15, 1921, the troops of the Romanian Eastern Army numbered 63.4 thousand bayonets, 6.3 thousand sabers, 2296 machine guns, 496 guns and 25 tanks (which accounted for 41.5%

of the bayonets , 58.9% of sabers, 47.7% of machine guns, 54.3% of guns and 50% of tanks of the total number of the Romanian army)[356] . On January 5, 1921, the Romanian Foreign Minister T. Ionescu again informed Moscow of Bucharest's invariably peaceful position and that Romania was not at war with Russia. Therefore, "in our opinion, the point is not to negotiate peace between Romania and Russia, which has never been violated, but to settle issues that could arise in relations between the two countries as a result of the events that took place during the last years." If the Soviet side agrees with such a position, then it would be good for it to report on

those issues that "should be the subject of negotiations between both sides"[357] . On January 15, Moscow sent a note to Bucharest, which noted that "the Russian Government takes note with pleasure of your statement about the peace-loving and correct attitude of the Romanian Government towards the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics. I can assure you that the Russian Republic, for its part, is completely averse to any attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Romania or other hostile acts and has firmly

relations currently established between Russia and Romania. It is all the more desirable, in the opinion of the Russian Government, to enter into negotiations with Romania in order to establish mutual relations between the two countries on a firm basis of an agreement. Romania was asked to hold a conference with the participation of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, which could resolve all "without exception questions" that were of interest to both sides. If Romania is not ready to discuss all the issues, then the RSFSR proposed to discuss only the issues of "restoring commercial relations" and navigation on the Dniester[358] .

In its response note dated January 31, the Romanian government stated that the Soviet side agreed that "there is no state of war between Romania and Russia. It naturally follows from this that both countries are in a state of peace. Since Moscow mentioned some issues that could be the subject of negotiations, Ionescu suggested that both sides send a delegate to Riga, where it would be possible to agree on a program of negotiations[359] . On the same day, in London, Ciotori again talked with Krasin and drew his attention to the importance for Romania of resolving the issue of her documents, manuscripts, and similar materials remaining in Russia. Since the issue of gold was not raised, Krasin believed that this was a hint at a possible agreement regarding Bessarabia: gold in exchange for the recognition of this region as part of Romania[360] . On February 7, Moscow —

notified Bucharest of its agreement with its proposal for negotiations and the appointment of M.M. Litvinov. Revel [Tallinn] [361] was proposed as a place for negotiations . For its part, on February 10, Romania announced its consent to negotiations in Revel and asked to indicate the date for the start of these negotiations[362] On February 15, the Soviet side drew the attention of the Romanian government to the fact that "in the area adjacent to the Bessarabian border, rebellious White Guard bands raised uprisings against the Soviet Governments of Russia and Ukraine, and the Bessarabian territory served as the base for all operations. The Romanian administration, exercising power in Bessarabia, not only does not oppose the rebellions based on Bessarabia, but, on the contrary, supports them. So, for example, on February 5, the gang

Petliura's cavalry, under the command of a Petliura officer, crossed the Bessarabian border from Romanian territory and entered Ukrainian territory. Similar facts were repeated several times, which requires constant vigilance and the use of armed force on the part of the Russian and Ukrainian military authorities. The Soviet government protested against such actions of the Romanian authorities and drew the attention of Bucharest to "the danger posed by these facts for peace and the successful outcome of negotiations with Romania"[363] . The Soviet leadership found

itself in a difficult position. As Rakovsky, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, rightly emphasized in a telegram to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR on February 17, "concluding an agreement with Romania is an extremely difficult task, because, on the one hand, we have to regulate navigation on the Dniester, on the other hand, to avoid indications that Bessarabia given to Romania. Therefore, the whole task will be to ensure that the articles of the treaty relating to borders are of a temporary nature. In concluding this preliminary condition, I believe that the main purpose of the treaty should be to secure for us maximum neutrality on the part of Romania. Second: commodity extremely important exchange; third exchange: Bucharest - representations. observation post for the entire Balkan Peninsula and Central Europe. As the main issues in the negotiations, it was necessary to agree with the Romanians on the neutralization of the entire Dniester estuary, increase the line of territorial waters from 3 to 12 versts and support the demand for the neutralization of the Black Sea straits, which Romania also puts forward. It was also necessary to achieve the participation of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR in the Danube International Commission, to resolve the issue of the exchange of former prisoners of war and to conclude various economic conventions. Rakovsky resolutely objected to raising the question of the option, citing the fact that "we cannot in any way assume the obligation to consider the Bessarabians who are on the —

territory of Russia and Ukraine as Romanian citizens"[364] .

February 13, 1921 Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army S.S.

Kamenev sent the commander of all the armed forces of Ukraine and Crimea M.V.

pointed out that "the military-political situation on the western borders of the RSFSR, perhaps in the near future, will put the Red Army again before the armed defense of the borders of the RSFSR." The White Guard formations on the territory of Poland, the Wrangel army and the troops of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania appeared as probable opponents. The strongest adversaries would be Poland and Romania, while the rest of the western neighbors would either become allies of Poland or remain neutral. "Our common task in the west is to defend the borders of the RSFSR from the invasion of enemies." Accordingly, the troops were required to: "a) Repel an armed invasion and inflict a decisive defeat on the White Guard formations produced on the territory of our neighboring states, as well as repel any landing attempts by the Wrangel army on our Black Sea coasts, b) Inflict a decisive defeat on the armies of our neighbors states if they declared war

on us." The directive indicated several options for the operational actions of the Soviet troops, depending on the general situation. Among other things, there was a "PR" option, which provided that "when Poland came out together with Romania, with the partial participation or neutrality of a group of northern neighboring states, our plan is based on inflicting a decisive defeat on the most powerful and dangerous army of Poland and expectant actions against those remote from the main objects Romanian Wars. The Western Front, deployed in this case, delivers the main blow in Belarus, and the troops of the Southwestern Front are operating in Eastern Galicia, simultaneously leading an active defense against Romania and defending the Black Sea coast to Kerch[365] . Accordingly, Frunze, with his directive No. 2812/know/ ss of February 25, demanded that the headquarters of the Kiev (KVO) and Kharkov (HVO) military districts submit their views on these options for the actions of the Soviet troops by March 10[366] . In pursuance of this directive, on March 23–24, the headquarters of the KVO prepared reports on two options for the actions of the troops in the event of a war with Poland,[367] which, according to the operational documents of the Soviet command, was considered

In the meantime, on February 18, Moscow received a response from Bucharest, which denied the possibility of the Petliura detachments penetrating the territory of Ukraine and requested exact information about the alleged incident in order to “conduct an investigation”[368] . On March 3, 1921, a Polish-Romanian mutual assistance treaty was signed, which provided for mutual military support in the event that the eastern borders of Poland or Romania were subjected to an unprovoked attack (Article 1); mutual consultations and coordination of the policy of both countries in relation to the eastern neighbors (art. 2); the conclusion of the Polish-Romanian military convention (art. 3) and the obligation not to conclude peace and not to conduct separate negotiations in case of war (art. 4). The term of the contract was set at 5 years[369] . It is clear that, having learned about the conclusion of this agreement, on March 13, Chicherin drew Litvinov's attention to the need to clarify the question, what do the Romanians want - "put up with us or fight"? [370] At that time, a new interstate association arose in the Balkans - the Little Entente . It began on August 14, 1920, when a military agreement was signed between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. On April 23, 1921, a Romanian-Czechoslovak agreement was concluded against Hungary, and on June 7, 1921, a Romanian-Yugoslav agreement against Hungary and Bulgaria[371] .

On March 15, Romania notified the RSFSR that G. Filality, who is a commissar in Constantinople, had been appointed representative at the talks in Reval. The time of his possible arrival in Revel was supposed to be announced after his return to Bucharest[372] . Thus, the Romanian leadership has shown that the problem of an agreement with Moscow is not of much interest to him. It is clear that the Soviet government continued to seek the start of negotiations with Romania, which remained after the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish treaty of March 18, 1921, the only western neighbor, relations with which were still not regulated by a specific agreement. On March 23, Moscow again drew the attention of Bucharest to the fact that “the Romanian troops stationed along the Dniester not only protect the White Guard detachments and facilitate their crossing of the river in order to attack the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces, but also commit actions directly hostile to the latter. So,

for example, on March 12, Romanian troops heavily shelled the town of Yaruga, southeast of Mogilev [-Podolsky], and on March 14 they repeated this shelling with even greater energy. The Soviet side protested against such actions and demanded their cessation[373]. On the same day, Romania was told that Moscow was waiting for a message about the day of the arrival of the Romanian

representative in Revel[374]. On March 25, Ionescu informed Chicherin that there could be no attacks by "Romanian troops on Russian and Ukrainian units", although he agreed to investigate these facts. For its part, Romania put forward counterclaims about the facts of shelling of the Romanian troops from the Soviet coast[375]. On April 9, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR sent a note to Romania, in which they indicated that Romanian warships were attacking Soviet fishing boats in the Dniester Estuary. Accordingly, Moscow and Kiev demanded "the immediate removal of all warships from the Dniester estuary" and declared that the appearance of Romanian warships "in its waters will be considered by them as a hostile act, against which all measures necessary to protect our shores will be taken." At the same time, the Soviet republics proposed to Romania "to form a mixed commission ... to develop the statute of the Dniester estuary and the rules of navigation in its waters"[376]. On April 12, Ionescu informed Chicherin that the facts of the shelling of the Soviet coast by the Romanian troops were not confirmed. Practice firing took place in this area, but not a single shell flew across the river. In the same way, he denied the fact that armed Romanian ships had fired on Soviet watercraft on the estuary, pointing out that it was from the Soviet coast that fire had been opened on these Romanian ships. Nevertheless, Romania accepted the proposal to create a mixed commission on the estuary, but saw the main task of this commission in setting buoys along a line equidistant from both banks. Moscow was again re

Incidents on the Dniester

On April 29, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR declared that they could not accept the Romanian explanations about the incidents on the Dniester, where the "trial" firing of the Romanian troops led to "a certain number of wounded in Ukrainian towns located on the left bank of this river." The Soviet governments reiterated that "in fact, it has been established that groups, and sometimes entire gangs, of revolutionaries, ^{petliurists,} counter-^{previously} formed in Bessarabia, are crossing the river under the protection of the Romanian occupying troops." The note expressed the hope that the Romanian government would report on the measures it had taken to prevent such actions[378] .

According to the report of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Crimea A.T. Anders dated April 18, 1921 to the chief of staff of the troops of the Republic and the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, the following incidents took place on the Dniester: bombs began to be thrown from our posts, and at the same time a bullet fire was opened from the side of the rumberg. On February 21, in the area of Slobodzeya, 10 versts south of Tiraspol, a Red Army soldier was wounded by a gunshot from the direction of Romania. On February 28, an artillery shot was fired from the room side, and the shell exploded on our territory 2 versts east of Tiraspol. Repeated lighting of our coast and territory with room floodlights (on the night of January 6, 11, February 2, 8 - in the area of the Dniester Estuary, on the night of January 10 - the Belyaevka - Mayaki section). Shelling from the side on April 4 near Cape Kuchier, 5 versts north of Dubossary, of our patrols"[379] . On April 19, Moscow and Kyiv again protested against the—

hostile actions of the Romanian courts in the estuary. Refusing to divide the estuary into two equal parts, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR proposed to establish a single regime on the entire estuary, capable of eliminating all pretexts for conflict with the Romanians[380] . After consideration of this issue by military experts on May 10, the Romanian government agreed to the Soviet proposal to create a "mixed

Commission for the establishment of a single regime in the waters of the Dniester Estuary"[381] . On May 19, Moscow offered Odessa as a place for negotiations, but on May 25 Romania put forward a proposal to organize the work of the commission on a ship in the middle of the estuary[382] On June 1, the Soviet side agreed with this proposal and notified Bucharest that V.I. Yakovlev, and its members are representatives of the General Staff A.I. Medel and the Main Naval Staff G.N. Stepanov[383] . The Soviet delegation was tasked with achieving the neutralization of the estuary and ensuring the freedom of merchant shipping and fishing. The delegation was required to "take into account the fact that we did not recognize the appropriation of Bessarabia by Romania and when we talk about Bessarabia, we consider it an occupied region ... When it comes to the Bessarabian coast, we will have to avoid such expressions that could be interpreted as recognizing Bessarabia as part of Romania" [384] . On July 10, meetings of the Soviet-Romanian mixed commission on the problem of the Dniester Estuary began. However, this issue turned out to be too closely connected with the problem of determining the border, and on July 22, at the initiative of the Soviet —

side, the negotiations were interrupted for an indefinite period[385] . Meanwhile, on May 23, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR again protested against the hostile actions of the Romanian troops on the Dniester, where on May 11, in the area of Mogilev-Podolsky, "60 shots were fired at Russian and Ukrainian troops"[386] . On May 27, Bucharest denied such incidents, and of Soviet territory on May 11 in the area of — regarding the shelling Mogilev-Podolsky, he proposed creating a mixed [387] On June 16, Ionescu sent a telegram to Moscow to investigate this incident, in which he indicated that "on the night of the 1st June at two o'clock, at a distance of one verst from the Romanian village of Vaskautsi, the following border incident took place: a Romanian patrol seized a group of armed soldiers who had arrived on two barges on our shore and shot them. To this he was answered with volleys of rifles, and then on our bank and on the Ukrainian bank, quite close to the same place, other barges appeared with soldiers trying to cross the Dniester in order to enter Bessarabia. When our soldiers fired at these barges, t

crossed over to our shore, so those who tried to cross over to the other shore. During this incident, shots were fired from both sides. Another incident took place at midnight between June 2 and 3, when gangs armed with revolvers and rifles crossed the Dniester and attacked our picket [...] in Gruzenwitz. In the ensuing struggle, those who crossed to our shore left one dead, on our side one soldier was wounded .

Having received this note, Chicherin on June 19 notified Bucharest facts[389] . investigation will be carried out. The relevant that the request was sent to the headquarters of the CMD, which, in turn, requested the headquarters of the border division that guarded the banks of the Dniester[390] . Having received a response from the headquarters of the border division at 22 o'clock on June 20, the chief of staff of the KVO I.Kh. Spider on June 21 sent the following message to Moscow: "According to the report of the head of the border division, not a single Red Army soldier of the border division took part in both incidents. According to the same report, both cases actually took place: from June 1 to June 2, in the area of the village of Vyshkovtsy, which is 7 versts up the Dniester from the mouth of the Yagorlyk, agents of special post No. 6 of the special department worked and the second case from June 2 to 3 near Khotyn , where, according to the head of special department No. 4, agents of Zakordot worked. —

Further investigation of both cases is carried out by the head of the Special Department of the KVO"[391] . On June 23, the head of the border division, in response to a request from the head of the special department of the KVO, reported that "on the territory of the division's border guards, there were no cases of our troops crossing the Romanian border "[392] . On July 19, the head of the special department of the KVO, Vorontsov, sent a report to Moscow, Kyiv and Kharkov, which contains the most detailed results of the investigation of these incidents. "On the night of May 31 to June 1, in the village of Isakovtsy (the confluence of the Zbruch River with the Dniester), employees of Zakordot crossed to the rum side without the knowledge of the Special Point, where they raided a Romanian patrol of 3 people, of whom one was seized and transported to our side, the other two Romanians fled. The head of the Romanian cordon turned to the head of Special Point No. 1 for an explanation of this incident. It was announced that the raid was carried out by some bandits, who, after crossing to our side, were arrested

Kamenets [-Podolsk]. On the night of June 2-3, in the area of the village of Maryanovka (12–15 versts southeast of Kamenetz-Podolsk), employees of Zakordot crossed to the Rum side without the knowledge of the Special Point, on the report of the same border guard department, on the night of June 2-3, in the area of the village of Grushevtsy (on the Romanian side) Romanian gendarme cordon. As a result, 1 fighter was killed, and the other was wounded, whom the fighters managed to transfer to our side. The deceased was left in Romania. The transfer point of the Odessa Zakordot reports on this incident: on the night of June 2-3, a military armed detachment, numbering ... a person (a gap in the document. - MM), formed by underground organizations of the Khotinsky district and having a base on our side, performing the task entrusted to it, collided in village Grushevtsy with soldiers of the Romanian border guards. As a result, our detachment lost 1 comrade killed and 1 slightly wounded. The Romanians lost 2 people seriously wounded, who soon died. The place of crossing of our detachment (the village of Maryanovka) is completely unknown to the Romanians, just as it is not known where the detachment came from and where it disappeared.

According to a report on the night of June 5-6, the village of Braga on the Dniester (10 versts east of Khotyn) was supposed to be a crossing to the room side of the room spies. At the indicated place, the Red Army found 5-6 people sitting in a ditch, dressed in black suits, signaling to the room side by means of electric lamps. The Red Army soldiers opened fire on these persons. The spies began firing their revolvers. At the same time, strong rifle fire opened up from Romania, thanks to which our Red Army men were forced to retreat. Returning some time later with reinforcements to the same place, the Red Army did not find anything. According to the report of the same Department, on the night of June 5-6, vil. Luki, which is 30 miles east of Khotyn along the Dniester. The shooting continued until almost morning. According to inquiries made in the Romanian villages of Vilyamovka and Grushevtsy, 5 and 10 versts southwest of the Studenitsa metro station, there was a raid on the Romanian border units, due to which the Romanians opened fire on the nearby forest, in which bandits were suspected. Bullets landed on our side in the area of the village of Luka.

Conclusion: the Romanians know from reliable sources that their soldier, captured on the night of June 2-3, is in the government power of Soviet Ukraine, but they do not know for certain who he was captured - by bandits or government officials, which is evidenced by the persecution done by the Romanian troops to the residents of Grushevtsy, suspected of attacking the cordon of guards on the night of June 2-3. Also, according to the census in the border zone, where if there is no young man, then the Romanians consider them Bolsheviks, who are in gangs, their property is taken into account "[393] . It is clear that neither the Soviet nor the Romanian sides were going to admit their responsibility for

these incidents.

On July 1, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR notified Romania that, as an investigation of the facts indicated in its telegram of June 16 showed, "none of the military personnel of the few Red Army units ... took part in the incidents mentioned. The armed men who attacked the Romanian patrols in Bessarabia on the indicated days belonged, in all likelihood, to some gangs or detachments of unknown origin, whose presence on the banks of the Dniester is the result of the excessive tolerance of the Romanian military authorities towards Petliurists and other anti-Soviet Ukrainian elements. . Several such persons, who took a Romanian soldier with them and crossed the Dniester ... were arrested by the Ukrainian authorities and sent to Kamenetz-Podolsk." All these incidents were the result of insufficient Soviet military forces on the Dniester, which is associated with the unwillingness of the Romanian side to arouse any suspicion in the event of a reinforcement of Soviet troops there. At the same time, the Soviet governments protested against new shelling by the Romanian troops of the Soviet bank of the Dniester: on the night of June 5-6, the village of Luki (20 miles from Kamenetz-Podolsk) suffered from the Romanian shelling and demanded that the Romanian government stop supporting anti-Soviet elements and

hostile actions of the Romanian troops[394] . On—

July 7, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR announced a new attack by the Romanian troops on their troops. June 5th, at 2:00 p.m. 15 minutes in the morning, from the side of the Lipkan, near Bender, the Romanian forces opened heavy fire on the Russian and Ukrainian troops located on the other side of the river.

For two hours, the Soviet troops were subjected to continuous shelling, without reacting in any way, but then, considering it impossible to continue to remain a passive object of this attack, they fired 45 shots of buckshot at the Romanian forces, which then ceased hostilities. No actions that could provoke the Romanian units were taken from the Soviet side, therefore the Soviet republics "declare a strong protest against this new attack by the Romanian army"[395] . On July 13, Ionescu promised to investigate these facts[396] . On July 17, the Romanian side notified the RSFSR that "on the night of July 2-3, at 23:00 ... your soldiers fired on our post in Soloncheni and wounded 11 of our soldiers"[397] . On July 27, the Soviet side promised to investigate this incident, but drew the attention of the Romanian side to the fact that "On July 13, a military post located in Podoyma, 10 versts northwest of Kamenka, was attacked by a detachment of Romanian soldiers who crossed the Dniester near Orini. After a fierce battle, the landing detachment was driven back across the Dniester . On August 8, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR declared that the facts reported in a telegram from Bucharest dated July 17 were not confirmed by the investigation[399] .

According to Soviet intelligence on August 1, 1921, the Romanian army was estimated at 182,270 bayonets, 14,013 sabers, 6329 machine guns and 1011 guns, of which 78,270 bayonets, 9763 sabers, 2774 machine guns and 483 guns accounted for the Eastern Army, which united 6 infantry and 1 cavalry division[400] . True, according to the intelligence report of September 15, it was believed that "Rum troops were concentrated in Bessarabia solely to repel the offensive of the Red troops. On the part of Rumania they do not want war, but they are—

very much afraid of the Red offensive . In the summer of 1921, Soviet troops fought against the Petlyura detachments, which were crossing the territory of the Ukrainian SSR from Poland, and against various local bandit formations. The high intensity of the fighting created the impression in the Soviet command that the enemy was preparing some kind of major performance, and intelligence reported on the transfer of Petliura units from Poland to Bessarabia[402] .

Accordingly, the headquarters of the KVO continued to develop operational plans

August, temporarily acting commander of the troops of the KVO N.N. Petin submitted report No. 38820/yy "Operational considerations in the event of an offensive against Poland and Romania" to the commander of all the armed forces of Ukraine and the Crimea. This document stated that "in the event that Poland and Romania let the armed forces of the counter-revolutionary organizations of Petlyura, Savinkov and Wrangel cross the state border, the Federation of Soviet Republics will certainly face the question of not only eliminating this adventure, but also opening hostilities against the Poles and Romanians. In this case, I believe that the

Polish army should be the initial object of our actions, firstly, as a stronger one and, secondly, as operating in the Kovel-Kiev or Lvov-Kiev operational direction, which is more dangerous for us. The defeat of the Romanian army cannot be a priority task, since our maneuver group will be under the threat of a flank attack and can be pressed against the Black Sea. Based on the military-geographical features of the theater of operations, the political situation in Galicia, the deployment of the armies of Poland and Romania and the construction of the Dubno-Rovno UR, "I consider it most advantageous for us, when acting against the Poles, to elect Starokonstantinov, Volochisk, Brody, Proskurov, Tarnopol, Lvov".

This main operating line V lane will allow the fortified area to reach the rear and, hiding behind the Dniester, be near the junction of the Polish-Romanian border. "A strike in the indicated direction should be preceded by an offensive by parts of the Kharkov district in the general direction of Chisinau, Iasi, in order to divert the main forces of the Romanian army. At the same time, a separate detachment should be put forward to occupy Bukovina, which will immediately expand the gap at the junction of Romania with Poland. If neutrality is violated only by Romania, then, taking

into account the Soviet-Polish treaty and the internal situation in Poland, she may refuse to come to the aid of Romania. Then "the most correct decision on our part would be to deliver a lightning-fast, crushing blow to the Romanian army, to seize Bessarabia and with this success to finally fetter the initiative of the Polish army, and most importantly, to suppress it morally. In this case, our main operational direction will be Tiraspol,

Chisinau, Iasi, along which the army should be sent, consisting of the 30th, 51st and 52nd rifle divisions and the 3rd cavalry corps. From the side of the Kyiv military district, an auxiliary operation by the army, consisting of the 15th, 24th and 45th rifle divisions [...] and the 1st cavalry corps, should be undertaken. The task of this army is to attack in the rear of the enemy defending the Yassky region, approximately in the direction of Mogilev-Podolsky, Nyamtsy (90 miles west of Yassy) and capture the city of Chernivtsi. Against Poland, the troops of the KVO will create barriers in the areas of Zhitomir, Chudnov, Berdichev and Letichev, Novaya Ushitsa, Zhmerynka [403] The leadership made diplomatic efforts, seeking to normalize the situation on the western border.

— . However, the Soviet

On August 13, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR sent a note to Romania, in which they reported that, according to Soviet intelligence, in Bendery, at the Romanian headquarters, there is a "rebel Ukrainian headquarters, headed by a certain Pshennik", subordinate to the chief military commissioner of the government of the UNR Gulyai-Gulenko and keeping in touch with gangs in Ukraine. Gulyai-Gulenko, on behalf of the Petliura government, oversees the UNR military internee camps, where "he was allowed, with the assistance of General Delvig, to recruit volunteers from there to create detachments that were to be sent to Ukraine." Petlyura's units from Galicia in June were transferred to Bessarabia, from where they are preparing to start military operations against the Ukrainian SSR after the harvest. The Romanian government maintains official relations with the UNR representative "Macievich, who is in Bucharest and enjoys the rights of a diplomatic representative." Declaring their desire to develop good-neighborly relations and fully restore normal diplomatic and economic relations with Romania, Moscow and Kiev "count on the adoption by the Romanian Government of urgent measures to eliminate all causes" that worsen their relationship. Romania should have stopped all moral and material support for the "Petliura and counter-revolutionary organizations" and expelled their leaders from the territory of Romania, Bukovina and Bessarabia, disbanded the detachments created by them and stopped diplomatic relations with

government of the UNR. In order to assist the Romanian government "in the destruction of bands organized on the territory of Bessarabia and Romania for the purpose of aggressive actions against the Soviet Republics", the governments of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR "consider it necessary when pursuing these bands, if they cross into the territory occupied by the Romanian authorities, to pursue and on this latter territory, notifying the Romanian authorities of this in time so that these actions of the Ukrainian and Russian Red troops would not be interpreted as actions directed, in any degree, against the Romanian people and the Romanian Government . On

August 20, Ionescu informed Chicherin that there were no Petliura and White Guard troops in Romania and no. None of the named Petliura "representatives" are in Romania either, and Bucharest "does not maintain official relations" with the UNR government. And although Moscow declares that it is not going to commit any hostile actions against Romania, "between June and August 15, the Red Army tried twelve times and managed to cross the Dniester several times, firing from the Russian coast on the Romanian coast." In particular, "at 11 p.m. on June 4, the Tohatinsky patrol was attacked by a group that crossed the Dniester in a boat under the cover of rifle fire from the Russian coast. June 22 at 13:00 the same thing happened to our post at Mayaki on the Dniester estuary. 4 thousand Russian rubles, 9 Hungarian grenades and 30 cartridges with explosive bullets were found in the boat. On the night of July 4-5, at zero hours, two kilometers north of the Tiginsky bridge, in front of Lipkany, 4 boats tried to cross the Dniester with the support of rifle and machine-gun fire from the Russian coast. Similar attacks took place on the morning of July 8 in Kitskany, on the night of the 8th to the 9th - in Macula de Piatra, in the afternoon of the 18th - north of Telitsa. On the morning of the 24th, our post near the village of Ustye was attacked by 30 Red Army soldiers who had crossed the Dniester. On August 6, an attempt to cross near Tigina [Bender] was made by two boats. On August 12 and 13, a gang of 15-20 people managed to cross the Dniester 20 km south of Dubossary and robbed the inhabitants of the village of Chimisany. On the night of August 13-14, a significant number of horsemen cro

the village of Inautsy, robbed the homeowner and two Jews. On the night of the 14th to the 15th, they attacked a Romanian post in the village of Korzhevo in the Dubossary region. I'm not talking about the Khotyn area, where such attacks happen daily."

Although Romania does not blame the Soviet governments for these incidents, it states that "if there are bandit attacks, incursions, sorties, they are carried out on your side, not on ours." Naturally, the Romanian government cannot agree that "the troops of the neighboring state [405] on August 26 Ionescu reported to Moscow that they had crossed our border" 6 and 8 o'clock, several ~~about~~ the new incident near Bendery. "Between people tried to cross the Dniester in longboats; our patrols prevented their crossing", but came under fire from rifles and machine guns from the east coast[406] .

Soviet border guards also recorded numerous hostile actions from the Romanian side. The operational information report No. 105 of the department for combating banditry of the VUCHK reported that "on the night of July 29, 1921, between Strokantsy and Beloch, the Romanians made an attempt to land on 3 boats, but met by our fire, were forced to return back, during a shootout one Romanian was wounded"[407] . Akimov, Chief of Staff of the All-Russian Cheka of Ukraine, ~~reported~~ on September 1 that "on the night of August 22, no one knew who, from the south side of Rybnitsa, made a light signal in the direction of Cape Rezina. On the night of August 23, armaments for two hours fired at the eastern bank of the Dniester from the village of Yerzhev, which is 5–7 versts north of Rybnitsa, with a rare rifle fire. During the shelling from the side of Chernaya village, the Romanians threw 2 red rockets"[408] . According to the intelligence report for the period from August 15 to September 15, "in the Soroca region, ~~according~~ to reports from military units, frequent shelling of our posts with rifle and machine-gun fire from the Romanian coast was noted. A case of shooting from the Romanians was also noted in the area of the village of Grigoriopol (40 versts east of Bendery). A crossing from the Romanian coast of trained dogs for the transfer of correspondence was noticed. According to the Romanian press, as a result of the attempt of the Red detachments on August 6–7 to cross the Dniester, General Ruzhinsky took measures to strengthen the border guard .

In September 1921, the situation on the Soviet western border escalated. The famine that arose in the summer in Soviet Russia gave rise to hope in the West that the power of the Bolsheviks would soon fall, and the Entente decided to push things. On September 3, France offered Poland to send an ultimatum to the RSFSR, in case of rejection of which it was necessary to start a war. For its part, Paris also promised to send an ultimatum to Moscow and persuade Romania to do so. However, Soviet diplomacy, having learned — about these intentions, made them public[410]. Naturally, Poland and France stated that there were no proposals. True, this did not prevent Poland from asking Germany what concessions on the Upper Silesian issue would allow Warsaw to count on the neutrality of Berlin in the event of a new Soviet-Polish war[411]. On September 5, Poland eastern border, pulling additional gendarmerie forces there. The workers of the Soviet embassy in Warsaw found themselves under the defiant supervision of the Polish police, and the situation on the Soviet-Polish border escalated. For its part, on September 9, Moscow again demanded that Warsaw stop helping the White Guards[412]. On

September 14, Poland accused the RSFSR of failing to fulfill the Riga Treaty and put forward a number of demands that should have been met before October 1, otherwise threatening to break off diplomatic relations. On September 17, Moscow announced its agreement to fulfill some Polish demands if Poland removed the most prominent leaders of the White Guards from its territory by the same time and punished those responsible for their support. The next day, a Polish note was handed over to the Soviet side, confirming the above requirements and notifying Poland of its readiness to report on the measures taken against the crossing of the border by undesirable elements[413]. Britain, Finland and Estonia also made claims against the RSFSR[414]. In an effort to avoid an increase in confrontation, the RSFSR on September 22 proposed to Poland a specific program of measures to normalize relations on the basis of mutual implementation of the provisions of the Riga Treaty[415]. The publication of this note in the press led to the fact that Romania abandoned its intention to put forward its claims.

It is clear that in Moscow they feared the outbreak of war, therefore, the RVSR, by its protocol No. 145 of September 21, 1921, decided that "in view of the situation created in connection with the Polish ultimatum and in view of the need to keep the army at the ready, which is completely incompatible with demobilization, reorganization and the resulting demobilization moods", it is necessary to "suspend all resolutions and orders on dismissal on indefinite leave, disbandment of units and institutions until the current situation is clarified." The Council of Labor and Defense (STO) of the RSFSR must adopt a resolution on providing troops, primarily border troops, with food rations. It was proposed to strengthen the Revolutionary Military Council and the political directorates of the Petrograd, Western, Kiev and Kharkov military districts with experienced personnel, the Political Directorate of the Red Army needs to develop a plan for the mobilization of communists on the Western Front and take measures to strengthen agitation in the border districts and to correctly announce all changes in Russia's relations with Poland and Romania. Prepare the draft of 1900 and 1901. birth and subsequent ages. "Immediately begin to separate the headquarters of the Cavalry Army from the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District. Develop a transfer plan and proceed with the transfer of the Cavalry Army. Measures were envisaged for the preparation of stocks of weapons and food, the deployment of military production and evacuation in the districts. On September 22, by telegram via direct wire, the STO notified all district commanders of the suspension of

demobilization, reorganization and disbandment of troops[416] . On September 23, 1921, the commander of all the armed forces of Ukraine and the Crimea, with his directive No. 43401ss, set tasks for the troops of the KVO and KhVO in the event of a war. The directive set out several options for action. According to the "PR" option, "the main task is to inflict a decisive defeat on the Polish army, as the most powerful; against Romania, the same

expectant actions, as remote from the main objects of the war. The following tasks are assigned to the fronts: 1) On the Western Front - inflicting a quick and decisive defeat on the Polish army, an offensive in

the general direction towards the Osovets - Bialystok - Brest-Litovsk front. 2) T

b) ensuring the mobilization and concentration of the armies of the front; c) securing the left flank of the advancing armies of the Western Front; d) active defensive operations against Romania covering the directions to Kyiv, Cherkassy, Kremenchug and Yekaterinos Lav; e) the defense of the Black Sea coast from the Dniester estuary to the Kerch

Strait inclusive. According to this option, "active defensive actions against Romania" should "result in delivering a blow in the direction of Iasi and capturing Bessarabia by us." The command of the districts was required to submit their views on all issues by October 5[417] . Accordingly, the Soviet troops were put on high alert and began preparations for evacuation [418] . However, the the western neighbors of the Soviet internal problems of republics from the border strip of valuable property and the firm, albeit constructive, position of Soviet diplomacy made it possible to find a compromise. Already on September 26, Poland declared its readiness to discuss Soviet proposals[419] . As a result of the negotiations, on October 7, a Soviet-Polish protocol was signed on the settlement of mutual claims.

Conference in Warsaw

Meanwhile, on September 17, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR turned to Romania with a request to extradite N.I., who had crossed the Dniester on August 28. Makhno and his associates[420]. On September 27, the Romanian government offered to submit documents from the courts on extradition and to undertake the obligation not to apply the death penalty to the extradited, since it has been abolished in Romania. In this case, the Romanian side will consider the case and decide on extradition[421]. On October 22, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR indicated to Romania that its legal demands regarding the extradition of Makhno would be taken into account and the relevant materials would be submitted. But the activity of the Romanian authorities themselves in Bessarabia, which, contrary to the agreement of March 9, 1918, still remains occupied, is replete with both violations of legal procedures and the use of the death penalty[422]. On October 29, the Romanian side notified Moscow that it did not yet know whether Makhno was among those interned in Bessarabia. In general, the Soviet note of October 22 was described as interference in the internal affairs of Romania, although the Soviet proposal to discuss the problem of navigation on the Dniester, according to Bucharest, testified to the recognition by the Soviet side of the actual state of affairs[423].

On September 22, a Soviet-Romanian conference began in Warsaw, which was supposed to "outline the program of a future conference that would put an end to the actual situation in relations between Russia and Romania." The Soviet delegation was headed by L.M. Karakhan, Romanian - G. Filality. According to the Soviet delegation, the following issues should have been considered at future negotiations: "The question of Bessarabia, currently occupied by Romanian troops, contrary to the agreement concluded between Russia and Romania on the cleansing of this area. Settlement of Russian-Romanian borders. Regulation of navigation on the Danube. Mutual payments. Resumption of trade relations. Resumption of diplomatic and consular relations. Protection of interests of national minorities. Mutual non-interference

internal affairs of both countries. Elimination of gangs moving from Bessarabia to Ukrainian territory with criminal purposes. Convention on the Resumption of Postal, Telegraph and Railway Communications.

The Romanian delegation refused to discuss the issue of Bessarabia at the conference, because, in its opinion, "from the historical and national point of view, Bessarabia was an integral part of Romania until 1812; in terms of ethnicity, the population of Bessarabia is largely Romanian; from the point of view of the principle of nationalities, the population of Bessarabia joined their homeland by a decision adopted on March 20, 1918 by Sfatul Tarii, the parliament of the Moldavian Republic, recognized by the government of Kerensky; the Romanian army crossed the Prut after the decision of "Sfatul Tarii" to join Romania and at the request of the Bessarabians. In the same way, the Romanian side refused to discuss the issue of national minorities and navigation on the Danube. With regard to gangs moving from Ukraine to Bessarabia, Filality suggested that mixed commissions be created for each such fact to investigate them. In general, the Romanian side proposed to discuss the following issues at a future conference: "The values that were in Russia as a contribution. The premises and property of the Romanian embassy in Petrograd. Deposits made by the Romanian supply commissions in Russian banks. Release, if possible, immediate, with permission to return to their homeland of the Romanians detained in Russia ... Russian refugees in Romania, as well as Russians from Wrangel's army "[424] . On September 23, the parties agreed on the issue of discussing the problem of mutual settlements

at a future conference. The question of navigation on the Danube, according to Filality, had already been decided in Paris, but he promised to ask Bucharest for instructions. When discussing the issue of national minorities, Karakhan referred to the Soviet-Polish agreement, in which this problem was reflected. As for Bessarabia, the Soviet delegation expressed the following opinion: "Bessarabia could not be an inseparable part of Romania, because the independence of Romania was recognized in 1878; from an ethnographic point of view, it is possible to prove the opposite of what [the Romanian side] claims; the fact that Romania sought to

1920, by means of a treaty with the sanction of the Great Powers to the annexation of Bessarabia, proves that the acts of Sfatul Tsarii concerning the annexation of Bessarabia are by no means indisputable; the proclamation of the Moldavian Republic (January 24, 1918), as well as the formation of "Sfatul Tarii" itself, took place at the end of November 1917 after the overthrow of the Kerensky government; irrespective of the fact [that] "Sfatul Tsarii" did not have the authority to decide on the annexation of Bessarabia, its decisions were adopted under direct pressure from the military authorities and under the influence of administrative terror; an agreement signed by the Russian government and General Averescu (March 9, 1918) provided for the evacuation of Bessarabia by the Romanians . In a personal

conversation with Filality, Karahan suggested that he avoid questions about Bessarabia, national minorities and Romanian values at a future conference. In his opinion, this would allow the restoration of diplomatic relations, and the issue of Romanian values could be resolved later in a diplomatic manner. However, as Filality reported to Bucharest, in his opinion, "the Bolsheviks are aimed at only one thing: to restore relations with us, as they were restored with all the neighbors, and to send us 80-100 people to Bucharest, as they did here [in Warsaw], who will start propaganda." Accordingly, the Romanian representative believed that "to restore relations with the Bolsheviks would mean playing their game without any benefit to us"[426] .

On September 28, Romanian Prime Minister Averescu, in a telegram to Filality, confirmed Bucharest's unwavering position on Bessarabia and reminded him that the question of Romanian values remains "a requirement of the highest importance." Nevertheless, the Romanian delegation was required "not to hasten events, but to drag them out depending on the circumstances"[427]. On October 3, Averescu reminded Filality that, regarding "Bessarabia, a wording should be found that would allow discussing all issues arising from the actual state of affairs that developed during the events of the war," and "the issue of offsets cannot be excluded from the program. On the contrary, it must be one of the main points of clarification... Under all circumstances, our tactics must

is to win time - we must be accommodating in terms of form and very careful in terms of [substance](#) . —

On October 3, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR sent a note to Romania, in which they noted that the Romanian government did not agree to expel from the country the representatives of the UNR government indicated in the Soviet note of August 13, and cited new facts of the activity of Petliura agents on the territory of Bessarabia and assistance to them from the Romanian troops . An earlier proposal on the possibility of the Soviet troops pursuing bandits on the territory of Bessarabia took into account a similar agreement between Romania and Bulgaria. In any case, the preservation of the Petliurist organizations in Bessarabia retains the relevance of such a possibility. The development of the negotiations in Warsaw, where the Soviet governments are ready to eliminate "all existing misunderstandings", will depend on the actions of —

Romania aimed at stopping the "organization of hostile actions against the Soviet republics"[429] . On October 5, instructing Filality, Averescu pointed out that "of all possible Russian governments, the Soviet government is the one with which we can negotiate in the most favorable way for us on the question of Bessarabia - a really controversial point between Romania and Russia. The consent of this government to recognize the actual state of affairs may in the future, if everything changes in Russia, be a powerful lever. Therefore, it is necessary to make every effort to achieve this." Of course, the question of Romanian values "should ~~not~~ fall out of the program, because without it the negotiations will lose all interest for us"[430] . On the same day, at a regular meeting of the Soviet-Romanian conference, Filality announced the declaration of the Romanian government: "The Romanian government does not allow in any case and in any form to discuss the legality or final nature of the reunification of Bessarabia with Romania. However, it goes without saying that if the Republic of Soviets wished to conclude an agreement with the Government of Rumania regarding the consequences of this reunification, we could take this path. However, since the Republic of Soviets proposed to us to include in the program the question of navigation

touched upon a number of issues arising from the accession of Bessarabia to Romania. The Romanian delegation again recalled that the issue of Romanian values "is one of the main demands of the Romanian government"[431].—

On the evening of October 6, Karahan again spoke privately with Filality and suggested to him that, as a concession, Romania should take upon itself the obligation "in the event of a war declared to Soviet Russia by another state ... to maintain neutrality on a mutual basis"[432] . For his part, on October 10, Chicherin asked Karakhan: "Did you indicate to Filality that there was a war with Romania and everything handed over to us is booty? Did they point out that the self-determination of Bessarabia was a comedy, even Senator Alexander protested? Have they pointed out that until we recognize Bessarabia as Romania, its possession is unstable, because we can take it away at any moment, and in Bessarabia already now there is an almost complete uprising even of Moldavians "[433] . On ~~the~~ same day, the Romanian delegation was again instructed to play for [time](#)[434] . On October 11, Filality asked Bucharest for instructions regarding the readiness to recognize the Ukrainian SSR as one of the contracting parties and said that the Soviet delegation retained the right to bargain over the recognition of Bessarabia as part of Romania[435] . —

On October 17, Romanian Foreign Minister Ionescu informed Filality that he "never believed that our valuables would be returned to us, just as I knew that the Soviet government had no other goal than to resume diplomatic relations with Romania, to poison our country with a revolutionary propaganda, hiding behind the shield of diplomatic immunity. The minister believed that the Bessarabian issue should not be transferred to the area of Russian internal problems, it should always remain an international issue, and therefore it was decided, "whatever the consequences, not to enter into a discussion of the issue of Bessarabia as a program item to be resolved by the two governments." Ionescu approved the position expressed at the conference, which boiled down to discussing the issue of Romanian values until the restoration of diplomatic and economic relations. Bucharest also rejected the offer of a guarantee of neutrality in the event of an attack on Soviet Russia by a third state. The minister pointed out that

a possible agreement should be "carefully avoided the words "peace treaty" or "cessation of the state of war". We stand most resolutely on the fact that we are not in a state of war and, consequently, we do not have the task of concluding a peace treaty . In response—

to Karakhan's reports on the progress of the discussions in Warsaw, Moscow on October 21 decided to "insist on the participation of Ukraine" and "apply mutual settlement of claims either in the form of raising questions about both Bessarabia and settlements at the conference, or by eliminating both" . In the case of "refusal of the Romanians from the mutual repayment of claims, do not hesitate to break"[437] . Thus, as expected, the parties remained unanimous on the issue of Bessarabia. On October 25, the Soviet delegation reiterated that "Romania has Bessarabia under the right of military force and that there are no legal titles on the side of Romania in this matter. The only act capable of legalizing and formalizing the current actual situation of Bessarabia could [could] be an act emanating only from Russia." Accordingly, the conference was adjourned indefinitely [438] . On November 11, Moscow

again asked Bucharest to confirm the fact that Makhno was on Romanian territory in order to send material substantiating the request for his extradition to the Soviet authorities. The Romanian side was again reminded that "until Russia and Ukraine recognize the secession of Bessarabia and its annexation by Romania, all questions relating to it" will be of interest to them. "Neither the decision, moreover the controversial one, of the Moldovan nationalist society, nor the decisions of the powers to which Russia and Ukraine are by no means subordinate, can replace for them their own decision and the expression of their own will." It is the future conference that could comprehensively consider the issue of Bessarabia and the decisions of Sfatul Tsarii. Contrary to the statement of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the agreement of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR to discuss the issue of navigation on the Dniester is not a recognition of the fact that Bessarabia was annexed to Romania on their part. On the contrary, in a number of declarations, Moscow and Kyiv have repeatedly stated

demarcation line, taking into account the actual occupation of Bessarabia by the Romanian troops. Only an agreement between Romania, on the one hand, and Russia and Ukraine, on the other, will be able to change our point of view on this subject.” Romania was reminded that it had violated the agreement of March 9, 1918, and that the Petliura detachments now located on its territory were preparing new attacks on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR[439] .

On November 16, Ionescu sent a reply telegram to Moscow stating that “the royal government will in no way, either directly or indirectly, accept claims” regarding Bessarabia “neither from the present Russian government, nor from its successors, if any; besides, these questions concern only Russia. What you call Bessarabia, that is, Romania between the Prut and the Dniester, is an integral part of the Romanian kingdom. Bessarabia, which formed a state, reunited with Romania, and this reunification cannot be a subject of discussion for anyone. The sovereign right of Romania does not follow from the agreement concluded in Paris on October 28, 1920 ... but

is the result of an act of reunification carried out by the representatives of Bessarabia, an act final and not in need of any other confirmation. The four powers only recognized the sovereignty of Romania, since they had the right to consolidate, from the point of view of international law, the situation that had developed in Europe as a result of the war. From the point of view of Bucharest, the discussion of the issue of navigation on the Dnieper with the participation of Romania serves as a recognition of the fact that she has the right to decide these issues, which are usually decided by riparian states when it comes to border rivers[440] .

Raid on Tiraspol

Incidents on the Dniester continued. So, according to the summary of the headquarters of the VUCHK troops dated November 25, "On November 17, the 185th battalion[:] in the village. Rogi (6 versts north of Dubossary) a sentry noticed a boat crossing to our side with 2 unknown persons. At the time of the discovery of the boat and the entry of the unknown to our shore, the sentry was 5 versts east of the crossing. 7 shots fired by unknown persons due to range and bushes did not reach the target. Investigation in these places did not give any result. 186th battalion: November 11 at 15:00 in the area of vil. Tsybudna (4 versts north-west of Yagorlyk), our sentry was fired upon from the side by the Rumcavalrymen with several shots. There was no answer from our side... At the site of the 2nd company, our mounted patrol on November 12 at 14 o'clock in the area of vil. Sorzen was fired from the rum side"[441] .

In the reconnaissance reports of the 51st Rifle Division, stationed on the left bank of the Dniester, dated November 19, it was noted that "3-4 days ago, allegedly ataman Gulyai-Gulenko went to Zabolotny in the Birzulsky district," and "according to the gubchek on November 19 or 20, Petliurovsky the command intends to transport unknown units from the territory of Romania in the Tiraspol-Dubossary region and unite as such with the Gulyai-Gulenko detachment ... then, by joint actions, seize Odessa and raise an uprising in the latter. The Bendery group of Petliurists must cross at three points: 1) Kitskany (Tiraspol region); 2) the village of Parkany; 3) Sukleya (5 versts south of Tiraspol). The said points allegedly have vehicles for approximately 300 people each. A crossing of 200 people is planned against Dubossary"[442] . The evening operational report of the headquarters

of the KhVO No. 04821 / op dated November 19, 1921 reported that "according to the report of the brigade commander of the 28th border at dawn on November 19, a gang of 150 bayonets under the command of Pshennik crossed the border in the Parkany region (8 miles west of Tiraspol) and, pushing back the units The 184th border battalion, together with the rebellious population of the Ternovka-Parkany region, occupied the latter, cutting out the communists. At 9 o'clock. On November 19, the gang occupied the western suburbs of the mountains. Tiraspol, from where, after a sh

parts of the 2nd battalion of the 451st regiment, the gang was driven back to the west, having lost dead, wounded and prisoners, including the last two officers. The battalion of the 451st regiment, together with the Tiraspol garrison, continuing the pursuit of the gang, at 14:00. occupied Parkany - Ternovka, the gang, having dispersed, left in a northerly direction. During the battle with the gang, the battalion commander of the 2nd-451st regiment was killed. Parts of the 184th border battalion, concentrated in Tiraspol, were again deployed along the border of their sector, the 2nd battalion of the 451st regiment - Parkany. The maneuver group of the 151st brigade, consisting of the 451st and 453rd regiments and teams of foot reconnaissance divisions serving the lagsbor in the Cherny Kut-Isaev area (2-7 miles south of Chernov) was ordered to transfer: the 453rd regiment and teams of foot scouts 151 th brigade - Petroverovka area, 451st regiment - Tsebrikovo (30 versts northeast of Tiraspol), from where to conduct enhanced reconnaissance in the general direction to Tiraspol, allocating at least 3 strong detachments for this purpose. Brigade commander 152 - a maneuverable group consisting of the 152nd brigade and cavalry regiment 51, maintaining continuous communication with the 186th border battalion, headquarters 71 of the 24th division and headquarters 153 to be on alert "[443] .

According to the evening operational report of the HVO headquarters No. 04283 / op dated November 20: "According to the report of the regiment commander 451, on the evening of November 19, the Pshennik gang crossed back to the right bank of the Dniester in boats served by the Rumsoldiers (the place of the crossing was not indicated). According to additional information received, as a result of the battle near Tiraspol and Parkana, 15 Petliurists and 180 rebels were taken prisoner . The operational report of the HVO headquarters dated November 23 reported that "it is calm in the sector of the 28th border brigade. According to additional information, Pshennik's gang crossed to the Rum side on November 19 in the Ternovka region (8 versts west of Tiraspol); the crossing was made

in boats brought by the Romanian soldiers"[445] . The reconnaissance report of the 51st Rifle Division on November 21 reported that "a gang of Petliurists numbering 150 people with 1 Colt machine gun at 5 o'clock on November 19 against the village of Bychek (south of the Plosky farm) crossed to our side partly on boats, partly ford. The sentries, noticing the crossing, opened fire, retreating to the headquarters of the troops of the post in the village of Bychek. On alarm, the platoon scattered into a chain and a battle ensued with the bandits, but

border riflemen began to withdraw in the direction of Tokmogzey (5 versts northwest of Tiraspol), losing 2 killed and 3 wounded. The gang that crossed was divided into two groups: one of them moved to the village of Parkany, the other in the direction of Tokmogzey, but, met by the approaching units of the 185th battalion, as a result of the battle, was partly thrown back to the room side, and part went after the first group to Parkany. With the approach of gangs to Parkany from the room side opposite the indicated village, a new gang of 60–70 people begins to cross. At the same time, an uprising of peasants rises in Parkany, who attacked the headquarters of the 18th cavalry squadron, the communications platoon and the economic command, captured 2 Maxim machine guns and 1 Shosh. Under pressure from bandits and peasant rebels, a platoon of the 1st company of the 184th battalion withdrew and took up a position east of Parkana, where another platoon joined it, a firefight ensued. As a result, the bandits pushed the platoons back to Tiraspol, occupying the outskirts of Tiraspol, Fortress Sloboda. With the Tiraspol garrison units put in order, the gangs were driven back, and by 2 p.m. we occupied the Parkany, and during the retreat the rebels abandoned all the machine guns captured in the 18th cavalry squadron, as well as their own machine gun. By 10 p.m., the border guards were restored, and some of the bandits crossed over to Bessarabia on the boats supplied by the Rumsoldiers. The national composition of the gang is Ukrainians and a small part of the Poles, there was a national Ukrainian banner and proclamations in German. Losses on our side are clarified, 18 squadron commander and about 20 cavalymen were killed and a squadron squadron

and about 10 cavalymen were wounded "[446] . On November 21, 1921, the head of the field headquarters of the VUCHK troops, Evdokimov, and the special commissioner for active gangs, Gofitsky, sent an emergency operational report to Moscow, Kiev, and Kharkov, in which it was reported that "according to the report of the OGChK and headquarters 28, received on November 21 at 15 o'clock (by courier) On November 19, in the evening, in the area between Varnitsa and Gura-Bikului, a detachment of 150 people crossed under the command of Pshennik, led by Emelyanov, Baturin, Deduchenko, Zhelobaev and Colonel Pukalov. After the crossing, they broke up in groups: Baturin went to Ploskoye to raise an uprising, Yemelyanov, Deduchenko, Zhelobaev, Pshennik and Pukalov to Pa

The attack is repulsed. According to the information received, Yemelyanov was wounded. The gang mainly counts on the uprising. Urgent reinforcements are needed in case all bandits unite. They have few weapons. Romanians contributed to the crossing. The possibility of crossing reinforcements from the roombank today is allowed. According to additional undercover information and testimonies of the captured Petliura scouts, the first group will be followed by a landing of more than 1,200 bandits. According to the latest information, Gulyai-Gulenko with a detachment, having landed in the Vadreshkovo region, makes his way to Olgopolytsina to join the band of Zabolotny and cut off Birzulsky district from Odessa. Emergency measures have been taken along the line of the check to widely cover the movement of the enemy

zakordon on the rum side, as well as in the near-bottom strip"[447].

On the evening of November 22, the operational report of the headquarters of the troops of the VUCHK reported that "according to the information of the Odessa gubchek, based on the report of staff 1 in the area between the s.s. Varnitsa - Guta Bakului (Romania) 15-20 versts north-west of Tiraspol, a detachment of 150 people under the command of General Pshennik crossed (obviously, one of the detachments of Gulyai-Gulenko). After the crossing, the detachment broke up into several groups: one led by Baturin left in the direction of Ploskoye, 10 versts north of Tiraspol, to raise an uprising. The second, headed by Pshennik, Emelyanov, Dudushenko, Zhelovaev and Pukalov - with. Kalkany 3 versts west of Tiraspol. The attack was repulsed. Yemelyanov was reportedly wounded. According to the captured Petliura scouts, the first group will be followed by the landing of a detachment of more than 1,200 people. According to additional information, Gulyai-Gulenko himself allegedly landed in the Vadrashkov region 60 versts southwest of Olgopol, making his way to Olgopolytsina to join Zabolotny's gang, having the main task of cutting off Birzulsky district from Odessa. The information is being

checked"[448]. According to operational information report No. 195 dated November 23, "the gang, which raided Tiraspol on November 19, crossed from the room side in the area of the village. Bychka (18 versts east of Ploskoye) under the command of Petlyura's colonel Pshennik, his assistants Khorunzhago and Parayk with the active participation of Tsukalago, Emelyanov, Nevitsky, Ivashchenko, Baturin, Zhelobaev and others.

Rumcaptains from the headquarters of the 3rd Rumcorps Statulesco and Marlari took part, who facilitated the crossing and promised to give weapons. First, 34 people crossed, armed with rifles, revolvers and grenades, under the command of Colonel Sharapko. The crossing was also facilitated by the foreman with. Bychka Lantsev (former commandant of the city of Tiraspol). The second group of bandits under the command of Baturin, numbering 30 people, went to Ploskoe in order to raise an uprising, which they succeeded, and the rest moved to Varnitsa (18 miles northeast of Tiraspol), where they captured 3 machine guns, killed 13 Red Army soldiers and moved to Tiraspol, from where were knocked out, and the 3 machine guns taken were also repulsed, and the gangs scattered around the adjacent villages in order to cross back to Romania. The Romanians took the bandits back and opened fire on our units in order to give the rest of the bandits the opportunity to cross. During the crossing, many bandits drowned in the Dniester. During the battle, proclamations in German addressed to the German colonists signed by Petlyura, Gulyai-Gulenko and Poplavsky, as well as two national Ukrainian flags, were captured. From the interrogation of the arrested, it turned out that in the Akkerman area against Mayaka, Gulyai-Gulenko, led by 27 Cossacks, was going to cross over to our side, — .

counting on the assistance of local peasants and intending to move to Birzulu. November 25: "According to additional information, Pshennik's gang crossed over to our side in the region of 4 versts north of Parkana, partly in boats, partly ford. After a short battle with a platoon of the 184th frontier battalion, which retreated to Tiraspol due to its small number, the gang, divided into two groups, one headed for Parkany, the other for Tiraspol, on the way to which it was met and driven back by parts of the 1st company. Part of this group went back to Romania, the other part joined the first group. With the approach of the first group to Parkany, another gang of 60–70 people began to cross from the room side, and at the same time an uprising was raised by the bandits in Parkany. From Parkan, the gang, pushing back parts of the 184th battalion, headed for Tiraspol. Met at Tiraspol by parts of the garrison, the gang was repulsed and went to Parkany. During the retreat, the bandits abandoned all the machine gun.

a machine gun taken out by a gang from Romania. The return departure of the gang across the Dniester was carried out in the Ternovka region on boats supplied by the Romanian soldiers. The national composition of the gang is Ukrainian-Petliurists and a small part of the Poles. The gang crossed over with the national Ukrainian banner and proclamations in German"[450] .

Under these conditions, on November 19, a resolution of the STO was adopted, according to which the border troops of the Cheka were replaced at the border by field troops of the Red Army[451] . Only almost a year later, on September 27, 1922, by a new resolution of the STO, the protection of the border was transferred to the jurisdiction of the GPU, within which a separate border corps was created[452] . On November 24, 1921, the Chairman of the Military Council of Ukraine and Assistant Commander of all the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Crimea sent the RVS KVO the following order: "The crossing of the Petliurists in the Tiraspol region is of great importance in the field of international relations, therefore the Military Council invites you to urgently collect and submit the following intelligence information : 1) the exact name of the military units to which the gangs that crossed from the Rum side near Tiraspol belong; 2) about the assistance rendered by the Romanian frontier units in the crossing of bands to our territory and return; 3) in what way the gang was equipped on Romanian territory and what were its intentions; 4) the names of the captured officers and their testimonies"[453] . According to the reconnaissance report of the 51st Rifle Division of November

29, according to interviews of prisoners and arrested people, it was revealed that the day before the crossing, Pshennik's gang received from Chisinau, with the assistance of the 3rd Romanian Corps, 16 rifles and 15 cartridges for each. Weapons were issued on the shore just before the crossing. Since there were few weapons, the commander of the 7th border company, Captain Stanesko, issued 16 more grenades with his authority. The rest of the gang members were told that 650 rifles and 15 machine guns were waiting for them in Parkany. The crossing took almost 2 hours on 1 boat for 7 people. The commander of the 7th border company and soldiers of the Romanian border guards were present at the crossing. They did all this allegedly for money, without any official order. The War Ministry demanded that the gang be removed from Bendery to the camps, but the headquarters of the 3rd Corps used the gang for their own purposes. After leaving Tiraspol, the gang split into two groups. One in

led by Dudichenko, Pukalov and Zhelabaev, she went to the Bychek farm and on the afternoon of November 19 she returned to the room side. The second group, led by Pshennik and Emelyanov, crossed at the bridge in Parkany. Part of the bandits scattered around—

the farms and the city[454] . To investigate the case of the gang raid on the Tiraspol district, a commission was created under the chairmanship of Bogdanov, which, having considered the materials submitted by the Odessa Provincial Cheka, the border troops, units of the Red Army and the Tiraspol garrison, on December 3, 1921, drew up a conclusion. This document allows a more detailed presentation of the events in the Tiraspol region. On November 18, the controller of the post in the village of Bychek Yuryev warned the platoon commander of the 1st company of the 185th battalion of the Cheka, Burenin, that a crossing from the Romanian coast was expected at night. When it got dark, Yuriev, Burenin and 2-3 other people went ashore and saw an alarm, which someone, apparently, answered from our shore. Somewhat later, on our shore, someone began to hit the board, giving them a signal. The shore was carefully examined, but no one and nothing was found. Everyone returned to the cordon. At about 11 p.m., a sentry reported that a boat had been seen on the water. The platoon, raised on alarm, went to the shore. There they saw 10-15 people who landed on the shore. A shootout began. Having fired the cartridges, the platoon returned to the cordon for ammunition. Coming out a second time to the shore, the platoon heard the command: "The first company to the right, march into the chain," after which the platoon commander gave the order to move away from the coast over the

hillock beyond the village, where the Red Army stood for 2 hours. Suddenly, in front of them, in the darkness, Baklanov, the brother of the chairman of the local Selrevkom, outlined a cart, on which several people were sitting. One of them called out to the Red Army: "Stop, what a pass." One of the Red Army men answered: "The trigger." Then those sitting on the cart opened fire and moved aside. The border platoon, split into two groups, also withdrew from Bychek to Malaeshty and Krasnogorka. Later, both groups joined in Krasnogorka, and in the morning the 1st company of the 185th battalion arrived there from Tokmadzeya, alerted by Yuryev. Both units returned to Bychek, but it turned out that the bandits had left for Parkany at night. However, instead of pursuing the gang, as the squadron commander Petrukhin suggested, the company commander ordered the wounded to be gathered and

In addition to the platoon of the 1st company of the 185th battalion, there were 4 cavalrymen from the 17th cavalry squadron in Bychka, who lived separately in an apartment. The commander of the border platoon did not know exactly where they lived, and in the confusion of the battle no one remembered them. As a result, 2 cavalrymen were killed, 1 wounded, one of the two border guards who remained in the cordon due to lack of shoes was also killed (the other escaped by hiding behind the stove). A local resident JI joined the gang. Dontsov, who advised the chairman of the Selrevkom Baklanov to take refuge in his hut, since "they have an uprising", but "today I will save you, and tomorrow you will save me." Baklanov did just that. In the village of local residents, the bandits did not touch anyone, limiting themselves to a search.

According to local residents, about half of the bandits were armed, and they split into two groups. One went to Ploskoye, where it seemed to have scattered, since nothing more is known about it. Another group moved to Parkany. There was a garrison consisting of units of the 184th battalion and a platoon of the 18th cavalry squadron (up to 50 people in total with 25 rifles and 3 machine guns), whose soldiers lived in apartments where weapons were also located. Shooting in the village of Bychek, if it was heard, was perceived as training, especially since on November 18 they were warned about the teachings by Burenin. As a result, the Red Army soldiers were taken by surprise and 20 of them were killed. Having captured Parkany and armed with captured weapons, the bandits organized a peasant gathering, which called for an uprising and a campaign against Tiraspol. Some of the peasants willingly joined the bandits, while others were forced to submit.

They learned about these events in Tiraspol only at about 9 o'clock in the morning from the Red Army soldiers of the 451st Infantry Regiment who had fled to the city. There were 464 bayonets, 70 sabers with 11 machine guns in the city, while the gang was estimated at 150-200 people. However, the presence in Tiraspol of several headquarters with their own formations led to the fact that there was no single command. The head of the garrison, Zabaluev, left on November 17 to carry out a special task, his deputy did not enjoy confidence. Raised on alert, the 2nd battalion of the 451st regiment, consisting of 45 people, took up defense and, with skillful and energetic actions, essentially stopped the gang's offensive. However, the death of the battalion commander led to confusion and the withdrawal of the battalion to the city. Mobilization of the 7th company of the Communist regiment of local

the communists dragged on, and the other detachments acted without any coordination. Instead of organizing the defense and defeating the gang, the head of the special department Yuzhny constantly contacted the Odessa Provincial Cheka, informing about the situation and asking for instructions. As the commission found out, as early as November 16, Yuzhny received information from an agent about an impending raid by the Petliura gang, which was preparing a crossing in Kitskany, Parkany, and Bychka. Not fully trusting this information, Yuzhny reported it to Odessa and warned the local command, which reinforced the border guards with 60 Red Army soldiers. However, the units in Bychka and Parkany were not aware of this information, they were simply ordered to increase their vigilance. Naturally, no one took this as a serious warning. During the battles in Tiraspol and Yuzhny's visits to the telegraph, the VChK company, raised on alarm, remained inactive, waiting for his order.

After clashes on the outskirts of the city, the Soviet units withdrew to the headquarters of the garrison, from where they again launched an offensive. A detachment under the command of Tyulpanov soon occupied the Tiraspol fortress, where he took the first prisoners. The battalion of the 451st regiment knocked out the bandits from the Zhytomyr barracks. The gang began to retreat to Parkany, which were also occupied by Soviet units around 14:00. Finally defeated, the bandits, trying to cross back across the Dniester, undressed to make it easier to swim, and threw weapons and clothes on the shore. Most of them drowned in the river, some swam to the Romanian shore, and one was given a rope from the bridge by the Romanians.

The Soviet authorities carried out repressions against those who supported the bandits and personally participated in the hostilities. Thus, 36 people were shot in Tiraspol, 10 in Parkany, and 3 in Bychka. Their property was confiscated, and their families would be evicted from the county. Less involved in the events of 25-30 people were imprisoned in a concentration camp. In addition, arrests were made of those suspected of links with gangs or foreign organizations. "It is clear from

this case that if the raid was not directly organized by the Romanian authorities, then it, apparently, took place with the obvious connivance of our Transnistrian neighbors. From the documents taken from the prisoners, and partly abandoned by the raiders, it follows that many of them served in the 3rd Romanian Army Corps as agents, informers, etc. Further research

Documents and surveys of prisoners will make it possible to more accurately judge the extent of Romania's

participation in the events of November 19. In general, the commission's recommendations boiled down to restoring order in the border and military units, providing them with everything necessary and bringing their numbers up to staffing standards. In addition, the commission recommended bringing to trial those commanders and chiefs who failed to organize actions to repulse the gang, as — .

well as 6 people from [455] the composition of the 2nd Communist Regiment for desertion. Meanwhile, on November 29, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR sent a note to Bucharest, in which they pointed out that, although the Romanian side constantly denied the presence of agents of the UNR government in Bessarabia and the preparation of "bandit raids on Ukraine", new raids from across the Dniester took place.

"On November 19, at dawn, a gang of 150 bayonets that left Bendery pushed back the Soviet border post, occupied the villages of Parkany and Ternovka, massacred peasants there who were suspected of belonging to the Communist Party, and killed 13 Red Army soldiers. By 9 o'clock the gang reached the western suburbs of Tiraspol. At the same time, another gang of smaller numbers crossed the Dniester near the town of Gura-Bikului, north of Bender, and headed for the village. Flat, after the occupation of which she also moved to Tiraspol in a northwestern direction. After a short battle with the Tiraspol garrison, the gang was driven back, having suffered losses in killed, wounded and prisoners; among the last two officers. Ataman Pshennik commanded the raid, among his close associates in the gang were Yemelyanov, Dudichenko, Baturin and Colonel Pugalov. The Romanian captains Satulescu and Mardalescu (Mardariy) from the headquarters of the 3rd Corps took an active part in o

"At the time of the crossing, the Romanian artillery opened fire on our border posts from the Bessarabian coast, and when the defeated and scattered bands, on the evening of 19, descended to the Dniester, boats were sent from the opposite side by the Romanian soldiers towards them." There is information that on the morning of November 18, in the Dubossary region, a gang under the command of Gulyai-Gulenko himself tried to penetrate into Ukraine, and Frolov's gang of 200 people is concentrated in the Akkerman region. In addition, after the defeat of the Tyutyunnik gang, documents were seized that testify to contacts

Petliura representatives in Bessarabia with the headquarters of the 4th Romanian Corps. The Soviet governments protested and declared the responsibility of the Romanian government for these events[456] . In a reply telegram dated December 4, Ionescu promised to investigate this incident, but believed that it was unlikely that "the gang you are talking about formed on our territory." Nevertheless, he again repeated the already traditional phrase about the absence of aggressive intentions in Romania towards Russia[457] . On December—

28, 1921, the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets, on the initiative of Lenin, adopted the "Declaration on the International Position of the RSFSR", which noted that, despite repeated proposals to enter into "negotiations on all controversial issues, not excluding the issue of Bessarabia", Romania from evades negotiations and contributes to the formation and arming of Petliura gangs on its territory. Under these conditions, the congress warned "the governments of neighboring states that if they continue to encroach or support encroachments on the integrity of Soviet territory and on the security of the Soviet republics," they will force them to an adequate "response, which could be fatal for the attacker and his accomplices"[458] . It is clear that the command of the Red Army continued to develop plans in case of war.

By his directive No. 58198 / A / ss of February 4, 1922, the commander of all the armed forces of Ukraine and Crimea, Frunze, demanded that the headquarters of the KVO and KhVO develop plans in case of war with Poland and Romania, supporting the White Guard formations. On February 25, the HVO headquarters presented a plan for the regrouping and concentration of troops of the 10th Army in the event that Poland and Romania acted together with the White Guard formations. This document

indicated that the White Guard formations located in the Balkans and in Romania were possible opponents. It was believed that Romania alone would not fight, but together with Poland, her performance is quite likely. The forces of a potential enemy were estimated as follows. The Whites had 65 thousand people, the Romanian army has 183,270 bayonets, 14,130 sabers, 6,335 machine guns, 1,011 guns, of which 78,270 bayonets, 4,250 sabers, 3,562 machine guns, 528 guns fall on the Eastern Front.

It was believed that Romania was able to call up to 1940 thousand people, and the support from the Little Entente would allow her to concentrate main force in the east.

"When Poland comes out together with Romania, the main task of the Red Army is to inflict a decisive defeat on the Polish army, as the most powerful, while against Romania - expectant actions, as remote from the main objects of action." The 8th and 9th armies of the Southwestern Front were deployed on the Soviet-Polish border. For operations against Romania, the 10th Army was created, the command of which was allocated from the HVO headquarters. The army included the 3rd, 51st, arriving 53rd rifle divisions and the secondary 136th, 137th rifle brigades. The 30th and 15th rifle divisions from the KhVO were transferred to the 8th Army, and the 2nd and 34th rifle divisions deployed in Kiev and Lozova, respectively, were transferred to the reserve of the Southwestern Front. According to this plan, the troops of the 10th Army received the task of "providing

the left flank of the 8th Army, covering it from attacks from the Balti-Botosani direction in the direction of Kremenchug, actively defending the line of the river. Dniester and defend the Black Sea coast from the Dniester estuary to the Kerch Strait inclusive. The army troops deployed as follows: the 51st division on the lower Dniester and from the Dniester to the Tiligul estuary; 3rd division in the Crimea, in the area of Krivoy Rog, Kherson, Nikolaev; 53rd division in the area of Olviopol, Chemirpol, Golovenevsk; 136th brigade in the area of st. Fedorovka, the village of Vasilievka, and the 137th brigade in the Voznesensk region. Field Directorate of the 10th Army - at the station. Znamenka. In the event of a war with Poland alone, the 10th Army (3rd, 51st rifle divisions, 136th, 137th rifle brigades) will passively defend the Dniester line and the coast. On the 18th day of mobilization, the command of the 11th army is detached from the command of the North Caucasus Military District, which must subjugate the 3rd division and the 136th brigade to defend the coast from Ochakov to Kerch. If the attack is undertaken only by the White Guard formations, then the available units must repel it, and the command of the 10th Army is created only when the situation becomes more complicated[459] .

In an effort to prevent a new aggravation of the situation on the western borders, on March 18, the RVSR approved the following proposal by the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army: "Since, in view of

growing rumors about bandit raids and raids coming from Romania and Galicia in the spring, anxiety intensifies in the border population and, in particular, a desire is expressed to repulse the bandits on their own and punish their organizers, i.e. the Romanian and Polish authorities, the RVSR considers it necessary to turn to this attention of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in order to warn the Romanian and Polish authorities in one way or another that the Petliura and Savinkov gangs from Romania and Poland will inevitably cause a uniform rebuff from the border population. On the part of the Military Department there can be a full guarantee that if our borders remain inviolable, no gangs from our side will be allowed into the territory of Poland and Romania. In the case of repeated bandit raids on our territory, the local military authorities declare that it is completely impossible for them to take responsibility for protecting the inviolability of the Romanian and Polish borders, not to mention the fact that too decisive policy on our part in this regard will not be understood at all. the local population"[460] .

However, the general situation on the western border of the Soviet republics in 1922 was much calmer than the year before. Under these conditions, the operational plans of the Red Army outlined above remained only on paper.

Normalization on the Dniester and a conference in Vienna

In preparation for the international economic conference in Genoa, Romania refused the Soviet proposal to coordinate the interests of the parties in order to support each other at the conference. On the contrary, Bucharest regarded the forthcoming conference as another opportunity to internationalize its financial demands on the RSFSR. For its part, Moscow also counted the losses caused by the actions of Romania in 1916-1920. Already on January 22, 1922, according to incomplete data, Romania's debt was estimated at 1,005,501,601 rubles. 61 k. in gold (at the prices of 1916-1918)^[461] . The general claims of Moscow to Bucharest were expressed in the figure of 1,352,355,634 rubles in gold ^[462] . For its part, Romania believed that Russia owed it 15 billion lei, while the Romanians estimated their own debt at 873 million lei^[463] . during the Genoa Conference (April 10 - May 19, 1922), IN Romania declared that the RSFSR should return to it valuables totaling 7.9 billion francs^[464] . On May 6, Chicherin informed the press that "the demand to return Romanian gold without prior resolution of disputes existing between Romania and Russia, such as the issue of Bessarabia, is also unacceptable"^[465] .

On May 17, in Genoa, Chicherin declared that Soviet Russia was ready to sign a general non-aggression pact, but respect for the existing territorial status quo "is by no means tantamount for Russia to recognition of the current territorial status quo, and in particular, recognition of the current occupation of Bessarabia by Romania"^[466] . On the same day, the Romanian delegation declared its readiness to undertake a non-aggression against Russia at ^[467] . On July 7, the Ukrainian SSR, on the basis of maintaining quo, again demanded from Romania to stop supporting the territorial status the Petliura ^[468] formations, their disarmament and dissolution. On July 19, a conversation with Litvinov in The Hague, Diamandi announced Bucharest's readiness to resume negotiations with Moscow both on the question of Bessarabia and on the question of Romanian values. In the question of Bessarabia, we should talk about the settlement of the border so that Bessarabia remains behind

Romania. Litvinov hinted that the best solution to the issue of financial claims of the parties could be a mutual waiver of them. In addition, he invited Romania to take part in the disarmament conference in Moscow, to which Poland and the Baltic countries were invited as early as June 12[469] . On August 15, the Romanian side notified the RSFSR that it takes note of the Soviet proposal to participate in the disarmament conference, but believes that "the first step towards a disarmament agreement should be the recognition of existing borders"[470] . On August 28, the Romanian government

reiterated that it was ready to discuss any issues with the RSFSR, but "demands that it be considered established that the current border of Romania is not a subject of discussion"[471] . On September 26, Moscow announced that it was also ready to discuss any issues of Soviet-Romanian relations, but would not accept any ultimatums[472] . In the autumn of 1922, the parties twice again indicated their unchanged position[473] as a result, Romania did not take part in the Moscow Conference on Disarmament, instructing Poland to represent its interests. On December 19, 1922, in Lausanne, Chicherin, in a conversation with the Romanian ambassador in Paris, Diamandi, who assured him of Romania's peaceful intentions, made the following proposal as a possible compromise: "recognition of Bessarabia in exchange for the values and jewels of the Crown, the complete elimination of financial claims" and "settlement of other issues"[474] . This sounding did not have any specific consequences.

had.

As early as May 12, 1922, the tasks of Soviet active intelligence were clarified: "1. Continue further preparatory work. Take all measures so that the active intelligence apparatus does not decompose. Recognize as one of the tasks of active intelligence to reveal the mood of the local population and, in the case of spontaneous movements, to take over their leadership by agreement with the local party organs. 2. Consider it necessary to significantly strengthen the organizational work of active intelligence on the territory of Romania"[475] . In January 1923 the Soviet intelligence received information about the clashes that took place on the Hungarian-Romanian border. Based on materials from the Romanian budget discussed in parliament, the Soviet military command estimated the Romanian armed forces for 1923 at 160,884

to the [476] . Soviet intelligence managed to obtain data that, according Romanian General Staff, in the event of a war with the USSR, Soviet troops would advance from Khotyn and Bender to Iasi and Galati. Moreover, the main blow was expected from Bender to Galati and Bucharest. These assessments were generally shared by the French General Staff, which, however, doubted the stability of the Romanian troops and advised Romania to create a fortified line along the river. Prut, so that the Red Army could not break through the Carpathians to Transylvania[477] .

On May 16, 1923, the USSR informed Romania about new facts of shelling of Soviet troops by Romanian soldiers on the Dniester[478] . On June 12, the Romanian side replied that all these incidents were the result of the response of the Romanian troops to shelling from the Soviet bank of the river, and proposed to start negotiations on measures to prevent military incidents on the Dniester[479] . On July 16, Moscow agreed to this proposal[480] . On August 10, negotiations began in Tiraspol between the Soviet Union and Romania, during which the parties, by tacit agreement, refused to discuss the clashes that took place on the Dniester, and focused on developing measures to prevent them. As the head of the Soviet delegation A. Bobrishev pointed out in his report to Moscow, "the question of investigating cases that took place on the Dniester during 1921, 1922 and 1923 should be raised only as a last resort, because if from Romania or when connivance of its government and there were very serious cases of violation of the inviolability of our territory, then our active work did not stop almost until very recently. At the same time, the Romanian authorities have at their disposal solid data that compromises us, because both individual documents of ours fell into their hands, and there were cases when our agents went over to their side, not counting forced testimony .

The negotiations in Tiraspol ended with the signing on November 20 of the "Regulations on measures and means aimed at preventing and resolving conflicts that may arise on the Dniester River"[482]. At the same time, the Soviet delegation stressed that the Dniester was considered by the USSR as a temporary demarcation line. On November 30, a protocol was signed on the creation of a mixed commission to resolve emerging conflicts on the Dniester and an instruction on its activities. Meanwhile, in Moscow, the idea of restoring trade

relations with Romania. On September 3, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Chicherin sent a note to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in which he noted that "a full and final trade agreement would help secure Bessarabia for Romania, but a temporary and limited trade agreement with a certain proviso that it does not prejudice the issue about the settlement of the border, it would be useful to us. It will weaken Rumania's ties with Poland and therefore weaken the latter's international position . [483] Accordingly, on September 6, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) decided to "continue the technical work of the first Soviet Romanian commission with the aim of opening trade relations, but without concluding an agreement that would suggest the idea of ceding Bessarabia"[484].

On November 10, bilateral negotiations on trade issues began. The Soviet delegation suggested establishing a Soviet consulate in Bucharest and a Romanian consulate in Moscow. After long consultations, on December 31, the Romanian delegation refused to accept these proposals, citing the lack of diplomatic relations[485] . During the negotiations on December 5, Moscow— announced its readiness to take part in a conference for the complete settlement of Soviet-Romanian relations, Bucharest was asked to name the time and place of its convocation. On December 21, the Romanian side also agreed to continue negotiations in the second half of January 1924 in Salzburg. However, on December 29, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) made the following decision: "a) Reject Salzburg. b) Propose Odessa, or at least Vienna (not to mention the latter in the first note), proposing the date for convening the conference at the end of February. c) Keep in mind that delaying the conference for too long

fail. d)

Include representatives of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars in the future delegation "[486] . As a result of the exchange of notes, the parties agreed that the place of negotiations would be Vienna, and the [487] negotiations themselves would take place in March 1924.

The discussion of the prospects for relations with Romania revealed the presence in the Soviet leadership of supporters of two main options for diplomatic actions. Some were for holding a conference,

which could be used to declare the interests of the USSR and, possibly, reach an agreement with Bucharest. Others opposed the conference in general, because they believed that "in the Bessarabian issue, time is our best ally," and "on the day when we can speak so loudly that our voice is heard everywhere, like the voice of a great revolutionary state, it will not be difficult for us to will find a solution to the Bessarabian issue. As a result, on March 3, 1924, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) formulated instructions for the Soviet delegation at the upcoming conference, according to which "Bessarabia can in no case be ceded to Romania"[488] . Accordingly, in preparation for the Vienna Conference, the Soviet government launched a —

broad press campaign aimed at exposing the occupation regime in Bessarabia, highlighting the economic and political situation of the population of the region, and revealing the essence of the policy of Western imperialist circles towards Bessarabia. On March 2 and 14, 1924, crowded rallies of natives of Bessarabia took place in Moscow, at which the idea of creating the Moldavian SSR and its reunification with the USSR was voiced, and the mandate of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna Conference, handed over to its head N.N. Krestinsky. The order said: "... we entrust to you, representatives of the USSR at the conference in Vienna, the fate of the working people of Bessarabia, we ask you to defend the following demands:

- 1) immediate release from prison of all workers and peasants, those who fought for the cause of the liberation of the working people of Bessarabia;
- 2) immediate cessation of arrests, beatings, executions and persecution of the labor movement;
- 3) the immediate release of the mobilized Bessarabians from the ranks of the Romanian army; 4)
return of all property taken away by the Romanian bourgeoisie from the borders of Bessarabia, with full compensation;
- 5) opening the borders of Bessarabia for free entry and exit of citizens, immediately from the beginning of the conference; 6)
the immediate withdrawal of the Romanian troops and full compensation for the material and moral sacrifices suffered by all citizens of Bessarabia during the entire period of occupation;

7) the creation of the Workers' and Peasants' Republic of Bessarabia and its

reunification with the USSR. Down with the invaders! Long live the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic!" Meetings of protest against the occupation of Bessarabia and in support of the mandate worked out at the meetings of Bessarabians in Moscow on the Bessarabian issue also took place in Vinnitsa, Yekaterinoslav and other cities of the Soviet Union [489]

On March 23, 1924, a grand demonstration of protest against Polish rule in Galicia and Romanian rule in Bessarabia took place in Vienna. It was attended by thousands of Galician and Bessarabian refugees who were in Austria. At the rally, the speakers spoke about the reign of terror in Bessarabia, demanded the evacuation of the Romanian troops from the region and a plebiscite among the population of the region on the issue of its fate. On behalf of those gathered, the delegation handed over to Krestinsky a memorandum, in which, on the basis of documents and testimonies, the horrors of terror in Bessarabia were exposed and demands were put forward for the evacuation of the Romanian troops from Bessarabia, holding a plebiscite, compensating the Bessarabian population for the losses caused to them by the occupiers, and releasing political prisoners from Bessarabian prisons. At a reception of representatives of the foreign press at the USSR embassy in Austria, a delegation elected at a meeting of Bessarabians in Kharkov read out a statement in which the Romanian allegations were exposed that the Bessarabian population had decided to "attach" the region to Romania. The statement emphasized that even the so-called Sfatul Tarii vote on April 9, 1918 took place in the presence of Romanian soldiers and gendarmes and under the influence of open threats, and the act of the same self-proclaimed body of December 10 was only announced in the presence of deputies without voting "pros and cons". The delegation indicated further that it had in its possession the text of the protest of the representatives of the majority of Sfatul Tarii against this lawlessness. In the statement of the delegation of Bessarabians, the demand was again put forward to

grant the population of Bessarabia the right to self-determination[490] . For its part, Romania, preparing for the Vienna Conference, sought to create the impression that everything was going well in Bessarabia and that there was no Bessarabian issue. In order to process pu

the Romanian government organized several rallies, naturally endorsing the unification of Bessarabia with Romania (for example, on March 23, 1924, such an event took place in Chisinau). In an effort to strengthen its position at the conference, Romania tried to achieve the ratification of the Paris Protocol on the Bessarabian issue by France, Italy and Japan. Following the wishes of Romania, France ratified the Paris Protocol on March 11, 1924, thereby hoping to support Bucharest in the upcoming negotiations with the USSR in Vienna and to intensify anti-Soviet forces in the West. It is clear that the Soviet

government came out with a strong protest against the ratification by the French Parliament of the Paris Protocol. On March 16, the NKID of the USSR sent a telegram of protest to the French government, which stated: "The decision of the French parliament, adopted on the eve of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Romania, cannot be regarded otherwise than as the intervention of a third power, which will inevitably prevent the establishment of a lasting peace and will contribute to the extension unsettled state of this part of Europe. The Government of the USSR draws the attention of the French Government to the fact that the latter is in solidarity with the violation of the rights of the population of Bessarabia and the Soviet Union by the occupation of Bessarabia by Romania and is therefore responsible for the losses caused to the Soviet Union by the occupation. The government of the USSR will draw all the necessary conclusions from —

this . [491] The Romanian government instructed its delegation that, even before the start of official negotiations, it should obtain from the USSR recognition of the annexation of Bessarabia to — Romania[492] . Normalization of relations between Romania and the USSR is impossible "without establishing a border between them; the establishment of the border means the recognition of the unification of Bessarabia, which is and should be ours, so that this problem excludes all discussions"[493] . At the meeting of the Romanian Council of Ministers held on March 19, 1924, the last instructions of the delegation departing for Vienna were developed: in the event of the USSR refusing to recognize the accession of Bessarabia to Romania, the conference should be immediately interrupted. The

but not to sign any documents. Knowing in general terms about the uncompromising position of Romania, Moscow pointed out to Krestinsky on March 24: "It is necessary that the word "plebiscite" be heard at the conference. The Romanians will probably leave as soon as you touch Bessarabia, so one of your first words when you touch it, let it be a "plebiscite". Include this word in your very first sentence." [494] It was in this — .

situation that the Vienna Conference began its work. Before it began, on March 26, the head of the Soviet delegation, Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Germany, Krestinsky, at a meeting with correspondents of foreign newspapers, once again indicated that the USSR intended to resolve all disputes with Romania in a friendly atmosphere and by peaceful means. The official opening of the conference took place at 3:30 pm on March 27, 1924. At a meeting on March 28, the Soviet delegation proposed that territorial, financial, economic, political and legal issues be included in the conference agenda. The Romanian delegation stated that "the issues to be discussed are in principle those put forward by the delegation of the USSR, and [it] agrees with the latter on the proposed order of discussions." At the same time, the Romanian delegation believed that the USSR was ready to "recognize the Dniester as the border between Russia and Romania."

The Bessarabian question immediately occupied the main place in the work of the Vienna Conference. The declaration announced by Krestinsky stated: "The government of the USSR, and before the formation of the USSR, the governments of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR never gave their consent to the annexation of Bessarabia to Romania and consider the occupation of Bessarabia in 1918 by the Romanian troops, which continues to this day, as a forcible seizure of this region". Emphasizing that in its policy towards Bessarabia the Soviet government is guided not by any right inherited from Tsarist Russia, but by the principle of the nation's right to self-determination, the Soviet delegation, in order to justly settle the Bessarabia issue, proposed holding a plebiscite in Bessarabia. "The government of the USSR believes that the people of Bessarabia must decide for themselves whether they want to remain part of the USSR, whether they want to secede from the Union and join Romania, or, finally, prefer to exist as an independent sovereign state." At the next

meeting on March 31, the Romanian delegation rejected the proposal for a plebiscite, while indicating that the province's belonging to Romania was already a settled issue. In its declaration, the Romanian delegation stated that only on the basis of the recognition by the Soviet side of Bessarabia as an integral part of Romania would it be ready to continue negotiations.

At the meeting of the conference on April 2, the Soviet delegation resolutely rejected the Rumanian claims. In her statement, she pointed out that Romania "captured a part of Soviet territory with an armed hand, has been holding it for six years, has so far evaded any negotiations with the government of the USSR, and now, having finally sent a delegation for negotiations, is actually disrupting these negotiations, setting them as a condition continuation of the preliminary recognition by the allied Soviet government of the legality of the annexation of Bessarabia. Therefore, the Soviet delegation suggested that "the Romanian delegation refuse to put any preliminary demands on us and start a joint discussion of the conditions for organizing a plebiscite in Bessarabia. Only in this way will the Romanian government be able to free itself from the accusation that it holds Bessarabia in its hands just as forcibly and just as against the will of the population, as it does with Bukovina, which is mostly populated by Ukrainian peasants. The answer of the Romanian delegation was that it "finds it necessary to postpone the

negotiations and return to Romania"[495] . Romania's refusal to hold a plebiscite in Bessarabia was due not only to the fact that there— was, of course, no guarantee of a positive decision for Bucharest by the local population in the event of the withdrawal of Romanian troops, but also to the fact that the Western powers strongly advised not to create a precedent that set most of the borders that arose from the Versailles system of treaties[496] would be called into question . Thus, by its refusal of the plebiscite, Romania once again confirmed to the whole world that its power in Bessarabia rests solely on bayonets. In this regard, it is worth noting that in the press of Union Romania on the Little Entente of Yugoslavia, support for the Soviet position at the Vienna Conference[497] prevailed .

Summing up the results of the Vienna Conference at a press conference for foreign journalists in Vienna on April 4, 1924, Krestinsky

said: "The USSR, putting forward demands for a plebiscite on the Bessarabian issue, wanted to show by this that it was going towards Romania. But if the Romanian government wants the population of Bessarabia to resolve the question of the form of the state structure in the same way as the working people of the Soviet republics did, by convening a congress of Soviets, then the Soviet government will not object to such a method of resolving the issue after the abolition of the Romanian occupation. 498] . In a statement by the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, representatives of the press stated that, despite its failure, the Vienna Conference provided "an opportunity to once again remind the whole world of the existence of a serious territorial issue in the southeast of Europe, which neither the conference of ambassadors, nor the League of Nations, nor the parliaments can resolve. great powers, if there is no will of the Soviet republics directly interested in this issue, and also to remind the unfortunate population of Bessarabia that they are not forgotten by their brothers in Ukraine. The Soviet Union did not reconcile itself to the rejection of Bessarabia from it, and until the plebiscite is held, "we will consider Bessarabia an integral part of Ukraine and the Soviet Union"[499] .

Diplomatic games

Meanwhile, on February 5, 1924, G.I. Kotovsky, S.S. Timov, P.D. Tkachenko and a number of Romanian communist émigrés turned to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) with a proposal to create a Moldavian Republic, which, in their opinion, could attract the sympathy of the Bessarabian population, exert a "strong ideological influence on and, under an appropriate [...] international the surrounding regions revolutionize the entire situation in the Balkan Peninsula. In response to a request from the Central Committee about the advisability of such a formation, the commander of all the armed forces of Ukraine and the Crimea, Frunze, supported this proposal. The preparation of the organization of the new autonomy was entrusted to the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. On March 7, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U found it expedient to organize the Moldavian Autonomous Republic within the Ukrainian SSR. On March 11, the plenum of the Odessa Provincial Committee of the Communist Party decided to create a Moldavian communist section under the provincial committee. However, Kharkov and Moscow still hesitated. Then, in order to speed up the solution of this issue, on July 25, 1924, Frunze sent a note to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in which he wrote: population. The city of Tiraspol could be given as an administrative center. Finally, an international moment follows. The creation of even a small Moldavian republic or region in our hands will be a powerful tool in our hands to influence the mood of the worker and peasant masses of Bessarabia in the sense of strengthening hopes for deliverance from the Romanian oppression . On July 29,—

the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) decided "to consider it necessary, primarily for political reasons, to separate the Moldovan population into a special autonomous republic within the Ukrainian SSR and to propose to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to give appropriate directives to the Ukrainian Soviet bodies"[501] . Accordingly, on August 2, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U approved a detailed action plan on this issue. On September 25, the Politburo of the Central Committee indicated that "in the act of creating the Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Rep

the border of the USSR" - that is, the rivers Prut and ~~Danube~~[Danube](#)^[502] . By the decision of the III session of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of the VIII convocation on October 12, the Moldavian Autonomous SSR was formed as part of the Ukrainian SSR. In total, the new autonomy covered 11 districts with an area of 8.1 thousand square kilometers and a population of 545.6 thousand people, the city of Balta became its capital (since 1929 it was moved to Tiraspol). The act of the VUTsIK on the formation of the MASSR stated that "the western border of this republic is the state border of the USSR; we consider this border not the Dniester, but the Prut. Let the capitalists temporarily hold Bessarabia in their hands - this is a matter of fact, but not of right. Rights are on our side. Bessarabia is circled in red on our map, because Bessarabia must become an inseparable part of the AMSSR" ^[503] . Pointing to the international significance of the formation of the MASSR, Pravda wrote: "At the gates of Romania, where the most Black-Hundred bourgeoisie in Europe is rampant, the Soviet star has lit up. Its rays will shine far to the West, and it will serve as a guiding star for the entire population of Bessarabia and the proletariat of Rumania."

In Bessarabia, the underground struggle against Romanian domination continued. In all districts of the region there were circles and cells that distributed illegal newspapers, leaflets, appeals, etc. By the end of 1923, the South Bessarabian Underground Revolutionary Committee was created in Tatarbunary, which began preparations for the uprising. On the night of September 11, 1924, in the village of Nikolayevka, there was a clash between rebels and gendarmes, who managed to arrest most of the underground workers and seize materials indicating the presence of a revolutionary underground organization in the south of Bessarabia. The Romanian authorities began to gather troops to the south. On September 14, the rebel leadership decided to hasten the start of the uprising. On the morning of September 16, an uprising began in Tatarbunary and Soviet power was proclaimed. The rebels occupied the villages of Akmagnit, Mikhailovka and Chishmya, where there were clashes with the Romanian gendarmes and troops, but the general uprising in the region, which they expected, did not happen. On September 17–18, Romanian troops defeated the rebels and massacred the population, during which more than 3 thousand people died. These events received a great response in Europe, convincingly showing the falsity

the statements of the Romanian government about the "voluntary" desire of the Bessarabian population to unite with Romania[504] .

The investigation of the events that took place was carried out not only by the Romanian special services, but also by the structures of the Comintern. As a result, it turned out that the initiators of the uprising were the head of the South Bessarabian Revolutionary Committee A. Klyushnikov (Nenin) and O. Polyakov (Platov), who declared himself the leader of the uprising. Naturally, the Romanian side sought to prove that the uprising was the result of the "intrigues of the Kremlin", but the documents of the ECCI allow us to assert that the uprising was a personal initiative of these figures, who, to a certain extent, underground, misinformed Moscow. Moreover, in an effort to raise an uprising, its leaders in their proclamations declared that they had been promised help to the Red Army, which was an outright lie. Apparently, it was no coincidence that on February 25, 1925, the Soviet leadership decided to abandon the usual forms of "active intelligence" (sabotage, military subversive groups, etc.) and completely restructure the foreign activities of military intelligence.

On March 26, it was decided to create a non-party peasant revolutionary organization in Bessarabia on the basis of the militant organizations of the peasants "under the slogans of liberation from the Romanian oppression, division of the landowners' land and unification with the USSR." At the same time, it was necessary to focus on propaganda and agitation and not allow scattered spontaneous armed uprisings. It was also forbidden to contribute to the arming of the local— population[505] . Corresponding measures were also taken by the Comintern. On April 29, 1925, the Bessarabian commission on the national question of the 5th expanded plenum of the ECCI decided that the Communist Party of Romania should make more active use in its work of the fact that "the formation of the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, as an autonomous republic within Soviet Ukraine, is an expression of national aspirations of the Moldovan people and a clear example of the resolution of the Moldovan national question. At the same time, it was necessary to get rid of the passivity of the labor movement that exists in Bessarabia, "waiting for liberation ... from beyond the Dniester", and to propagate the slogans of the right of every people to self-determination, the liberation of Bessarabia from the Romanian occupation

and its unification with the Moldavian ASSR[506] . Accordingly, the manifesto of the Union of Revolutionary Peasants of Bessarabia indicated that its task was “first of all to liberate Bessarabia from the yoke of the Romanian occupation by organizing the peasants into the Union, and then the creation of a workers’ and peasants’ government and reunification with the Moldavian—

Soviet Republic beyond the Dniester”[507] . For its part, the Romanian government launched a noisy press campaign after the Vienna conference to discredit the very idea of a plebiscite. Terror was intensified in Bessarabia. Abroad, Romanian diplomats sought to achieve the earliest possible ratification of the Bessarabian Protocol by Italy and Japan. For Romania, the support of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia for its position on the Bessarabian question was very important. However, at the conference of the Little Entente in July-August 1924, they advised the Romanian government to resolve the Bessarabian issue with the USSR by peaceful means. Here it was decided that since the USSR had already been recognized de jure by England and France was close to this, then for the Little Entente there was no other way out but to recognize the Soviet Union, but there was no need to hurry with this step, since the Bessarabian issue had not yet been resolved [508] . Italy was also in no hurry to ratify the Paris Protocol, which had previously sought from Romania the conclusion of a profitable trade agreement

and compensation for damage to those Italian citizens whose land property had been expropriated in Bessarabia. Britain, which had ratified the Paris Protocol back in 1922, promised Romania not to discuss the Bessarabian question in negotiations with the Soviet Union. This did not prevent, however, the USSR delegation at the Soviet-British talks, after official greetings, from reading out a special declaration of the Soviet Union on the Bessarabian question.

“Officially, from the point of view of international law, Bessarabia remains a territory belonging to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” the declaration said. “Only the Bessarabian people themselves can change this historical fact, and they must be given freedom to express their will, and the Romanian troops and the Romanian administration must be evacuated from the territory of Bessarabia.” C

she intends to do in order to eliminate the injustice committed in relation to the Union of Soviet Socialist [509] Republics and the Bessarabian people" — .

Now that during 1924 the USSR was recognized de jure by England, France and Italy, Moscow could afford a more active position on the Bessarabian issue. Soviet diplomats in France and Poland tried to get the governments of these countries to refuse to support the aggressive aspirations of Romania[510]. On January 26, 1925, in a conversation with French Ambassador to the USSR J. Erbett, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Litvinov stated that the Soviet Union remained on the basis of its statement on the plebiscite made in Vienna, emphasizing that "we are not going to resolve this issue by force of arms , but we will wait for events ... "[511] . On December 16, 1925, in a conversation with French Prime Minister A. Briand, Chicherin rejected the idea of dividing Bessarabia put forward by Prague and Rome[512] . —

As a result of lengthy negotiations with Poland, on February 18, 1926, Chicherin managed to get an official statement from the Polish envoy in Moscow that "Poland is disinterested in the issue of belonging to Bessarabia, but is not disinterested in waging war between the USSR and Romania"[513] . On March 26, a new Polish-Romanian treaty of mutual assistance was signed, by which the parties pledged to mutually recognize and maintain their territorial integrity against any external attack. The secret military convention listed the USSR, Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria as the main potential threats[514] .

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On June 10, 1926, a Franco-Romanian treaty was concluded, by which the parties assumed the obligation to consult in case of a threat to their national interests and the territorial status quo. In the protocol attached to the treaty, the Romanian side declared its readiness "not to undertake any offensive by regular troops against Russia, and also not to allow the formation of irregular troops on its territory for aggression against Russia"[515] . Even before a detailed acquaintance with the text of this agreement, Moscow told Paris that the agreement would make a negative impression in the USSR[516] . On August 24, in a conversation with the French ambassador in Moscow, — Litvinov stated that "we would like a peace agreement with Romania, [...] but Romania evades the agreement. She will have even less desire to come

to consent now that she feels the strong support of France. Thus, the Franco-Romanian treaty not only does not facilitate agreement, but, on the contrary, perpetuates the current uncertain situation. Consequently, France has done a disservice to the cause of peace and the cause of settling disputes. If France believed that with this treaty she would force us to come to terms with the seizure of Bessarabia and accept the status quo,

then she is mistaken. The Soviet press actively criticized France's policy in Eastern Europe. When the French ambassador in Moscow on September 22 drew Litvinov's attention to the harsh tone of the speeches of Pravda and Izvestia, the latter replied that these articles "are only a weak reflection of the indignation aroused in us" [518]. On October 2, 1926, France was handed a note stating that the Soviet government considered the Franco-Romanian treaty as an unfriendly act directed against the interests of both the USSR and the Bessarabian population. "The French Government must know," the note emphasized, "that the peoples of the Soviet Union, as well as the entire population of Bessarabia, have never agreed and will never agree to consider the legal occupation of Bessarabia, as well as its annexation by Romania ... Promising Romania assistance to France in case of war and proclaiming the common interests of France and Romania without any reservations regarding Bessarabia, the French Government supports the aggressive and predatory tendencies of the ruling circles of Romania."

Taking into account the fact that the Paris Protocol would enter into force only after its ratification by all signatory countries, the Soviet Union made efforts to keep Italy and Japan from this act. On May 26, 1924, the USSR brought to the attention of Italy that it was protesting against the Romanian occupation of Bessarabia and hoped that the Italian government would not [520] This issue would Protocol of 1920. of the Italian treaty on non-ratify the Paris participation in agreements or actions hostile to each other and became especially acute after the contents of the Franco-Romanian treaty became known [521]. The Soviet Union put forward as one of the conditions for the signing of the Soviet-Italian agreement Italy's renunciation of

ratification of the Paris Protocol. However, at that time the influence of the USSR in the international arena was so small that the Italian leadership was much more concerned about the Balkan problems, where it sought to split the Little Entente and secure Romania's assistance in the Italo-Yugoslav confrontation [522]. Therefore, B. Mussolini approved the Italian-Romanian treaty concluded on September 16, 1926, which indicated the possibility of ratifying the Paris Protocol in the future. And the Italian Marshal P. Badoglio, who was making a trip to Romania and Bessarabia at that time, speaking at a banquet in Chisinau, declared his readiness to march in the forefront against the Soviet Union [523]. —

On October 6, 1926, Mussolini was given a note stating that the Soviet government does not recognize and does not recognize any act by which Bessarabia, against the will of the population, would be annexed to Romania, and that each such act would be considered by them as a manifestation of unfriendliness in relation to the Soviet Union [524]. "The purpose of the note," Litvinov pointed out in a conversation with the Italian ambassador in Moscow on November 9, "is to bring to the attention of not only the Italian government about our attitude to the Bessarabian convention, but also to the attention of the whole world, including Romania, that we are not on we do not give up one iota our rights to Bessarabia. And Chicherin, speaking on December 6, 1926 in Berlin to the press, noted that the Soviet Union could not "calmly treat such attacks" as Badoglio's statement in Chisinau —.

[526] When Italy ratified the Paris Protocol on March 9, 1927, the Soviet On March 17 the government protested. It recalled that during all the talks on Bessarabia, the USSR stood on the point of view that the fate of this territory could and should be decided solely by the free expression of the will of its population, and Romania's refusal of the plebiscite testifies to the understanding of the latter that it exercises its power only force of arms and violence against the will of the population of the region. Moscow once again declared that "the USSR still and invariably considers the annexation of Bessarabia by Romania a fact of naked violence" [527]. At the same time, the representatives of the USSR in Tokyo did everything to prevent the ratification of the Paris Protocol by Japan, while expressing the hope

Japan, not wanting to overshadow good relations with the USSR, will continue to refuse to ratify the Bessarabian Protocol^[528]. On March 14, 1928, Japan notified the USSR that it was not yet going ^[529] to ratify the Paris Protocol. — .

Negotiations in Riga

In July 1928, Czechoslovakia offered the USSR mediation in negotiations with Romania. In the future, it was proposed to exchange the recognition of Bessarabia for Romania for leaving Romanian values for the USSR. On September 29, Litvinov suggested that the Politburo reply to Prague that the USSR was ready to meet with the representative of Romania “for a preliminary discussion of the agreement, but that all negotiations would be unsuccessful if the Romanian government remained in the position it had taken during the Vienna Conference”[530] . For its part, the Romanian leadership remained in the position “not to discuss the issue of borders”[531] . As a result, the mediation of Prague did not useful.

On September 6, 1928, the USSR joined the Briand-Kellogg Pact and was the only member state to ratify it before the end of the year. On December 29, Moscow proposed to Poland and Lithuania to sign a protocol on the early entry into force of this treaty so that any state that signed the pact would later join the protocol. But Warsaw proposed to expand the list of participants in the future agreement by involving Romania, Latvia and Estonia. Upon learning of this, Lithuania refused to participate in the multilateral agreement. For Poland and Romania, this was another reason to demonstrate the strength of their military alliance. On January 11, 1929, the Soviet side indicated to Poland that it was not against Romania's participation in the proposed protocol, but this did not at all eliminate the existing Soviet

Romanian contentious issues[532]. In the end, on February 1, 1929, Moscow accepted the Polish proposal, and on February 9, the USSR, Poland, Romania, Latvia and Estonia signed the Moscow Protocol on the early entry into force of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. Turkey joined the protocol on February 27, Iran on April 3, and Lithuania on April 4 [533] . as a signing delegate, — .

a representative of a state with which the Union does not have normal diplomatic relations and with which it has long-standing serious disputes, unresolved and not resolved by this protocol, is only additional evidence of the peacefulness of the Soviet Union . On February 10, the newspaper Izvestia[535] published this Soviet position . In a conversation with the representative of Romania, K. Davila, Litvinov pointed out that for Romania the settlement of the issue of its border on the Dniester was of much greater importance than for the USSR, and that Moscow remained on the basis of its proposal for a plebiscite[536] . The same position was confirmed in the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of March 28, 1929 and in the speech of the

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR A.I. Rykov on May 23[537] In 1929, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, C. Argetoianu, frankly stated that "Romania wants to create a Central European Union against the USSR. This union should include Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Italy. The Kellogg Pact is primarily of moral significance. No one can force the state that has signed the pact not to wage war if it wants this war. Europe must not forget that Romania is protecting Europe from the Russian danger . The conference of the Little Entente in May 1929, discussing the issue of relations with the USSR, at the initiative of Romania and Yugoslavia, spoke in favor of a new delay in the establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow[539] . On December 5, 1929, the United States proposed to Romania to make a statement condemning the actions of the Soviet Union during the conflict on the CER, which the United States, Britain and France

had already done. It was not excluded that all the countries of the Little Entente and Poland would join this demarche. It is clear that Moscow tried to keep its Western neighbors from this step. Speaking at the second session of the USSR Central Executive Committee, Litvinov recalled that "on our southwestern border, one of the provinces that has not formally separated from our Union is still in the occupation of another country. This occupation is overlooked by the self-appointed guardians of the Kellogg Pact. I mean Bessarabia, whose population has never ceased to strive for reunification with our Union . Nevertheless, Romania

the Soviet-Chinese protocol on the normalization of relations, the French ambassador in Moscow tried to convey this Romanian note to Litvinov, who refused not only to accept it, but also to listen to it. The Soviet side quite rightly stated that a state that refuses to resume normal relations with the USSR and occupies part of the Soviet territory should hardly come out with moralizing on the theme of peacefulness[541] . In the context of growing economic problems and social protests of—

the population, Romania has relied on strengthening its armed forces. In the winter of 1930, negotiations began with Czechoslovakia on the acquisition of weapons and military equipment, and the Romanian press again launched a campaign about the "Soviet military threat." In the summer, Romania, like the rest of the Little Entente countries, approved the French idea of a "pan-Europe". In January 1931, Bucharest spoke out against Moscow's invitation to discuss this project. On January 15, the Polish-Romanian mutual assistance treaty was extended. Along with the United States and France, Romania tried to participate in the economic boycott of the USSR, preventing Soviet supplies along [the Danube](#)[542] . Moreover, the Romanian government confiscated a batch of galoshes purchased in the USSR, as their soles bore the "Hammer and Sickle" brand, which could "be a means of conducting Soviet propaganda", especially in Bessarabia[543] . It is clear that all this did not contribute to the improvement of Soviet-Romanian relations.

In May-June 1931, Soviet-French negotiations began on the conclusion of non-aggression and trade treaties. On August 10, the Soviet-French non-aggression pact was initialed, and France suggested that Poland also reach a similar agreement with the USSR. On August 23, the Polish side was handed over to the Soviet side a proposal to resume negotiations on a non-aggression pact, and on September 23, France announced that the signing of the Soviet-French treaty was an agreement. For its part, Moscow suggested conditional on achieving Soviet-Polish that Paris persuade Warsaw to soften its position and pointed out the impossibility of linking the two treaties. In May 1931, Poland notified Romania

of the imminent resumption of negotiations with the USSR and offered Bucharest its mediation if it was ready for similar negotiations with Moscow.

On November 14, Warsaw offered its mediation to Moscow on the basis of "leaving the question of Bessarabia aside." However, the Soviet Union, although it supported this Polish idea, preferred to conduct bilateral negotiations without intermediaries. On November 25, the Romanian government asked France for possible negotiations with Moscow. On November 27, Paris confirmed its consent to these negotiations and declared its readiness to maintain its obligations with respect to Bucharest in any case. On December 5, Romania invited the USSR to conclude a non-aggression pact. Moscow, on the other hand, hoped that it would be possible to start negotiations with Romania on the "normalization of relations", but basically it was a Soviet concession to Poland and France. In December 1931, an agreement was reached that the Soviet-Romanian negotiations would be conducted in — and the parties agreed to Riga [544] so that the question of Bessarabia would be left aside. Romania, pushed by France and Poland, was not inclined to rush things and took the Polish draft non-aggression treaty as a basis, adding to it a text that could be interpreted as an indirect recognition of Bessarabia as part of Romania[545] . At the same time, in December

1931, negotiations began between the USSR and Finland and Latvia, with which non-aggression pacts were signed on January 21 and February 5, 1932, respectively. Meanwhile, on January 6, 1932, Soviet-Romanian negotiations began in Riga. The Soviet delegation was headed by a member of the board of the NKID B.S. Stomonyakov, and the Romanian one - Charge d'Affaires in Latvia M. Sturdza. As expected, the main discussion revolved around the question of whether or not to designate the issue of Bessarabia in the forthcoming agreement. On January 20, the Romanian side declared that until the Soviet side accepted a firm commitment not to include the question of Bessarabia in the non-aggression pact in any way, it considered it useless to continue the negotiations that had begun[546] . On January 26, TASS published an interview with Litvinov, who outlined the Soviet position, which was to mention in the treaty the existence of unresolved problems between both countries, since "we cannot conclude any agreements with Romania that could be interpreted as our indirect or tacit recognition of the capture of Bessarabia"[547] . Actually, this was precisely what did not suit the Romanian

side. As a result, the negotiations were practically curtailed[548] . On January 25, the Soviet-Polish treaty was initialed, but Warsaw assured Bucharest that it would not sign it until the moment when the USSR concluded similar treaties with all its Western neighbors.

In contacts with Moscow, Paris and Warsaw continued to insist that they would sign treaties with the USSR only after a Soviet-Romanian agreement was reached. Accordingly, the Romanian Prime Minister N. Iorga on February 1, speaking in Parliament, expressed gratitude to Poland and France for supporting the Romanian position[549] . True, already in February 1932 Warsaw began persistently advising Bucharest to find a way to negotiate with the USSR. In May, Poland stepped up its efforts to speed up the Soviet-Romanian negotiations, but while Moscow accepted some of the Polish compromise proposals, Bucharest rejected all. From the summer of 1932, France also began to actively act as an intermediary. And again, the USSR accepted many compromise proposals, and Romania rejected them[550] . On June 23, on behalf of Poland, Moscow was offered a new compromise (Romanian) version of the treaty, but everything again came up against the question of mentioning or not mentioning the presence of controversial problems in Soviet-Romanian relations, and the Soviet side proposed to return to the elimination of differences on the text agreed in Riga. All these delays and the uncompromising position of Romania led to the fact that Poland decided to sign an agreement with the USSR, without waiting for the completion of the Soviet-Romanian negotiations. It is clear that Bucharest, having received a Polish notification of this, declared that Poland had taken an unfriendly position, which, however, did not prevent Warsaw from signing a non-aggression pact with the USSR on July 25 and refusing to officially confirm its readiness to link its ratification with the signing of a similar Soviet-Romanian agreements. In this situation, the —

negotiations were postponed until autumn[551] . This time, France tried to put pressure on Poland so that it would not rush to ratify the Soviet-Polish treaty, and Romania was told that the Soviet-French treaty would not be signed until the end of the Soviet-Romanian negotiations. After consultations with the USSR, on September 1, France proposed to Romania a new version of the final protocol: “

the obligation of each party to refrain from any attack on the other shall be construed to mean that no dispute, territorial or otherwise, existing between the parties, can ever limit the said obligation or serve as a motive for either of the contracting parties or give them freedom to commit acts anywhere contrary to the obligation of non-aggression established by this treaty. It is also understood that this agreement cannot serve other purposes, in particular, it cannot be interpreted as resolving the noted disputable issues that exist between the parties at the time of signing this agreement, which issues are not affected by its conclusion .

Although this compromise proposal was also rejected by Romania, France tried to resume the Soviet-Romanian negotiations and hinted to Bucharest that, in case of his intransigence, she would also sign an agreement with Moscow[553] . On September 13, the Polish ambassador in Moscow handed over to the Soviet side a new compromise proposal and a new Romanian draft non-aggression pact approved by France[554] . At the same time, Romania sought from France that, as a condition for signing an agreement with the USSR, it demanded from the Soviet side a written declaration of non-aggression against Romania[555] . It is clear that France was in no hurry to complicate its relations with the USSR. On September 17, an agreement was reached that the Soviet-Romanian negotiations would resume in Geneva. In the meantime, during meetings between Litvinov and the Romanian ambassador to Poland, V. Kadere, by October 2, the text of the treaty was generally agreed upon. Moscow even agreed to its signing, but the Romanian side insisted on the exclusion of the words "existing disputes" from the final protocol and did not want to make any compromises[556] . The resigned Romanian ambassador in London N. Titulescu, who had previously repeatedly publicly opposed the signing of an agreement that did not contain the recognition of Bessarabia by the Soviet side as part of Romania, on October 11 in Paris tried to obtain France's assistance in recognizing the Romanian border along the Dniester by the Soviet Union. At the same time, he declared that the Soviet-French treaty was by no means conditioned by the Soviet-

France and Poland that it is ready to sign the treaty if Romania agrees with the text agreed in Geneva [\[557\]](#) — .

Under these conditions, the USSR announced on October 16 that Romania was deliberately delaying the negotiations [\[558\]](#) . On October 20, Titulescu, who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, applied for mediation to Poland, but was refused, because Warsaw did not believe that Romania ~~wanted~~ wanted to reach an agreement [\[559\]](#) . Then, on November 1, Bucharest sent its proposals to Paris, which on November 3 sent them to Moscow. Now Romania wanted to revise the text of Article 4 and drop the words about the existing dispute protocol [\[560\]](#) . In response, the USSR declared that it was ready to wait another 4 months for Romania's consent to sign the text of the non-aggression treaty agreed in Geneva, if France immediately signed the long-prepared Soviet-French treaty. In any case, Moscow is going to pursue a policy based on the Briand-Kellogg Pact [\[561\]](#) . Speaking in Parliament on November 23, Titulescu declared that "Romania cannot agree to such a non-aggression pact either today or ever " [\[562\]](#) . Under these conditions, Poland ratified the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact on November 27, and France on November 29 signed a similar agreement with [the USSR](#) [\[563\]](#) . As a result, Moscow managed to somewhat neutralize the anti-Soviet orientation of the Polish-Romanian and Franco-Romanian treaties [\[564\]](#) of 1926 and 1931.

New trends in international relations

The position of Romania during the Soviet-Romanian negotiations showed that Bucharest was no longer in a hurry to fulfill all the requests of France, which reflected the decline of French influence in Eastern Europe. On February 15, 1933, the Soviet-French non-aggression pact entered into force. On February 16, the countries of the Little Entente signed the Organizational Act, which reflected the strengthening of their union, aimed at maintaining the existing status quo. Naturally, France and the USSR approved this step, while Germany, Italy and Hungary, which were getting closer and closer, condemned it. Moreover, already on March 14, Italy offered Romania to refuse support for Yugoslavia in its territorial disputes with Hungary and Bulgaria in exchange for the latter's refusal of

territorial claims to Bucharest. On the 20th of February 1933, in the capitals of the great powers of Europe, discussions began on the "Pact of Four" proposed by Mussolini (England, France, Germany and Italy). Naturally, Poland and other Eastern European allies of France—did not support this [idea\[565\]](#), and the USSR also spoke out against its implementation. On March 25, 1933, the Little Entente opposed such an agreement and tried to influence the positions of Britain and France. However, it quickly became clear that the small countries had no real levers of influence, and gradually their criticism of the Pact of Four subsided. On May 30–31, the Little Entente came to terms with the French project of the "Pact of Four"[566]. However, the small countries of Eastern Europe were well aware that in the new

conditions it would be worthwhile to focus not only on France. As early as February 22, 1933, Romania notified Germany that economic and political relations with it should not be violated by any decisions of the Little Entente and, under certain conditions, Bucharest would not oppose Berlin's revanchist aspirations. On March 17, the Romanian King Carol II told the Völkischer Beobachter correspondent that he attaches great importance to strengthening relations with Germany and "the Polish question cannot interfere with this." Even the day before, similar ideas were unofficially brought to the atten

fascists S. Tatarescu. The only thing that worried the Romanian leadership was the prospect of a German-Hungarian rapprochement, which should have been blocked by concessions to Germany. For its part, Berlin considered it necessary to completely change Romania's foreign policy orientation. In May, Romania's desire for closer relations with Germany was brought to the attention of Berlin. In response, Hitler declared that if the Little Entente was favorable to Germany, he would try to minimize the possibility of arming Hungary. As a condition for the German-Romanian rapprochement, the demand was put forward for Bucharest to withdraw from the former foreign policy alliances[567] .

— 21

In the meantime, on June 7, the "Pact of the Four" was initialed[568] . June Bucharest tried to sound out the position of Berlin regarding the refusal to support the territorial claims of Hungary in exchange for the willingness of Romania not to object to the annexation of Austria to Germany. On July 15, a Pact of Accord and Cooperation between England, France, Italy and Germany (the "Pact of Four")[569] was signed in Rome , which ~~did~~ not enter into force, since it was not ratified by France. In early August 1933, a personal representative of the head of the Romanian government arrived in Berlin, who confirmed Bucharest's readiness to establish close economic and political ties with Germany, but the German leadership demanded a complete reorientation of Romania's foreign policy. However, the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations, the intensification of revanchist propaganda in Hungary and the position of France led to the fact that Romania was in no hurry to change its policy. It became obvious that an immediate foreign policy reorientation of the Romanian leadership was not expected[570] .

In the meantime, the USSR supported and expanded the French plan for ensuring security in Europe and submitted a convention on the definition of the aggressor (attacker) to the disarmament conference. Already in March, the countries of the Little Entente supported the Soviet proposal. On April 19, the USSR invited Poland to take part in a conference to sign a convention on the definition of aggression, but Warsaw, which generally approved this idea, suggested that Moscow first regulate its relations with Romania. However, the solidarity position of the countries of the Little Entente

allowed Romania on June 24, on its behalf, to declare its readiness to sign a convention on the definition of aggression without resolving the Bessarabian issue. [\[571\]](#).

Under these conditions, Poland had to agree to the Soviet proposal, but Warsaw advocated signing a regional convention, and not open to signing by all comers. Thus, the Polish leadership demonstrated its independence and tried to put pressure on Germany, in fact supporting its fears about signing an open document. In addition, Warsaw opposed the participation in the convention of the countries of the Little Entente, since this could hurt the interests of Hungary and Italy, with which Poland had good relations, the Bessarabian issue was bypassed on the basis of an agreement that the protocol would indicate the inviolability of the territory located "under the authority" of the contracting parties. As a result, on July 3 the USSR, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan signed a regional protocol, and on July 4 the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Turkey signed an open convention on the definition of aggression[\[572\]](#) . The Romanian leadership used this convention to propagate their version of the solution of the Bessarabian issue of their side; on December 29, at the IV session of the USSR Central Executive Committee, Litvinov [\[573\]](#) . So announced that the territorial dispute with Romania was still not resolved[\[574\]](#) .

In the second half of 1933, the Soviet Union actually supported the French idea of collective security in Europe, and in December the Soviet leadership determined the country's new foreign policy[\[575\]](#) . The discussion of the idea of the Eastern Pact between Paris and Moscow, which began in the autumn of 1933, led in the spring of 1934 to the appearance of a draft agreement providing for the conclusion of an agreement between the USSR, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic countries and a Soviet-French treaty of mutual assistance related to the Eastern Pact and the Locarno agreements. It was assumed that France would provide assistance to the USSR in the event of an attack on it by any of the participants in the Eastern Pact, and Soviet assistance to France was carried out in the event of an attack on it by any of the participants in the Locarno agreements. For France, the implementation of this project was due to the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, and Moscow considered

obligatory participation in the agreement between France and Poland. However, French soundings of Poland on the subject of its participation in the projected agreement showed that the Polish leadership is cautious about multilateral agreements and fears the strengthening of the international influence of the USSR.

In the context of a clear rapprochement between France and the USSR, on January 22–23, 1934, the countries of the Little Entente discussed the prospects for establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. If Czechoslovakia, whose relations with Poland after the signing on January 26, 1934 of the German-Polish declaration on the peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force[576] worsened, was interested in accelerating the normalization of relations with the USSR, then Yugoslavia was against immediate steps in this direction, hoping for Germany's support in the event of an aggravation of relations with Italy. Romania, on the other hand, sought to link the restoration of diplomatic relations with the settlement of the Bessarabian issue in its favor. As a result, it was decided that "the three states of the Little Entente will restore normal diplomatic relations with the USSR as soon as there are political and diplomatic conditions that meet the interests of each of the three countries"[577]. In the meantime, the country's foreign policy was further influenced by the leadership in determining the was gradually weakening, which was also due to the unwillingness of France to make concessions on the issue of paying debts on loans. Accordingly, the pro-German circles in Bucharest used this fact in every possible way to propagate in favor of an orientation towards Berlin, which continued its tough course towards Romania, trying to achieve its final rejection of the pro-French orientation. The intensity of passions was so great that on the night of December 31, 1933, members of the Iron Guard killed the Romanian Prime Minister I. Duca. On February 6, 1934, diplomatic relations were established between Hungary and the USSR[578]. In the meantime, lengthy negotiations,

backed by France, were completed, and on February 9 the Balkan Pact was signed, by which Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey guaranteed their borders and pledged to support each [579] friend in the event of a threat to the territorial status quo. The Rome Protocols were the answer to it, signed in March

Italy, Austria and Hungary. During the discussion of the idea of the Eastern Pact, since April 1934, under the influence of France, Romania began to more and more definitely lean towards the normalization of relations with the USSR. Since that time, direct Soviet-Romanian negotiations began, during which Titulescu again tried to get the USSR to declare that it would renounce Bessarabia in exchange for the establishment of diplomatic relations[580]. For its part, Moscow, naturally, was not inclined to make such statements and insisted on the resumption of diplomatic relations in full. In the end, the parties agreed to leave the Bessarabian question aside[581]. France and Czechoslovakia also pressed Romania and Yugoslavia to speed up their agreement with Moscow. As a result, on June 9, 1934, an exchange of letters took place in Geneva, according to which Romania and Czechoslovakia established normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union [582]. On July 23, diplomatic relations were established

between the USSR and Bulgaria[583]. This testified to a noticeable increase in the role of the USSR in the international arena. Nevertheless, the Romanian leadership used the fact of establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow to prove the version that the Soviet side finally recognized Bessarabia as part of Romania. However, the Soviet position on this issue remained unchanged, and no Soviet Romanian agreements of a political or technical nature gave no indication that the Dniester is a border river[584]. Since September 1934, a direct telephone, telegraph and postal connection was established between Romania and the USSR, and on February 8, 1935, an agreement was reached on the establishment of a direct railway connection, according to which a bridge near Tiraspol was restored on the Dniester (291.6 m). Three other railway bridges near Rybnitsa, Mogilev-Podolsky and on the Kamenetz-Podolsk-Larga line remained destroyed. On July 17, Moscow turned to England, France, Italy and Romania with a proposal to include the USSR in the European Danube Commission, but, despite the positive reaction of Paris and Rome, the negotiations showed that Bucharest and London, which stood behind it, actually frustrated [585] the decision that satisfied the USSR this question

In the meantime, the negotiations for the Eastern Pact during 1934 showed that this agreement was opposed by England, Germany and Poland, who took the idea negatively. The German leadership was afraid that such an agreement would make expansion impossible, and the Polish leadership would lose the opportunity to become a great power due to the growing influence of the USSR in Europe. Such a position of Poland became for England a convenient cover for her negative attitude towards this agreement. On September 18, the USSR was admitted to the League of Nations. Meanwhile, negotiations on the Eastern Pact finally reached an impasse, since neither Germany nor Poland agreed to

participate in this association. In the spring of 1934, Romania tried to involve the Little Entente in the negotiations on the Eastern Pact and thereby extend its guarantees to the Balkans. However, the Soviet Union rejected this proposal, since it was not going to worsen relations with Italy and Hungary. France also did not support him. At the same time, Moscow told Paris on July 26 that "we are ready, however, to conclude, in addition to the Eastern Pact, a special Soviet-Polish-Romanian protocol on mutual assistance, if Romania and Poland so desire." For his part, on September 2, Titulescu suggested to Litvinov, in order to calm Romanian public opinion, "to come up with some kind of tripartite combination with the participation of Romania and the USSR, either with Poland or with France." But things did not go beyond these general phrases. In September 1934, Romania again raised the question of its now individual participation in the Eastern Pact, but a month later it lost interest in this proposal. At the same time, Bucharest continued to probe Berlin for mediation in Franco-German relations and to express readiness to maintain "good relations

with Germany"[586] . The assassination on October 9, 1934 in Marseilles of the French Foreign Minister and an active supporter of the Eastern Pact, L. Barthou, led to the fact that henceforth for Paris this idea became only a means of pressure on Berlin in order to force it to an agreement with France. Meanwhile, the sluggish Franco-Polish negotiations on the Eastern Pact showed that without the participation of Germany, Poland would not agree to sign this agreement[587] . C

Germany about its readiness to improve bilateral relations and mediate in the cause of reconciliation between Germany and France[588].

The determining factor in the development of international relations in Europe was the relationship between England, France, Germany and Italy. It was England that became the force that tried to modernize the Versailles system by creating a new balance of power in continental Europe. The result of this British policy was the connivance of any actions of Germany, starting with its withdrawal from the League of Nations in October 1933. Not wanting to contribute to the creation of the system of collective security proposed by France in Europe, London actually supported the intransigent position of Poland and Germany regarding the Eastern Pact. Even when in March 1935 Germany openly violated the military restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, England, although it condemned these actions, entered into bilateral negotiations on naval issues, as a result of which Germany received a legal opportunity to create a navy. The main motive of the British leadership was to prevent the deepening of the crisis in Europe, which should have allowed England to maintain its international influence. On March 10-16, 1935, Germany announced its refusal to comply with the military restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, which caused fears in Romania about the possibility of similar steps on the part of

Hungary and Bulgaria[589]. This unilateral step by Germany led to the fact that on March 30, France offered the USSR to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance, which was signed on May 2. However, the issue of a military convention with the development of measures to organize this assistance was postponed by the French side[590]. On May 16, a Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance treaty was signed. For its part, Poland in May 1935 notified France not to count on Warsaw's automatic support of the Soviet-French mutual assistance treaty. On May 23, Carol II assured the German military attache in Bucharest that Romania would not give permission for the passage of Soviet troops[591]. In the meantime, on March 23, 1935, a long-term German-Romanian economic agreement was signed[592]. At the same time, Romania informed Germany that it — At that would not join the Eastern Pact if Berlin and Warsaw did not participate in it. Romania is not obliged to help France in case of

Franco-German conflict and will enter the war only if Hungary intervenes[593] . At the end of April 1935, Romania again offered Germany mediation in establishing German-French relations. In response, Berlin recommended that Bucharest begin this noble mission from Paris. At the beginning of May 1935, German-Romanian economic negotiations were held in Bucharest, at which, with the help of Titulescu, the German delegation managed to achieve favorable agreements signed on May 24[594]. An important step was taken towards the economic subordination of Romania to German influence. It is clear that such an agreement did not cause joy in either

Paris or Moscow, and both countries asked Bucharest about its policy towards Germany. Naturally, Titulescu declared his ignorance and non-participation in these agreements, although the German documents now available completely refute this version. Significant efforts to change the pro-French orientation of Romania were made not only by the German, but also by the Polish embassy in Bucharest, which repeatedly drew the attention of the Romanian government to the inexpediency of the Soviet-Romanian rapprochement. Polish diplomats in Romania widely promoted the idea of German-Polish-Romanian friendship as opposed to focusing on France and the USSR. The Polish embassy even intimidated Bucharest with the threat of leaving Romania to its fate, while Poland and Yugoslavia would move closer to Germany. The main target of the Romanian right and their Berlin and Warsaw friends was Titulescu. England also supported the rejection of Romania's rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, on May 29-31, 1935, the USSR handed over to Romania 1443 boxes (135 tons) with archival documents and manuscripts of its Academy of Sciences[595] . In June 1935, a steamship service was opened along the Odessa-Constanta line. In July, a protocol was signed on the transit of Romanian goods through the USSR, and the Moscow-Prague airline passed through Romanian airspace[596] . On June 24, Romania probed the USSR for the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty against both Germany and Hungary in exchange for the recognition of Bessarabia as part of Romania[597] . In response, Moscow stated that it would not renounce its rights to Bessarabia and did not intend to provide

Assistance to Bucharest against Hungary, since Romania refuses to denounce the alliance treaty with Warsaw and excludes assistance from the USSR in the event of a war with Poland[598] . Nevertheless, in the course of the Rumanian-Yugoslav conference on July 1-13, it was decided that Bucharest might conclude a mutual assistance pact with Moscow. However, at the same time, Romania told Germany that it would not take any steps to the detriment of Berlin. On July 21, the Romanian embassy in Berlin was instructed to bring to the attention of the German side that an agreement on mutual assistance with the USSR is possible only if it guarantees the territorial integrity of Romania and its allies. If such an agreement is reached, Bucharest is ready to conclude an identical treaty with Germany so that she also guarantees the Romanian borders[599] .

Although there was no official announcement of the Soviet-Romanian talks, opponents of rapprochement with the USSR in Bucharest were louder and louder about the inadmissibility of concessions to Moscow. Accordingly, Titulescu had to refute rumors of negotiations with his eastern neighbor. The campaign to discredit the idea of rapprochement with the USSR was conducted by Germany, which knew for sure that negotiations were still going on. In October 1935, Bucharest informed Warsaw and London that it would not agree to an agreement granting the Red Army the right of passage through Romanian territory[600] . In November 1935, the Polish-Romanian union treaty was extended. At the same time, it became clear that the Romanian leadership took a more cautious position regarding the mutual assistance treaty with the USSR. However, while Bucharest was not ready for a sharp change in foreign policy, in addition, there was hope that the USSR would agree to recognize the border along the Dniester. As a result, it was decided to continue negotiations. At the same time, Titulescu also had to moderate his appetites somewhat. If on June 24 he suggested that the Soviet side take the Soviet-French treaty as a basis, then on November 16 it was already the Soviet-Czechoslovak one. In general, Titulescu's position in these negotiations was at least not clearly defined. For its part, Moscow was ready to discuss any possible proposals, except for the recognition of the annexation of Bessarabia. But this is exactly what the Romanian leadership was trying to achieve. It is clear that in the presence of such disagreements, the negotiations assumed a sluggish character[601] .

On February 15, 1936, the Soviet-Romanian payment agreement and other economic documents were signed, but there was no noticeable expansion of the Soviet-Romanian trade, since at this time Romania was more concerned with expanding economic ties with Germany and Italy. In addition, it should be remembered that Romania and the USSR offered a similar set of goods for foreign trade and, naturally, were not interested in mutual trade. As a result, the share of Romania in Soviet foreign trade in the second half of the 1930s. continued to be negligible (see table I)[602] .

Table 1

Share of Romania in foreign trade of the USSR (%)

	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
Экспорт	0,05	0,02	0,17	0,04	0,02	0,26
Импорт	0,001	0,001	0,13	0,06	–	–
Оборот	0,03	0,01	0,15	0,05	0,006	0,13

Bucharest between Paris and Berlin

At the same time, Romania continued to drift towards Germany. On November 9, 1935, Titulescu, in an interview with the German charge d'affaires in Romania, stated that he "never gave consent to the Russians for the passage of troops" and "would conclude a pact of mutual assistance with them only on the condition that it would not be directed against Germany"[603] . On February 24, 1936, the constant readiness of Bucharest to seek friendly relations with Germany was brought to the attention of Berlin. The Romanian envoy in Berlin declared that his country was not going to grant the USSR the right of passage of the Red Army through Romanian territory and, in the event of an agreement with Moscow, was ready to sign an identical agreement with Germany if it guaranteed the Romanian borders[604] . In March, Romania reaffirmed its German-friendly position and readiness to mediate in Germany's negotiations with Britain and France.

Counting on the creation of an agreement of the great powers of Europe under its auspices, England feared that the collapse of the fascist regime in Italy and the Nazi regime in Germany would lead to the Bolshevization of these countries and thereby sharply increase the threat to the positions of London. Therefore, despite the sometimes rather harsh rhetoric regarding the actions of Italy and Germany, England tried to keep all the doors open for an agreement with them. This explains the fact that when the Wehrmacht occupied the Rhine demilitarized zone on March 7, 1936, London in every possible way kept Paris from any countermeasures. During the discussion of this issue in the Council of the League of Nations on March 14–19, it was decided to refrain from any action. The Soviet proposal of March 17—, about readiness to support any action of the League of Nations[605] naturally remained unanswered. If we take into account that on February 16 the Popular Front came to power in Spain, which was perceived by the conservative British leadership almost as the Bolshevization of the country, then the position of England will be quite logical. Berlin's anti-communist rhetoric found a favorable audience on the banks of the Thames. Therefore, when a civil war broke out in Spain on July 18, 1936, and the Republican government had to practically re-creat

England, under the pretext of the danger of war with Germany and Italy, put pressure on France not to sell weapons to Madrid. It is clear that the

remilitarization of the Rhineland, presented by the German side as a response to the beginning of the process of ratification of the Soviet-French pact of mutual assistance, and the passivity of France[606] only increased Romania's readiness ~~for~~ friendship with Germany. It was quite obvious that the Romanian ruling elite was increasingly inclined to opt for orientation towards Germany and Italy. The background of this choice was explained in his speech at the end of March 1936 by the leader of the Peasant Party Vaida-Voevod: "Over the past two years, our policy has slid down a dangerous slope. We have reached the point where Litvinov has become our stronghold. Now the situation is quite clear. There is a struggle between nationalism and communism. Therefore, we must make a choice. I choose Mussolini and Hitler. I choose Mussolini because he... saved the Italian nation from the danger of communism and now fascist glory shines on African heights... As for Hitler, this... figure saved European civilization... Without Hitler, France would be communist today"[607]. During the session of the Balkan Entente on May 4–6, 1936, it was decided to limit mutual assistance obligations only to the Balkan

countries[608]. In the summer of 1936, Romania offered France to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance with the Little Entente, but with the growing ~~in~~fluence of supporters of the policy of "appeasement" of Germany in the French leadership, it was impossible to implement this proposal[609]. When discussing the Italo-Ethiopian conflict in the League of Nations in July 1936, Titulescu asked French Prime Minister L. Blum a public question ~~whether~~ the small countries could count on France in the face of the German threat. "Reassure us, Mr. President of the Council of Ministers of France, or at least tell us the truth! For we do not forget that on March 7 you did not defend yourselves, so how will you defend us from the aggressor ?

more eloquent than any

words. By this time, it became clear to the Soviet leadership that the Soviet-Romanian negotiations on a mutual assistance pact had reached an impasse.

The Romanian side tried to achieve recognition by the Soviet Union of the annexation of Bessarabia and sought to link the future treaty with the Soviet-French one, and assistance to Moscow from Romania in the event of a Soviet-Polish war was excluded. Neither Moscow nor Bucharest were going to make concessions on these issues, which means that an agreement could not be reached soon[611]. Nevertheless, on June 30, 1936, Titulescu notified the Romanian leadership that he intended to bring the negotiations on a mutual assistance pact with the USSR to its logical conclusion, "after which he would like to concentrate future activities on the normalization of relations with Germany, the final result of which will be (which and not so improbable) reaching an agreement between Germany and Russia", which should not come at the expense of Romania[612]. On July

11-14, 1936, a new crisis arose in the Romanian government, but Titulescu again managed, by blackmailing him with his resignation, to maintain the foreign policy course and continue negotiations with the USSR[613]. On July 20–21, in Montreux, Titulescu and Litvinov decided to bypass the issue of Bessarabia and actually agreed on the main provisions of the treaty, which were to become the basis for further negotiations. The parties disagreed only on the question of the connection between their treaty and the actions of France. This document provided for the possibility of allowing Soviet troops to enter the territory of — Romania[614]. However, Titulescu did not inform the government about the initialing of the draft agreement, since he actually exceeded his powers. Moreover, pro-fascist forces were gaining more and more influence in Bucharest. Italy, Germany and Poland gently but strongly advised the Romanian government to get rid of the overly pro-French foreign minister [615]. On August 29, the government resigned in order to return to its duties on the same day with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. Antonescu. Although Bucharest loudly declared that the principles of its foreign policy would be preserved, naturally no one believed in this. On September 19, Antonescu assured Litvinov that "Romania's foreign policy remains unchanged in relation to allied and friendly powers, and especially Russia"[616].

On October 1, in response to assurances of friendship from Antonescu, Litvinov quite rightly stated that "political friendship

has its value only when it is not hidden", but if the Romanian minister "whispers about friendship in my ear, and publicly bows to Germany and Poland, then this will not bring any benefit either to us or to Romania"[617] . It became obvious that negotiations with the USSR on a mutual assistance treaty were a thing of the past, and Romania was increasingly drawn into the wake of German politics[618] . — Under these conditions, Moscow was forced to confine itself to the role of an observer[619] . During 1936, 31 cases of shelling from the Romanian side of the Soviet territory, residents and border guards[620] were recorded . During the Italo-Ethiopian war, although Romania joined the system of economic sanctions, it increased its exports to Italy through third countries. In the autumn of 1936, Antonescu declared that "the Romanian government has great hopes for a favorable resolution of the Abyssinian conflict and that Romania, as a Latin state, does not intend to infringe on the glory and strength of Latin Italy" [621] On September 24, 1936, a new German-Romanian economic agreement that expanded the supply of Romanian raw materials to the Third Reich on the basis of clearing. As a result, the turnover of German trade with Romania increased from 109.6 million marks in 1934 to 300 million marks in 1937, and the share of Romania in German —

exports [622] increased from 27.8% in 1933 to 37.2 % in 1937. At the end of November 1936, the visit of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Warsaw took place, which was perceived by foreign observers as a demonstration of the Polish-Romanian alliance. During the visit, Antonescu told reporters that Romania did not want to be in either the Soviet or anti-Soviet bloc [623] . In fact, Romania has publicly put an end to the game of collective security. In November 1936, Hitler announced that he was ready to guarantee the Romanian borders in exchange for Bucharest's friendly political line towards Germany. "The Hungarian revisionist statements should not be taken to heart... The real danger that threatens Romania in the European world is Bolshevism. But if Romania wants to become an outpost of the European order, then no state will be more interested than Germany in its support ... "[624] At the end of 1936, Germany invited Romania to join the Anti-Comintern Pact and was ready to provide loans for the purchase of weapons and conclude an agreement

Romanian border guarantees. However, the Romanian leadership decided to

wait[625] . From the second half of 1936 it became clear that the unity of the Little Entente was largely illusory, since neither Romania nor Yugoslavia were ready to support Czechoslovakia in the event of a conflict with Germany. On the whole, this position of Romania met the aspirations of Germany, which was interested in dividing its Eastern European neighbors. In an effort to intensify the split of the Little Entente, the German press lashed out at Czechoslovakia, presenting it as a conductor of the Comintern's influence, but extolled Romania, which refused the treaty with the USSR. It is clear that Bucharest's foreign policy drifted more and more towards Berlin, while England and France practically ceased their active policy in Eastern Europe. On March 20, 1937, Berlin warned Romania against concluding a Little Entente treaty with France, as this would bring her into the same camp with the Soviet Union. Germany promised Romania protection from the claims of Hungary and Bulgaria, urging her to stand guard over "Soviet barbarism" and not to take on new obligations in relation to France and Czechoslovakia. In the spring of 1937, a verbal agreement was actually reached that Romania would not conclude any new agreements that could be interpreted as anti-German and would not allow any foreign army to pass through its territory. For its part, Berlin guaranteed the integrity of the Romanian territory[626] .

It is clear that during the civil war in Spain, Romania was, in fact, on the side of the Francoists, and the funeral of two volunteers from the Romanian Iron Guard who died in Spain on February 13, 1937 resulted in a solemn review of all the anti-democratic forces of the country with the participation of German diplomats, Italy, Poland, Japan and Portugal. The Romanian authorities sabotaged the supply of oil products to Republican Spain, but facilitated the supply of Francoists, who received 66,278 tons in 1936, and 229,351 tons of oil products in 1937[627] . Romania banned the sale of weapons to the legitimate government of Spain, but there were no bans for Franco. In April 1937, the Council of the Little Entente rejected Czechoslovakia's proposal to conclude a single mutual assistance treaty between the three countries[628] . Visited April 22–2

1937 Polish Foreign Minister J. Beck urged the Romanian leadership to create a new Little Entente consisting of Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria and promised to get Germany to influence Budapest in order to limit Hungarian claims to Bucharest. However, the Romanian leadership was in no hurry to make an unequivocal decision, since France, although not very actively, pointed out the inadmissibility of the pro-German tilt of Bucharest. On April 28, Romania

probed the USSR for the conclusion of a treaty of neutrality in exchange for recognition of the annexation of Bessarabia[629]. On May 25 in Geneva, in a conversation with Litvinov, Antonescu again spoke of the possibility of signing a Soviet-Romanian neutrality treaty if the Soviet Union renounced its rights to Bessarabia. It is clear that the Soviet side rejected this proposal[630]. Occasionally, the — Romanian prime minister spoke to the Soviet plenipotentiary in Bucharest about Romania's desire to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance with the USSR, but the matter did not go beyond general phrases[631]. Moreover, the Romanian side considered the recognition by the Soviet Union of the annexation of Bessarabia as an indispensable condition for such an agreement, whereas [632] Moscow was not going to make such a concession. Meanwhile, incidents on the Dniester continued. So, at 22.50 on April 1937, at the site of the Glinnoye outpost, a shootout took place with 3 unknown persons who crossed the river in a boat, and with the Romanian border guard covering them. On June 10, a local resident R. Ursul was killed by a shot from the Bessarabian coast, and an attack on the Soviet border guards took place near Kamenetz-Podolsk. On August 29, when a Romanian intelligence officer who crossed the river was detained in the Tiraspol region, fire was opened on Soviet border guards from the opposite bank. Despite the persistent efforts of Soviet diplomacy, the Romanian side practically thwarted the investigation of these cases[633].

The visit of King Carol II to Poland on June 26-30, 1937 only confirmed the fact of the revival of the Polish-Romanian anti-Soviet alliance. The Polish side, fulfilling its promise to Germany, continued to persuade Romania to abandon its orientation towards France and Czechoslovakia in the matter of collective security[634]. Continuing assure the Soviet embassy of readiness to reach an agreement

with the USSR, Romania at the same time declared to Poland and Germany that there would be no agreement with Moscow. On July 7–9, during negotiations between the chiefs of staff of Poland and Romania, an agreement was reached on the preparation of measures to counter the passage of the Red Army to the aid of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the parties agreed to deploy 350,000 Polish and 250,000 Romanian armies in the East in case of war, in addition, the Romanian military pledged to increase the number of its troops in Bessarabia and Bukovina in peacetime at the expense of Transylvania. Poland promised to supply Romania with weapons, and Romania - Poland with fuel and strategic raw materials. It was decided that in the event of the defeat of the USSR, the territories conquered in the east south of the line Vinnitsa - Kyiv - r. The Desna will go to Romania, and to the north - to Poland. Romania allocated 2 billion lei for the reconstruction and construction of new railways going to the eastern border. The press again launched an anti-Soviet campaign demanding that the issue of Bessarabia be resolved in favor of Romania[635]. Somewhat later, while in Paris, the Romanian king unequivocally stated that “Russia remains Russia, and any alliances with it, if France tries to impose them on us, we will break”[636].

In October 1937, in a conversation with the German envoy in Bucharest, in response to a question about the possibility of a new Franco-Romanian alliance, Antonescu stated that “Romania's line is absolutely clear: no more alliances. Romania intends to develop its friendly relations, for example, with Germany”[637]. However, in the context of maintaining noticeable economic ties with England, the Romanian leadership was in no hurry with an unequivocal reorientation to Berlin. Bucharest's fear of a new redistribution of borders also served as a significant deterrent. Under these conditions, the best way out of the situation was to be maneuvering between the great European powers. On December 7, 1937, Romania declared to Germany that she was ready for further rapprochement with her. On December 9, a new trade agreement was signed, according to which Romania received German weapons in exchange for oil. “The significance of Rumania in supplying us with raw materials (food and oil), the German envoy in Bucharest V. Fabritius reported to Berlin on November 18, “is very great and presents favorable prospects for the future. E

Relations with Germany more and more bind Romania with the Reich politically, which inevitably leads her away from the Eastern policy, which, under Titulescu, was clothed in friendly relations with Soviet Russia ... As I have repeatedly reported, the expectation of German assistance to Romania was repeatedly expressed by the ruling circles - Romanian prime minister and others

responsible persons"[638]. Romanian exports to Germany increased from 3.9 billion lei in 1936 to 6.1 billion lei in 1937, while to England it decreased from 3.1 to 2.8 billion lei respectively[639].

At this point, the British leadership decided to intensify the policy of appeasing Germany. In the course of contacts with the German leadership on November 19, 1937, the Lord Chairman of the Royal Privy Council of England, E. Halifax, and on December 2, the British Foreign Minister A. Eden, notified Berlin that London was not opposed to the revision of borders in Eastern Europe, but considered it an indispensable condition to prevent war. In other words, Germany received carte blanche for any actions in Eastern Europe that did not lead to open war. The French leadership actually supported this English position[640].

Naturally, under these conditions, the German leadership decided to intensify its foreign policy towards its neighbors. In November 1937, at a meeting between Carol II and the President of Czechoslovakia, E. Benes, the latter was told that "Romania will not interfere in the conflict between Czechoslovakia and Germany"[641].

The visit of French Foreign Minister I. Delbos to Romania on December 8-11 showed that Paris, like London, was not opposed to its further rapprochement with Germany. Thus, the question of concluding a mutual assistance pact between

France and the Little Entente[642]. From the beginning of 1938, Romanian military orders began to be placed in Germany, Italy and Poland, and France refused to guarantee payments to Romania on military orders in Czechoslovakia, which led to their cancellation[643].

Czechoslovak Crisis and Romania

On February 10, 1938, a royal dictatorship was established in Romania: on February 11, a state of siege was introduced in the country; on February 24, during an open vote, a new constitution was adopted, in which Article 91 all political parties, instead of which the National Renaissance Front was created on December 16, the government was finally able to get a fully controlled parliament[644] . Considering that out of 16 billion lei of foreign investment in Romania, England accounted for 6.7 billion, France - 4.6 billion, the USA - 2.9 billion, Italy - 1.5 billion, and Germany - only 0, 3 billion lei[645]

the Romanian leadership hoped to continue maneuvering between the great European powers. In March 1938, Romania drew the attention of England and France "to the danger that threatens the world as a result of the establishment of a German monopoly in the markets of the countries of the Danube basin and Eastern Europe", but at the same time it was stated that "there can be no question of ousting Germany from these markets, which would be unnatural, apolitical and dangerous . Thus, Bucharest once again demonstrated the need for equal influence of the great powers in the region.

On March 18, 1938, Romania approved the Anschluss of — But Austria[647] , warned Germany against "direct pressure" on Czechoslovakia, and reiterated that it wanted close ties with the Third Reich. On March 30, in response to a request from France about the attitude towards the possibility of the passage of Soviet troops to help Czechoslovakia, the Romanian leadership stated that "in the event of a conflict only between Germany and Czechoslovakia, the allied treaties of Romania with Poland and the countries of the Balkan Entente oblige it to remain neutral. If France intervenes in the conflict, then Rumania, although not obliged, would, however, also be disposed to intervene, but would subordinate her intervention to a preliminary agreement with Poland. Romania refuses on principle to allow the passage of Russian troops. However, if Romania faces a Russian ultimatum

will not put itself in conditions that could lead it into conflict with France and Czechoslovakia . Thus, Romania tried not to miss any opportunity.

At first, the Eastern European countries declared that in the event of a war they would be on the side of Czechoslovakia. However, already in April 1938 it became clear that there was no unity in the east of Europe. On April 6, Poland protested to Romania in connection with the fact that aircraft purchased by Prague in the USSR flew through its airspace to Czechoslovakia. For its part, Bucharest protested against Czechoslovakia. Referring to these statements, on May 25, France indicated to the USSR that Poland and Romania strongly opposed the passage of Soviet troops[649] . In May, the Romanian leadership faced a choice. Rapprochement with the Soviet Union threatened the activation of social movements in the country. Rapprochement with Germany meant economic enslavement and subjugation. France was not very active, and hopes for its support became more and more ephemeral. As a result, it was decided to bet on England, despite the fact that Bucharest already knew that London considers Romania a sphere of influence of Germany[650] . For its part, Germany continued to tame Bucharest. On April 22, Berlin notified the Romanian government that it had no territorial claims in the Balkans and was ready to guarantee the existing Romanian borders. In response, Bucharest assured Berlin that Romanian policy was not pro-Soviet. On

April 25, Litvinov sent a memorandum No. 5217 / I / s to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the course of the session of the Council of the League of Nations, in which he wrote in particular: "As for Romania, at least the following is clear to me: the current Romanian government , like the previous one (Tatarescu), does not at all want to openly enter into hostile relations with the USSR. This, however, did not prevent the government of Tatarescu, just as it would not prevent Komnenus from tying itself even closer to Poland and flirting with Germany. I don't know whether the current government will be inclined to conclude any pact with us at all, but I consider it completely out of the question if we maintain our previous position on the question of Bessarabia. Only if we are ready to talk with Romania about Bessarabia, can we find out the amount o

and the weakening of its ties with Poland"[651] . However, there were very serious doubts in the Kremlin about the possibility of receiving any "compensation" from Romania at all, so on April 29 the Politburo decided to take this note into account[652]. Thus, the Soviet position on the Bessarabian issue remained unchanged.

The aggravation of the situation around Czechoslovakia affected the policies of all Eastern European countries. On May 4–5, a regular session of the countries of the Little Entente decided that the Sudeten question is an internal affair of Czechoslovakia, and it should not count on the support of Yugoslavia and Romania in the event of a conflict with Germany. In May, in response to a request from France about Romania's readiness to let the Red Army through to help Czechoslovakia, a statement followed: Bucharest "will never allow this." At the same time, the Rumanian representative in the League of Nations drew the attention of England and France to the fact that trade with them was falling, while with Germany it was growing. However, no clear answer was received from London and Paris. It was brought to the attention of England and France that the presence of the Romanian-Polish alliance and the Balkan Entente made the issue of allowing Soviet troops to help Czechoslovakia an international problem.

In general, the Romanian leadership was keenly following all the zigzags of the German appeasement policy. On May 30, Romania notified Czechoslovakia that it would not make any statements about the prohibition of the passage of Soviet troops, but this does not mean that it would agree to this. In response, Prague stated that it refers to the possible assistance of the Red Army only in order to force Germany to lower its demands, therefore it agrees with the Romanian position[653] . Noting the intensification of Romanian-Polish relations and the pro-German tilt of Romania, the Soviet side decided to recall the existence of the unresolved Bessarabian issue. On June 15, the Romanian mission in Moscow was pointed out the unacceptability for the Soviet side of the use in the Romanian notes of the definitions "Romanian territory" in relation to Bessarabia, which "we have never recognized and will not recognize such a territory." The "tacit agreement that both sides will avoid discussion of Bessarabia both in the press and in official speeches" established after the signing of the London Cor

Romanian friendship, otherwise there can be no question of the readiness of the USSR to silently endure Romania's claims that Bessarabia belongs to it[654] . On June

18, in a conversation between Litvinov and the Czechoslovak envoy and the French ambassador in Moscow, the latter stated that the Romanian government was showing "extreme intransigence" on the issue of allowing the passage of Soviet troops, which was explained by Bucharest by the refusal of the USSR to recognize the border along the Dniester. If Moscow agrees to this recognition, then the Romanian government will be able to allow passage Red Army to help Czechoslovakia[655] . It is clear that the Soviet leadership was not going to make such a concession, if only because there were no guarantees of a change in Romanian policy. Meanwhile, Romania began to lean towards the normalization of relations with Hungary, which on June 29 was declared that "in the event that Germany attacks Czechoslovakia from Hungarian territory, the countries of the Little Entente will not threaten Hungary. In the event that Hungarian troops participate in hostilities together with the Germans, the Bucharest and Yugoslav governments will be able to justify their neutrality by saying that an attack on Hungarian territory occupied by the German army will, in essence, be an action not against Hungary, but against Germany . On July 9, Romania reaffirmed its position to France, according to which it rejects any proposals regarding the

passage of Soviet troops: "No one can demand from Romania that she agree in advance to the passage of Soviet troops. Romania knows which side she will be on in case of war . On July 26, Romania declared to Poland that "it would not let a single Soviet soldier through its territory," which Warsaw reported to Berlin[658] . On July 31, the countries of the Balkan Entente, in violation of the Treaty of Nei, decided to grant Bulgaria equal rights in matters of armaments and at the same time liquidate the demilitarized zones in Greek and Turkish Thrace[659] . On August 13, Romania declared to France that it would "close its eyes" to the overflights of Soviet aircraft at high altitudes, but refused to let the ground forces through[660] . The attempt of the USSR through France to put pressure on Poland and Romania ended in vain, since Paris did not demand from its allies the passage of Soviet troops, but asked them only to report their opinion on

this issue. On August 14, Bucharest advised Prague to move closer to Berlin [661]. On August 21–23, the conference of Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente, in violation of the Treaty of Trianon, decided to recognize Hungary's equal rights in the issue of

armaments[662]. On September 2, Litvinov told the French chargé d'affaires in Moscow that the decision of the League of Nations to recognize Czechoslovakia as a victim of aggression could push Poland and Romania to allow the passage of Soviet troops[663]. However, the Czechoslovak question was not raised in the League of Nations, and Czechoslovakia itself did not turn to either the USSR or Romania for help. On September 8, Bucharest officially denied reports spread in the European press about the conclusion of a Soviet-Romanian agreement on the passage of troops and the transit of military cargo from the USSR to Czechoslovakia. On the same day, Romania told France that if the West received the consent of Poland, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia to let the Soviet troops through, then Bucharest would also discuss this issue. However, the transport network of Transcarpathia is not very developed, so the transfer of troops is doubtful. In response, France thanked Carol II for "Romania's —

valuable contribution to the peaceful action of the great powers"[664]. Officially, neither France, nor England, nor Czechoslovakia asked Romania to let the Soviet troops through. This spared Bucharest the need for any clear statement. However, on September 11, Romania told France that "the Romanian government cannot allow the passage of Russian troops through its territory, and the recommendation of the Council of the League of Nations will not be able to change our decision", which follows from the agreements with Yugoslavia and Poland. "If the Russians try to get through, Romania, with the support of Poland, will defend itself"[665]. Of course, in conversations with Soviet diplomats, the Romanians were more circumspect - they referred to the desire to maintain neutrality. On September 11, France informed the USSR that "Romania cannot let the Red Army through, but that if Soviet planes fly high over Romania, —

they will not be seen"[666]. On September 16, it became clear that Poland was on the side of Hungary, and Warsaw did not take into account the interests of Romania. On September 17, Bucharest again denied rumors about the transportation of military materials from the USSR to Czech

Germany told Romania that it was satisfied with its position "regarding the possibility of the passage of Russian troops and its desire for close Romanian-German cooperation" and was disposed to resolve the Romanian-Hungarian disputes in favor of Bucharest. In exchange for a guarantee against Hungarian claims, Germany demanded that Yugoslavia [667] and Romania maintain neutrality in the Sudeten question. On the — . At the same same day, Hungary announced its claims to the territory of Czechoslovakia, and Prague asked Belgrade and Bucharest about their position in the event of Hungarian assistance to Germany. On September 22, Poland offered Romania to negotiate with Hungary. In this situation, Yugoslavia and Romania were in no hurry to clearly define their position, although on September 25 both countries agreed that it was necessary to remain neutral and wait for the decisions of England and France[668] .

On September 23, through Rome, it was brought to the attention of Berlin that, despite "the strongest pressure", Bucharest "refused, refuses and will refuse to satisfy such a demand in the future" about the passage of Soviet troops in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia[669] . In the event of an aggravation of ~~Soviet~~-Polish relations, "Romania will be on the side of Warsaw" and that "in any case, an alliance with Poland will take precedence over obligations regarding Prague"[670] . At the same time, Romania declared that it was against ~~the~~ satisfaction of the Hungarian demands on Czechoslovakia. Having coordinated its position with Yugoslavia, Bucharest on September 26 turned to Germany with a request to moderate Hungary's appetites. "Germany solemnly declared to us that we can count on her assistance if we do not enter into some kind of combination directed against the Reich (there are repeated statements of Hitler and Goering about this). Romania refrained from any action that could be considered hostile to the Reich. Now we have the right to expect that Germany, too, will fulfill the promises she made . In response, Goering said on September 28 that if Romania and Yugoslavia did not interfere ~~in~~ the future, then Hungary would have a "deterrent effect." On September 27, it was brought to the attention of Germany that Romania would try to convince Czechoslovakia to resolve the conflict in favor of the Germans. At the same time, Prague was required to satisfy Polish claims.

During the September crisis of 1938, Czechoslovakia, Germany, France, Poland and the USSR took a number of measures to increase the combat readiness of their armed forces [672] . In particular, on September 21–23, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal K.E. Voroshilov ordered the command of the Kalinin (KaVO), Belarusian Special (BOVO) and Kyiv Special Military Districts (KOVO) to put on alert and concentrate troops near the border in order to conduct "major exercises." On September 25, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1035-256ss, issued on September 26, according to which the People's Commissar of Defense was allowed "without stopping construction work on fortified areas, to carry out the following activities:

1. To increase the combat readiness of fortified areas - a) call for at least 15-20 days assigned staff of machine-gun battalions, artillery divisions and special units of the fortified areas of the LBO, BOVO, KOVO, with the exception of the rear Kiev fortified area and fortified areas located along the river. Dniester. In total, for parts of the fortified areas, call on 54,000 people. With replenished units, conduct

enhanced exercises to fill the structures with ammunition, bring equipment to combat readiness and combat firing, using part of the time to clear the view and shelling, install a barbed wire net and set up anti-tank obstacles. b) Give orders to install weapons and load

ammunition of all combat installations of fortified areas. 2. Call for assigned staff for: a) 13, 2, 100 (Minsk region) and 4 sd (Slutsk) BOVO in the amount of 4000 people. for each division. b) 96, 97 and 72 RD KOVO, relocated to the state border, 3000 people each. for each division. In total, for rifle units, call on 25,000 people. 3.

Raise the system of air surveillance and communication posts (VNOS) LBO, BOVO, KOVO, MVO, HVO, especially in large air defense points, calling for assigned staff.

Call for assigned staff of the 1st and 2nd air defense corps (Leningrad and Moscow) and air defense units of Kyiv, as well as the anti-aircraft divisions of the Reserve

High Command in BOVO and KOVO. To raise

VNOS units and for air defense units, call on 39,000

Human.

4. Call for assigned staff for artillery units of the High Command of the LVO, BOVO, KOVO, HVO, MVO, OrVO, total 49,000

Human.

In total, 167,000 people will be called up for the listed events. In addition, to allow the call for an appropriate number of horses, cars and tractors"[673] . On September 27, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1039-257ss issued on September 28, according to which the People's Commissar of Defense was allowed to attract 4,500 artillery horses, 1,175 trucks and 190 cars to training camps in the LVO, BOVO, KOBO, MVO and HVO , as well as 700 caterpillar tractors[674] . On September 29, the Politburo of —

the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1047-261ss, issued on September 30, which approved the following proposal by Voroshilov:

"A. To call from the reserve assigned people of the LVO, BOVO, KOVO:

1. To all air bases, in total - 30,000 people. 2. In all tank brigades, in total - 39,000 people. 3. For 4000 people. to the following divisions: LVO - 70th rifle division Karelian fortified [reinforced] area. 90 sd Karelian fortified [fortified] area. 11th RD Kingisepp fortified area. 56 sd Pskov fortified area. CalVO - 67 sd Sebezh. BOVO - 50th and 5th rifle divisions, advanced to the state border in the Polotsk region. 27 sd Lepel. 52 sd Mozyr fortified [fortified] area. KOVO - 60 sd Ovruch. 45,44,46 and 81 rifle divisions - Novograd-Volynsk region, Shepetovka. 1 joint venture 7 sd, having called 8000 people into it. 99th and 95th divisions stationed in the Transnistrian fortified [fortified] regions, with their concentration in the region

Kamenetz-Podolsk, Mogilev-Podolsk. In total, to call for rifle divisions 72,000 people. B. Call on the training camp the entire command and command the composition of the combat units of the LVO, BOVO, KOVO and KalVO.

C. To call for the training camp the commanding staff of the headquarters of rifle divisions and regiments in the Moscow Military District, KhVO, PriVO,

UrVO, KalVO, OrVO and North Caucasus

Military District. In total, call on the command staff of 39,000 people. To carry out

these activities, call for a total of 180,000 people. D. To supply the Red Army with 22,000 horses for rifle divisions at the rate of harnessing all the artillery pieces of these divisions.

Take for the Red Army from the national economy 3400 freight machines, based on 25% of the mobilization needs:

for air bases - 1500 vehicles.

for tank [s] parts - 1250 vehicles. for building

parts - 650 machines. D. In order to

strengthen the headquarters of the districts and army groups, immediately send students of the 3rd year of the Academy. M.V. Frunze and the 2nd year student of the Academy of the General Staff for practice in the operational departments of the headquarters: LBO, KalVO, BOVO, KOVO, HVO, SKVO and army groups of BOVO and KOVO "[675] .

Meanwhile, a number of formations of the Red Army were concentrated on the western border of the USSR. In KalVO, the 67th Infantry Division advanced to the Sebezh region, and air defense points were deployed in Velikiye Luki and Sebezh. In the BOVO in the area of Sarya, Vetrino, Berezno, Begoml, formations of the Vitebsk Army Group (AG) were deployed (commander - commander F.I. Kuznetsov). In the area north of Pleschenitsa, Zaslavl, Minsk, Dzerzhinsk, Uzda, Timkovich, Semezhovo, the troops of the Bobruisk AG (commander - brigade commander V.I. Chuikov) concentrated, exercises of the 4th Rifle began in the Slutsk area, and in the lower reaches of the Ptich and Ubort rivers west of Mozyr - 52nd Rifle Division. In Slutsk, Bobruisk, Zhlobin, Pukhovichi, Mogilev, Minsk, Borisov, Orsha, Vitebsk and Polotsk, air defense points were deployed and put on alert Polotsk, Minsk and Mozyr

UR. In KOVO, the 60th Rifle Division conducted exercises in the Ovruch area, the 7th Rifle Division in the Chernihiv area, and the main forces of the Zhytomyr AG (commander - Divisional Commander F.N. Remezov) deployed in the area of Novograd-Volynsky, Yampol, Shepetovka, Baranovka . The troops of the Vinnitsa AG (commander - divisional commander P.S. Ivanov) concentrated in the area of Volochisk, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Yarmolinty. The 99th Rifle Division deployed in the area of Gaisin, Vapnyarka, occupying the Mogilev-Yampolsky UR with one regiment, and the 95th Rifle Division - in the area of Kotovsk, Balta, Ananiev. In Zhmerinka, Kazatin, Proskurov, Kiev, Shepetovka, air defense points were deployed and Korostensky, Novograd Volynsky, Letichevsky, Mogilev-Yampolsky, Rybnitsky and Tiraspol'sky URs were put on alert. According to incomplete data, these troops numbered 269,270 people, 86,497 horses, 2279 guns, 2055 tanks (see table 2) [\[676\]](#)

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table 2

<p><i>Number of troops deployed on the western border at the end of September 1938</i></p>

Армейские группы	Корпуса	Дивизии, бригады	Личный состав	Лошади	Орудия	Танки
		67-я СД	7605	2374	71	32
		Войска ПВО	?	?	24	—
Итого КалВО			7605	2374	95	32
Витебская АГ	4-й СК	5-я СД	7764	1638	33	29
		50-я СД	7728	1354	14	23
		18-я тбр	1501	—	—	160
		24-я КД	4447	4325	52	27
		27-я СД	7365	1163	88	—
		16-я тбр	1469	—	11	131
	Полоцкий УР		7020	—	82	—
	Итого		37 294	8480	280	370
Бобруйская АГ	16-й СК	2-я СД	7991	2415	37	22
		13-я СД	10 447	1961	78	16
		100-я СД	7514	2135	70	13
		21-я тбр	2316	—	6	149
	3-я КК	4-я КД	4472	4205	23	28
		7-я КД	3249	3387	21	39
		36-я КД	3705	3645	21	30
	Итого		39 694	17 748	256	297
		4-я СД	8001	2091	67	42
		52-я СД	9809	98	34	—
		Итого	17 810	2189	101	42
		Войска ПВО	?	?	204	—
Итого БОВО			94 798	28 417	841	709
Житомирская АГ	8-й СК 15-й СК	7-я СД	8465	1 783	106	36
		44-я СД	7919	2720	50	33
		45-я СД	9775	2798	69	56
		46-я СД	8987	2856	61	42
		60-я СД	8366	2846	60	46
		81-я СД	9294	2812	57	60
	2-й КК	3-я КД	3821	3990	20	47
		5-я КД	3990	4158	20	—
		14-я КД	4308	4281	22	10
	Коростеньский УР		7530	1225	?	—
	Новоград-Волынский УР		5730	845	43	—
	Итого		78 185	30 314	508	330

Армейские группы	Корпуса	Дивизии, бригады	Личный состав	Лошади	Орудия	Танки
Винницкая АГ	17-й СК	72-я СД	6552	1771	25	23
		96-я СД	6671	2068	101	27
		97-я СД	6464	2074	78	16
		23-я тбр	2374	—	3	117
		26-я тбр	2581	—	—	164
	Корпусные части		1518	374	26	—
	4-й КК	9-я КД	4166	4113	22	52
		32-я КД	4060	4235	19	52
		34-я КД	4246	4426	21	47
	Корпусные части		676	146	12	—
	25-й ТК	4-я тбр	3833	—	—	162
		5-я тбр	4058	—	—	204
		1-я спбр	3768	—	45	4
	Итого		50 967	19 207	352	868
		95-я СД	10 244	3046	75	78
		99-я СД	8813	3113	70	38
		Итого	19 057	6159	145	116
		Артполки РГК	10 372	—	161	—
		Войска ПВО	8198 +?	26 +?	177	—
Итого КОВО			166 867	55 706	1343	1314

In total, in the Red Army in late September - early October 1938, 328,762 people were called up from the reserve (commander political staff - 34,607, junior commanders and rank and file - 294,155), 27,550 horses and 4,759 vehicles (including 551 tractors), who were demobilized in accordance with the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved on October 16 and issued on October 17 by the decree of the —

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1113-274ss [677] . In the meantime, on September 29-30, during the conference of England, France, Germany and Italy in Munich, an agreement was worked out on the Czechoslovak question, which satisfied all the claims of the Third Reich. It was decided to transfer the border regions of Czechoslovakia to Germany before October 10. The right of the population of the transferred areas to opt was proclaimed, but not implemented. The proclaimed international guarantees same time, on were never formalized, since England [678] . At the September 30, England and Germany evaded this by signing a non-aggression agreement

the right of Poland and Hungary to a territorial settlement with Czechoslovakia was recognized. By signing the Munich Agreement, France violated the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of 21 January 1924 and the Treaty of Locarno of 16 October 1925. lose"[679] . According to Yugoslavia and Romania, the acceptance of the Munich Agreement by Czechoslovakia violated its obligations under the treaty of February 16, 1933 and testified to the cessation of the existence of the Little Entente[680] The agreement in Munich led to the fact that Romania also decided to improve its relations with Germany. Already on September 29, the — .

German envoy in Romania reported to Berlin that the king would like to establish closer relations with Germany and get support against the "Russian invasion". However, Germany was reluctant to give any written territorial guarantees, not wanting to worsen its relations with Hungary and Bulgaria. In addition, now that the need for a barrier against the Red Army had disappeared, the German leadership again began to insist on obtaining evidence from Bucharest that it "would not turn out to be an adversary either due to ties with the League of Nations, or through any combination or system of alliances" and demand economic concessions[681] . Having put forward an ultimatum to Prague on September 30 regarding the transfer of Teszyn to Poland, Warsaw asked Bucharest to influence Czechoslovakia in the sense of satisfying this demand. The next day, Bucharest asked Prague to do "everything possible in the interests of peace." However, Hungary's demand to expedite negotiations with Czechoslovakia on resolving

the issue of the Hungarian national minority displeased Yugoslavia and Romania, who told England, Italy, Germany and Poland about the need to limit Hungarian claims. Then Poland decided to influence Romania and on October 19 offered her to also participate in the partition of Czechoslovakia, but the Romanian government hoped to maintain contact with Germany through Transcarpathia, which remained under the control of Prague, and refused[682] . On October 28, this opinion of the Romanian government, which was in line with Germany's intentions, was brought to the attention of Berlin. On November 2, the first Vienna arbitration awarded

Hungary only the southern regions of Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine[683]. On November 5, in a conversation with the Yugoslav regent Paul Karol II, he admitted that the position of Poland and Romania was an obstacle in organizing assistance from the USSR to Czechoslovakia, but most of all both sides were worried about the problem of a new balance of power in Europe. Is it necessary to take into account the possible support of England and France, or will it be necessary to focus on Germany and Italy? There was no clarity on this issue [684] .

By the autumn of 1938, almost the entire Romanian elite agreed to look up to Germany[685] . According to the king, "he rather prefers to see the Germans as his enemies than the Russians friends"[686] . Trying to find a counterbalance to the new economic demands of Germany, Carol II visited England and France on November 15-21, 1938, trying to obtain loans for the purchase of weapons. England agreed to the provision of 25 million pounds. Art. as a trade credit, but the king was told that London supported the Romanian-German rapprochement, because it did not want to "create the impression that Great Britain is trying to put up a barrier to German expansion to the East." A similar position was taken by France, which began leisurely economic negotiations with Romania[687] . Returning to his homeland through Germany, on November 24 and 26, Carol II met with Hitler and Goering, to whom he, pointing to the existence of "good relations with the German Reich", proposed "systematic cooperation in the development of economic relations" based on the development of a long-term agreement on trade for 5 -10 years. It is clear that the king emphasized the anti-Soviet nature of Romania's foreign policy and the fact that the Polish-Romanian alliance was "directed exclusively against Russia"[688] . In the meantime, an Iron Guard putsch took place in Romania, which was suppressed by the Romanian authorities. On November 30, according to Romanian newspapers, C. Codreanu and 13 other leaders of this organization, who were imprisoned, were killed "while trying to escape." The German press sharply criticized this step of the Romanian government, the German envoy was recalled from Bucharest "for a report", and Berlin declared that a German-Romanian political agreement was impossible at the moment[689] .

The aggravation of Romanian-German relations coincided with the signing on December 6 of the Franco-German declaration on

non-aggression[690] . Under these conditions, the Romanian leadership saw a way out in new concessions to Berlin. As a result, already on December 10, a new trade agreement favorable for Germany for 1939 was concluded, which brought its share in Romanian imports to 45% (in 1937 it was 28.9 %)[691] . At the same time, the Crown Council decided on December 14, along with measures to improve relations with Germany, to take steps to maintain ties with England and France. In January 1939, Romania offered Germany negotiations for a long-term economic agreement, which began on 13 February. During the negotiations it became clear that, although Romania is ready for broad economic cooperation with the Third Reich, Bucharest also did not forget about its interests [692] . Through diplomatic channels, Romania informed England about the progress of the negotiations, but London took a wait-and-see attitude. On February 22, the draft agreement was basically agreed upon, but for various reasons the parties were in no hurry to sign it[693] . On February 25, Romania notified Germany that the Little Entente no longer existed, and the Balkan Entente was in no way directed against Germany[694] . In February 1939, Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, and the USSR severed diplomatic relations with it, which caused a joyful revival in Buch

Romania, the USSR and the political crisis of 1939

Knowing from their intelligence about the preparation of the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Western countries - participants in the Munich Agreement did not provide for any countermeasures. On March 13, England notified its diplomatic missions abroad that it would not take the initiative of any anti-German steps in the event of German actions against [Prague\[696\]](#) . On March 14, Slovakia, under pressure from Germany, declared independence, and the—— President of Czechoslovakia, E. Hacha, left for Berlin, where, during the “negotiations,” he agreed to the political reorganization of his country. On the same day, with the approval of Germany, Hungary moved troops into the Transcarpathian Ukraine, whose government offered Romania to send troops. However, Bucharest refused this proposal, by March 17, Transcarpathia was occupied by the Hungarian army, and Romanian-Hungarian relations escalated. On March 15, German troops entered the Czech Republic, on whose territory the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was created. Initially, the reaction of England and France was rather restrained, but as public opinion aroused, London and Paris toughened their position and on March 18, like the USSR, they protested the actions of Germany, English and French were withdrawn from Berlin "for consultations"

ambassadors.

In the meantime, German-Romanian economic negotiations resumed on March 10, and by March 16 the agreement was finally agreed, but its signing was postponed by the Romanian side under various pretexts. In the meantime, Anglophile circles in Romania tried to intensify economic ties with England, but London showed no interest in these proposals, since at that time England itself was conducting economic negotiations with Germany. During these negotiations in Düsseldorf on March 15, an agreement was signed that made it possible to change the cartel structure of the world in favor of the Anglo-German monopolies, and the refusal of the United States to join it could cause joint responses from England and Germany. On March 11, 1939, France also offered Germany an extensive economic agreement[697] .

On March 16, the Romanian envoy in London, V. Tilya, visited the Foreign Office and stated that Germany had practically given Romania an ultimatum demanding that it be granted special economic and political rights in Romania. Therefore, he would like to know to what extent the Romanian government "can count on Great Britain in the event that a real threat looms over Romania from Germany ... Will the British government be ready to do the same for Romania as for Turkey", which shortly before that were provided loans for the purchase of weapons. On March 17, in the same spirit, Tilya spoke with the British Foreign Minister E. Halifax, proposing the creation of an anti-German front from Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece under the auspices of England and France. Actually, it is still unknown whether this demarche of Thiel [698] was an official or private matter.

Be that as it may, on March 17, England asked Paris, Bucharest, Warsaw, Belgrade, Ankara and Athens about their attitude to the ongoing events. The next day, London also asked Moscow, "can Romania count on the help of the USSR in the event of German aggression and in what form, in what amounts"[699] . In response, the Soviet side proposed holding a conference with the participation of the USSR, England, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey to discuss the situation[700]. On March 18, the Romanian government stated that it did not authorize Thiel to make such statements and "at the moment there is no threat to the political or economic independence of Romania", however, this refutation was made at the request of the German envoy in Bucharest[701] . Actually, the Romanian envoy in Moscow, in a conversation with Litvinov on March 19, also denied the fact of the that the German [702] On March 20, it became known in Moscow Romanian ambassador to France also denied the existence of an ultimatum from Germany, but raised the question of French assistance to Romania. The French side pointed to the need for a collective action in support of Bucharest with the participation of the USSR. To this, the ambassador replied that "the involvement of the USSR should be approached" with extreme caution "", although the —

Romanian side is not against Soviet assistance[703] . On March 19, England declared that the convening of the conference proposed by Moscow was premature, and on March put forward a counterproposal to sign the Anglo

declarations on consultations in case of aggression[704] . While it was being discussed, on March 23, 1939, German troops entered Klaipeda (Memel) and an agreement was signed "On strengthening economic ties between Romania and Germany." Rumanian ruling circles believed that "the conclusion of a convention with Germany is a decisive step in the direction of our future policy"[705] . On the same day, British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain declared that England "has no desire ... to resist Germany's understandable efforts to expand its export trade" and it does not intend to "isolate Germany or stand in the way of its natural and legitimate commercial expansion into the Central and South Eastern Europe" [706] . For its part, Rumania told England that at the moment there was no immediate danger of attack for her, although Hungary and Germany were concentrating troops along the Romanian border and in Slovakia. Not wanting to provoke Berlin by entering into a military alliance with the Western powers, the Rumanian government would like Britain and France to declare on their own initiative their determination to defend Romania's existing borders. Bucharest continued to oppose the general pact of mutual assistance, and even —

more so against the participation of the Soviet Union in it [707] . In the meantime, on March 22, a TASS message was published, which refuted rumors about offers of Soviet assistance to Warsaw and Bucharest in the event of aggression against them, since "neither Poland nor Romania turned to the Soviet government for help and about any danger threatening them informed"[708] . On March 26, the Romanian envoy to the USSR informed the NKID of the main provisions of the concluded Romanian-German agreement, which "does not limit the sovereign rights of Romania either in the economic or in the political field. It does not create for Germany and no monopoly rights whatsoever in Rumania." Bucharest is ready for similar agreements with other countries. On his own behalf, the envoy added that it is possible that the agreement "is only the first step on the part of Germany, on which it may not stop. We were forced to agree to this agreement in order not to find ourselves eye to eye w

support - neither France, nor England, nor the USSR. From the Soviet side, the Romanian diplomat was informed about the progress of the discussion of the declaration proposed

by England[709] . On March 27, Bucharest received an English offer of assistance conditioned on the conclusion of a Polish-Romanian mutual assistance treaty against Germany, but the Romanian government declared that it could not sign such a treaty "without consultation with the countries of the Balkan Entente" and did not have "great confidence" in Poland, which inclined to negotiate with Germany[710] . On March 29, it became clear that Poland and Romania did not want to sign the declaration proposed by Britain if it was signed by the Soviet representative. In turn, Moscow, fearing to push Warsaw into the arms of Berlin, was not going to sign this document without the participation of Poland[711] . Thus, England faced the problem of how to ensure the involvement of the USSR in solving issues of European politics, which it had previously invariably rejected, at a time when many countries, whose opinion London tried to take into account, did not approve of flirting with Moscow. As a result, by the end of March, the issue of the declaration was dropped, and the above problem was again postponed to the future[712] .

On March 29, Litvinov pointed out to the Romanian envoy in Moscow that the Soviet side was interested in more detailed information about the Romanian-German agreement, "whether any other secret agreement has been signed." In response, the Romanian diplomat stated that "the agreement with Germany is purely economic", although the danger of German pressure exists and can be eliminated "only by joint actions of the great powers." The Soviet side was again hinted at the desirability of recognizing the border along the Dniester, to which Litvinov replied—

that "no danger threatens" this line[713] . Meanwhile, German-Polish relations escalated. Under these conditions, fearing a possible transition of Poland into the camp of Germany, trying to get her consent to guarantee the borders of Romania and restrain German expansion, England agreed to unilateral guarantees of Poland's independence. Despite Warsaw's requests to keep them secret, on March 31 the guarantees were published, but at the same time England did not refuse to promote the German-Polish settlement. Nevertheless, F

wishing to spoil relations with Hungary and believing that Western support would allow further maneuvering between Berlin and Moscow. At the same time, Warsaw offered England to conclude an Anglo-Franco-Polish union treaty[714] .

On April 1, Moscow notified London that, since the question of a declaration was dropped, "we consider ourselves free from any obligations." When asked whether the USSR intended to continue to help the victims of aggression, the answer was given, "that maybe we will help in certain cases, but that we consider ourselves not bound by anything and will act in accordance with our interests"[715] . On April 4, while orienting the Soviet plenipotentiary in Germany about the general principles of Soviet policy, Litvinov noted that "it is impossible to delay and stop aggression in Europe without us, and the later they turn to us for our help, the more we will be paid"[716] . On April 11, in a letter to the Soviet plenipotentiary in France, Litvinov noted that England and France were striving to obtain from the USSR a unilateral obligation to defend Poland and Romania, believing that the support of these countries was in the Soviet interests. "But we ourselves will always be aware of our interests and will do what they dictate to us. Why should we commit ourselves in advance, without deriving absolutely any benefit from these obligations for ourselves?"[717] The People's Commissar expressed concern about the British guarantees to Poland, since under certain conditions they could

take an anti-Soviet orientation[718] . In this situation, France accelerated the completion of trade negotiations with Romania that had been dragging on since November 1938, and on March 31, a Franco-Romanian economic agreement was concluded. Romania was given a loan of 500 million francs for the purchase of weapons and other goods, which was provided by Romanian supplies of oil and grain. Having learned about the guarantees to Poland, Romania tried to get guarantees of its borders from England and France, but London again repeated its conditions. Then the Romanian government decided to refer to the existing treaty with Poland, which is applicable to any aggression, "although the technical agreements provided only for the case of Russian aggression." Wanting to receive significant military support from Britain and France, Romania did not want to bind itself with an anti-German agreement, and spoke out against the rapprochement of Eng

and did not want to cooperate with Moscow. Meanwhile, Italy occupied Albania on April 7-10. As a result, on April 13, England and France provided guarantees for the independence of Romania and Greece. On April 14, Bucharest notified Berlin that "Romania will not join the British policy of encircling Germany" and that "military assistance from the USSR is undesirable" for her [719]. On April 17, Poland and Romania confirmed that their alliance treaty was directed

only against the USSR[720]. During a visit to Berlin on April 18-19, 1939, the Romanian Foreign Minister G. Gafencu reassured Hitler, assuring him that the Anglo-French guarantees had no real force and were more directed against Romania's immediate neighbors, and not against Germany. In any case, "Romania is ready to sincerely cooperate", loyally fulfill the economic agreement with Germany, has no obligations towards England and France, will in no case contribute to the English "encirclement" of Germany and will not take part in any diplomatic combination with the participation of THE USSR. For his part, Hitler warned Romania against rapprochement with Moscow[721]. On April 23-26 in London, Gafencu convinced the British leadership that Germany did not want war and was striving for an agreement with England. "Romanian friendship with France and Great Britain does not bother Germany, since this friendship provides Romania with the opportunity to take firm anti-Russian positions." The Romanian minister again spoke out against cooperation with the USSR, contacts with which should have been used to put pressure on Germany. During the London talks, the issue of strengthening the Balkan Entente by bringing Bulgaria into its composition was raised, for which, in the opinion of the British side, southern Dobruja should probably have been transferred to it. In any case, London was satisfied with the neutral position of the Balkan countries. Later, in Paris, Gafencu supported the British position regarding negotiations with the USSR[722]. On May 11, an Anglo-Romanian agreement was signed to increase trade. In July 1939 an agreement was reached that England would lend Rumania £5,612,300. Art. for the purchase of weapons and military equipment. This clearly showed the interest of the great powers of Europe in the widest [723] use of the Romanian raw material exports

Meanwhile, on April 11, England asked the USSR about the form in which it "could provide assistance to Romania in the event of an attack by Germany." True, it immediately became clear that Bucharest, in fact, was not inclined to cooperate with the USSR, fearing countermeasures from Berlin[724]. On April 14, Moscow, declaring its readiness to participate in a collective action in support of Bucharest, asked London about how the British government "thinks about the forms of assistance to Romania." But there was no clear answer from England, since London sought to ensure that the USSR assumed unilateral obligations with respect to its western neighbors[725]. It is clear that Moscow was not going to play this game, and in response, on April 17, England and France were invited to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance[726]. Now it turned out that England is in no hurry to implement

Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.P. On May 8, Potemkin had a protocol conversation with Gafencu in Bucharest, assuring him that the replacement of Litvinov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov will not affect Moscow's foreign policy strategy. To Potemkin's question whether the time had come to "revise the Polish-Romanian pact directed against the USSR", Gafencu replied that "nothing prevents the conclusion" of the Romanian-Polish agreement on mutual assistance "in the event of an attack from the west"[727]. It is clear that Bucharest did not oblige such a response to anything. On the same day, Romania notified Germany that she "firmly rejected" all proposals from the very beginning to involve her in negotiations with the USSR[728]. Moscow's attempt to liquidate the Polish-Romanian treaty of 1921, or at least extend its effect to Germany, aroused categorical objections from Poland and Romania[729].

Both countries in every possible way refused any agreements directed against Germany, and generally opposed collective security. Romania faithfully fulfilled its promise made on April 19 to Hitler not to enter into "no alliances against Germany" and not to have "no business with the Soviet Union"[730]. It is clear that England, at every opportunity, referred to a similar position of Warsaw and Bucharest in order to limit obligations towards the USSR[731]. It is no coincidence that Gafenka in London

recommended not to hide too much their unwillingness to cooperate with

Moscow. Moreover, this position of Romania was also used by England to put pressure on France. On May 23, the Romanian government again brought to the attention of England that "Romania does not wish to take part in any system providing for assistance from the Soviet Union" and "does not want to go along with England and France in their negotiations with the Soviets." Even earlier, the same was reported to Germany. However, this position was not hidden from Moscow either, which was told that "the Romanian government will not take part either in an alliance [with the USSR] or in negotiations about it. Romania___

cannot associate itself ... with Russia"[732] . In the conditions of the political crisis of 1939, the Soviet leadership was interested in accurately determining the positions of both the great European powers and their Western neighbors. Of course, the main attention of the USSR at that time was given to contacts with England, France and Germany. Moscow noted that the position of England and France in relation to Germany is gradually softening. If in March-April the Western allies made statements threatening Germany, then in the first half of May they only demonstrated calm confidence in their abilities, and by the beginning of June they called on Berlin to negotiate. Poland and Romania also showed no desire to cooperate with Moscow. The Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on a mutual assistance treaty that had begun developed neither shaky nor roll, since England and France were not going to recognize the equality of the USSR in European affairs, fearing that the creation of a real anti-German coalition would lead to the collapse of the Nazi regime in Germany and the fascist regime in Italy and " Bolshevization" of these countries. Therefore, all these diplomatic steps of the Western allies in relation to Moscow were aimed___

only at intimidating Germany and reaching an agreement with What Anglo-Russian agreement did not mention Romania ?___ her[733] . On June [734] and on July 20, new German-Romanian economic agreements were signed for the supply of timber and agricultural products to the Third Reich. At the beginning of July 1939, Romania concluded loan contracts in Germany for the supply of weapons, guaranteeing Berlin an uninterrupted supply of fuel. In July, Romania reaffirmed that "at the present time we do not intend to enter into any

direct or indirect connections with the Russians"[735] . However, on July 22, the Wehrmacht's High Command imposed a ban or limited the supply of weapons on credit to countries that "took part in the British policy of encircling Germany." Now Romania could receive weapons only in exchange for oil. Then Bucharest banned the supply of oil to Germany on account of clearing, since the Romanian obligations had already been fulfilled. After negotiations on August 19, it was possible to agree on the resumption of Romanian supplies. The Romanian government agreed to pay 5.5 million marks to foreign companies for oil for Germany, and the German side promised to supply the Romanian Air Force with 29 bombers and lift the ban on the supply of Czech

weapons[736] . Meanwhile, new incidents took place on the Dniester. On May 11, a Romanian border boat fired on and captured a fishing boat in the Soviet part of the Dniester Estuary. Although the boat and the fishermen were returned the next day, a joint investigation of this case showed that, although the fact of violation of Soviet territorial waters, shelling and capture of fishermen was confirmed, "Romanians took a sharply negative position on this issue." On May 31, during a meeting of representatives of the border units, the Romanian side tried to use in the protocol instead of the words "demarcation" the word "border" and the phrases "Soviet territory", "Romanian territory". As a result, the protocol was not signed by the Soviet representative. The Main Directorate of Border Troops (GUPV) of the NKVD asked the NKID to solve this problem through diplomatic channels[737] On June 28, the Soviet side pointed out to the Romanian mission in Moscow that in its note of June 7, the term "Romanian territory" was again allowed in relation to Bessarabia. The Romanian envoy stated that "in the future, the mission will refrain from using in correspondence with the People's Commissariat of — Foreign Affairs unacceptable language" for the Soviet side[738] . Accordingly, on July 21, the Soviet embassy in Bucharest received instructions from —

Moscow not to accept Romanian documents with such wording[739] . In the course of secret and overt Anglo-German contacts in the spring and summer of 1939, London tried to reach an agreement with Germany that would allow Europe to be consolidated, while Berlin

Naturally, the USSR closely followed the maneuvers of London and Berlin and tried by its countermeasures to prevent a new Anglo-German agreement, rightly regarding it as the main threat to its interests. In the spring and summer of 1939, England and France again tried to find an acceptable basis for an agreement with Germany, using the threat of rapprochement with the [USSR to put pressure on Berlin\[740\]](#) . However, it was quite obvious that they did not burn with the desire to have Moscow as an equal partner - this completely contradicted their foreign policy strategy. It was no coincidence that at the end of July England brought to the attention of Germany that negotiations with other countries "are only a reserve means for genuine reconciliation with Germany and that these ties will disappear as soon as the only important and worthy goal, an agreement with Germany, is really achieved"[741].] . It is clear that under these conditions, as the ~~talks~~ in Moscow showed, Britain and France were not going to agree that the Soviet Union, along with them, would have the right to determine when Germany acts as an aggressor. This is precisely what explained the fruitless discussion on the question of the definition of "indirect aggression". As a result of mutual suspicion and intransigence of the parties, the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations actually failed by mid-July.

However, an open recognition of this fact would deprive England and the USSR of a means of pressure on Germany, so on July 23 London and Paris agreed to the military negotiations proposed by the Soviet side. It is no coincidence that the composition of the Anglo-French military delegations was not very representative, and their instructions provided that "before the conclusion of a political agreement, the delegation must ... negotiate very slowly, following the development of political negotiations . Knowing that ~~the~~ Poles and Romanians do not want to allow Soviet troops into their territory," it was still necessary to develop plans for assistance from the USSR to Poland and Romania, whose position could change in the event of German aggression. "If the Russians demand that the French and British governments make Poland and Rumania" an offer of cooperation with the Soviet Union, "the delegation should not assume any obligations," reporting this to London. "The Poles and Romanians did not ensure the coordinated defense of their countries against the German attack,

since in the past the Polish-Romanian alliance was guided only by the assumption of an attack from Russia, "and the Romanian armed forces, consisting of 22 infantry, 3 cavalry divisions and 3 mountain infantry brigades, are of no noticeable value. The main task of the delegation was seen as obtaining a promise from Moscow to economically support Poland and Romania in case of war[743] . Still hoping to reach an agreement

with Germany, the British government did not want, as a result of negotiations with the USSR, "to be drawn into any definite obligation that could tie our hands under any circumstances. Therefore, with regard to a military agreement, one should strive to be limited to the most general formulations possible"[744] . It is no coincidence that the French delegation had powers only to negotiate, while the British delegation had no written powers at all[745] . Thus, for the Anglo-French side, it was about conducting fruitless negotiations, which it was desirable to drag out for the longest possible time, which, according to London and Paris, could keep Germany from starting a war in 1939 and hinder a possible Soviet-German rapprochement [746] .

For its part, the Soviet leadership, being generally aware of such intentions of England and France, appointed a representative military delegation with all possible powers. Options for a military agreement were developed that could be safely offered to partners without fear that they would be accepted. On August 7, a clear "scenario" for conducting military negotiations was developed. First of all, it was necessary to find out the powers of the parties "to sign a military convention." "If they do not have the authority to sign the convention, express surprise, shrug their shoulders and "respectfully" ask for what purpose the government sent them to the USSR. If they answered that they were sent for negotiations, then their views on the joint actions of England, France and the USSR in the war should have been clarified. If the negotiations do start, they should have been "reduced to a discussion on separate fundamental issues, mainly on the passage of our troops through the Vilna corridor and Galicia, as well as through Romania", putting forward this issue as a condition for signing

military convention. In addition, it was necessary to reject any attempts by the Anglo-French delegations to get acquainted with the defense enterprises of the USSR and the military units of the Red Army[747]. It is clear that under these conditions the military negotiations were doomed to failure and were used by the parties to put pressure on Germany.

During military negotiations in Moscow, the Soviet side raised the issue of the passage of the Red Army through the territory of Poland and Romania, which, apparently, was considered by the Soviet leadership as a kind of litmus test of the intentions of Western partners. Although England and France were well aware of Poland's negative attitude towards the problem of letting Soviet troops into their territory, it was decided to ask Warsaw again and try to find some kind of compromise formula that would allow continuing negotiations with the USSR. Apparently, the Western allies considered it unnecessary to request Romania, since it was already clear that even if the Polish government, which was directly threatened by the German invasion, was categorically against it, then there was nothing to say about Romania. On August 21, the Romanian ambassador in Paris, reporting Warsaw's negative response, advised his government to take a similar position. Actually, Bucharest did not need any hints. As early as August 11, Carol II told Turkish President I. Inönü that he would not allow the passage of Soviet troops through Romanian territory, even if they came "to the aid of the Romanian army"[748]. On August 21, the Prime Minister of Romania A. Călinescu wrote in his diary: "Reception at Karol. I am reporting a French-English request to Warsaw concerning the demand for the passage of Russian troops through Polish territory. They say that we will be asked the same question. King: 'We will answer that this will become clear when there is a war. In any case, what is necessary, first of all, is the unconditional recognition of Bessarabia.'"[749] Meanwhile, German Foreign Minister

I. Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow on August 23, and during negotiations with Stalin and Molotov on the night of August 24, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact and a secret additional protocol were signed that determined the spheres of interest of the parties in Eastern Europe. The sphere of interests of the USSR included Finland, Estonia, Latvia, the territory of Poland east of the Narew, Vistula and San rivers, as well as

Bessarabia[750] . Thanks to this agreement, the Soviet Union, for the first time in its history, achieved recognition of its interests in Eastern Europe by a great European power. Moscow managed to limit the possibility of Germany's diplomatic maneuvering in relation to England and Japan, which largely reduced the threat for the USSR of a pan-European consolidation on an anti-Soviet basis and a major conflict in the Far East, where at that time there were battles at Khalkhin Gol with Japanese troops. Of course, for this, Moscow had to take upon itself the obligation to abandon anti-German actions in the event of a German-Polish war, expand economic contacts with Germany and curtail anti-fascist propaganda.

The Soviet-German treaty caused confusion in Bucharest. On August 27, 1939, the Romanian government again assured Berlin of the loyalty of its course towards further friendship with the Third Reich and took credit for the fact that "it did nothing to improve relations with Soviet Russia, considering the improvement of relations with Germany the most important issue of its future policy ". Romania "wants to go hand in hand with Germany on the Russian question" and wants to know Berlin's opinion on this. The Romanian side notified the German leadership that it would remain "neutral in any conflict between Germany and Poland, even if England and France interfered in it" and would continue to sell strategic raw materials to Berlin[751] . At the same time, Romania gave its consent to England and France for the transit of military materials to Poland. On August 31, the Romanian Prime Minister notified the German envoy that Bucharest had always pursued a policy towards the USSR that met the interests of the Third Reich, continued to scrupulously fulfill its obligations under the agreement of March 23, 1939, and hoped that Germany would also fulfill its obligations regarding supplies weapons. To Fabricius's request to ban the transit of military materials to Poland, Kalinescu replied that this was impossible, since in this case England, France and Poland could demand the cessation of oil supplies

Part Three

Liberation (1939–1940)

In new conditions

The beginning of the German-Polish war required Romania to determine its position in the new situation. At the same time, the Romanian leadership decided not to rush, and only on September 4, after England and France declared war on Germany, a communiqué was published stating that Romania was determined "to continue to maintain the peaceful position that it has observed so far, seeking agreement with all neighboring countries. In this spirit, the government is ready to renew its proposal for a non-aggression pact" with Hungary. To the direct request of the German envoy to make a declaration of neutrality, the Romanian Prime Minister refused. In response to a new attempt by the German diplomat to achieve a ban on the transit of military materials and the passage of the British military mission to Poland, Calilinescu said that Bucharest would not allow the passage of "a large number of weapons and the passage of a large group of British military personnel." For his part, the Romanian prime minister recalled the arms supplies promised by Berlin to Romania and indicated that Romanian oil supplies to Germany would be carried out depending on these German supplies.

At this point, Germany could not afford any harsh actions or even statements against Romania, so Bucharest was told that military supplies would continue under any circumstances. Moreover, on September 3-4, Rome and Berlin had to hold back Hungary, which tried to enlist their support for an attack on Romania[753]. However, the successes of the German troops in Poland and the inactivity of England and France increased the desire of Romania to distance themselves from them, and on September 6 the Crown Council decided to declare neutrality. On September 8, Romania announced its intention to "strictly observe the rules of neutrality developed by international conventions in relation to the warring countries, involved in the current conflict." [754] At the same time, Bucharest refused a French offer to accept a military mission of instructors. On September 9, Berlin was informed that the Romanian leadership was interested in a strong Germany to "contain Russia." For its part, Germany indicated to Romania what it expected from

her strict observance of neutrality. In response, on September 14, the Romanian government declared its agreement with this demand and asked to transfer captured Polish weapons to Romania in exchange for additional supplies of oil and grain. Bucharest is ready to continue the corresponding deliveries throughout the war, than "wants to give Germany

the best proof of its goodwill." Before the war, Romanian oil entered Germany mainly by sea from Constanta to Hamburg (74.5% of deliveries), along the Danube (21.5%) or by rail (4%). The economic blockade of Germany, declared by England, led to the fact that sea deliveries turned out to be impossible, and the available capacities of tankers, barges and tanks were not enough to maintain the total volume of deliveries. In addition, of the total tanker tonnage on the Danube (220,700 tons), Germany controlled only 45%. Under these conditions, England tried to limit the possibilities of oil supplies to Germany and on September 12 offered Romania negotiations on buying oil from her. However, the Romanian side insisted on selling oil for US dollars. To a certain extent, this was a general requirement of both foreign oil companies in Romania (including British ones) and the Romanian government itself, which had to pay interest on loans. On September 16, Romania introduced a new foreign exchange regime, according to which exporters had to sell 30% of the proceeds to the National Bank at the official rate (with a 38% premium), and the remaining 70% at the free market rate to any buyers. Under these conditions, the Anglo—

Romanian negotiations were interrupted[755] . On September 16, Berlin protested against the transit of Polish gold reserves taken from Constanta to England. In response, the Romanian side noted that it refused to accept these Polish funds for safekeeping, but could not prevent their transit, since gold is a commodity like all others. At the same time, new negotiations began on expanding the supply of raw materials to the Third Reich in exchange for additional arms supplies to Romania. On September 17, Soviet troops crossed the border of Poland[756] . On the same day, Romania, as well as all the states with which Moscow had diplomatic relations, was given the text of the Soviet note to Po

neutrality towards these [countries](#)^[757] . On September 20, Molotov asked the Romanian ambassador in Moscow, "couldn't there be any surprises for the Soviet Union due to the fact that the Polish government, the main Polish leaders and 500 Polish military aircraft are on the territory of Romania?" The Romanian diplomat replied that there would be no incidents, and "Polish troops that crossed or will cross the border have been and will be disarmed and interned"^[758] .

Meanwhile, late in the evening of September 17, the Polish government and military command crossed the Romanian border, hoping to leave Romania for France. Contrary to the current Polish Romanian union treaty, Bucharest on September 18 stated that "the special conditions in which the events in Poland unfolded on September 17, as well as the fact that Poland asked the Romanian government to extend hospitality to the head of state and ministers who take refuge on our territory, showed that Romania must continue to maintain a position of strict neutrality in relation to the current belligerents. The government, taking into account the interests of the motherland, will take care of the security and protection of the country's borders . On the morning of September 18, a message was sent from the Polish consulate in Chernivtsi to Polish diplomatic missions in other countries on behalf of the President of Poland. On the same day, the Romanian authorities demanded that the Polish government sign a declaration relinquishing all of its constitutional political and administrative duties. This would make it possible to present the situation as a transit not of the government, but simply of Polish citizens. However, Polish Foreign Minister J. Beck refused to sign such a statement. Then, on September 19, members of the Polish government were transferred to Slanitsy, where they were informed about the internment.

Romania preferred to heed the "friendly" advice of Germany^[760] . For its part, Berlin agreed to transfer captured Polish weapons to the Romanian armed forces in exchange for oil and grain. The Romanian side tried to get Germany to at least partially pay for oil in foreign currency, but this proposal, of course, did not find support in Berlin. On the same day, the Romanian leadership drew

"serious concern caused in Romania by the advance of the Soviets to the center of Europe and the social danger that may arise as a result of increased communist agitation", in connection with the change in the situation in Eastern Europe[761] . Since the diplomats of England and France pointed out that the main threat comes from Germany, which must be defeated, the Romanian leadership continued to probe Rome and Berlin. On September 21, Italy was told that "Poland and Romania have hitherto performed the function of a barrier against Bolshevism. Romania will not be able to continue to perform this function alone." At the same time, Berlin was asked if Romania "could count on the friendly support of Germany so as not to have any troubles from Russia?" With German troops approaching the Romanian border, on September 21, the Iron Guard, expecting support from Berlin, staged a new rebellion, during which Prime Minister Calinescu was killed. However, the occupation of Western Ukraine by the Red Army and the passivity of the German embassy in Bucharest, busy preparing a new agreement on the supply of raw materials from Romania, allowed the Romanian government to suppress the rebellion and begin repressions against its organizers[762] . On September 28, Romania asked France about its position in the event of a Romanian-Soviet conflict: "Will France and Great Britain go to war against Russia? Will they be able to provide us with effective assistance by sending squadrons to the country and the Anglo-French fleet to the Black Sea? The indication by the French diplomat in Bucharest of the need to defeat Germany, and not to reach an agreement with her, provoked a response from Gafencu: "The defeat of Germany will not solve the problem of Europe. Russia has risen behind Germany's back... Therefore, after the victory over Germany, a new victory over Russia will be required. In this regard, they (England and France. - MM) are obliged to weigh the chances of a final victory and [...] take into account all these facts. That is, Romania stood up for the restoration of peace in Europe on the basis of the Anglo-French German agreement.

On the same day, in a conversation with the Soviet Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Romania, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gafencu emphasized a good-neighborly attitude towards Moscow, and on October 3, the new Romanian Prime Minister K. Argetoianu told the Soviet diplomat that

"Romania will continue to maintain the most friendly relations with the Soviet Union." The Romanian authorities lifted restrictions on the distribution of the Izvestia newspaper in the country and the showing of Soviet films in Bessarabia[763] . At the same time, on September 29, a secret agreement was concluded with Germany on the supply of captured weapons and military materials to Romania from Poland in exchange for additional supplies of oil and food. The Romanian government was forced to agree to the clearing payment for oil supplies proposed by the German delegation, but at the rate 40 lei per 1 mark, [764] while the Germans insisted on a higher ^{of} . exchange rate On September 30, Bucharest invited neutral Italy to influence the warring countries in order to find a compromise and restoration of peace, since "the continuation of the war will only benefit communism and the Slavs, who have already reached the heart of Europe, that it is necessary to convince France and England so that they do not go crazy, persisting in their inflexibility." At the same time, the Romanian leadership intensified the search for an ally against Moscow among the great powers, which were constantly reminded that on the Dniester it was protecting not only itself, but the entire European civilization from Bolshevism. But since both England and France, and Germany and Italy took an evasive position, the Romanian leadership continued its policy of balancing[765] .

The Soviet command closely followed the actions of Romania. By September 17, along the Dniester from Kalus to the Black Sea, troops of the Odessa Army Group (35th Rifle Corps consisting of the 15th, 51st and 95th Rifle Divisions) of the Ukrainian Front were deployed according to the cover plan[766]. By the end of September, the 146th Rifle Division of the 13th Rifle Corps of the 12th Army of the Ukrainian Front was deployed along the Cheremosh and — . Dniester rivers to Kamenetz- Podolsk . 550 rifles, 5577 revolvers, 1069 sabers, 2634 machine guns, 515 guns and mortars, 191 tanks, 4 armored vehicles, 3295 vehicles, 442 tractors and 143 motorcycles[768] . At 23.55 on September

26, the commander of the Ukrainian Front reported to the People's Commissar of Defense that "according to the headquarters of the Odessa group, Romania has noticeably strengthened the eastern and northern borders. Among the border guards, soldiers of the field tro

pickets are reinforced with machine guns, intensive surveillance of our territory is being carried out. Along with this, there is a concentration of field troops in the border areas: in the Bendery region, up to three regiments of infantry; in the forest west of Chern to the artillery battalion; On September 23, an infantry battalion arrived in Soroca. In the areas of Golerkany, Dubossary, Criuleny, Vodului-Vody, Bendery - trench work. In the areas of Chern, Rezina up to ten firing points. Recently, cases of provocative behavior of the Romanian border guards, expressed in the shelling of our territory, have become more frequent. So, on September 21, 2 shots were fired at bunker No. 1055, on September 22, the northern bank of the Dniester near Mogilev-Podolsky was fired three times from a machine gun, and on September 24, bunker No. 1006 was fired at . Similar facts took place later. So, on October 16, Soviet border detachments and the territory were fired on from the Romanian side three times. Naturally, the Soviet side protested[770] .

The successes of the Polish campaign of the Red Army gave rise to rather radical moods among the Soviet military personnel and the population regarding the solution of the Bessarabian issue. Thus, Colonel Pleshakov, a teacher at the Air Force Academy of the Red Army, believed that "now, having liberated Belarus and Ukraine, we will have to think about access to the Baltic Sea, especially since Lithuania also has former Belarusian territories, now you can click on Romania, it will quickly give up Bessarabia . "[771] The Red Army soldier of the separate communications battalion of the 13th rifle corps Kulibaba wondered, "when will we correct the border with Rumania, but Bessarabia must also be liberated"[772] . The border guards were no exception. For example, cadet Petrov, in a conversation with Lieutenant Sokolov, said: "Our army, advancing in Poland, may turn its left flank into Bessarabia." According to the squad leader Shumeiko, "Romanian soldiers mock the Bessarabian people. Isn't it time for us to pay for such dirty tricks ? On September 27, at a meeting in the village of Yassky, the collective farmer Muzurash said: "Our government did the right thing in defending the life and property of our brothers Belarusians and Ukrainians living in Poland. I can't wait until there is an order [774] to render assistance to the Bessarabian people."

True, at that time the Soviet leadership was busy solving a number of foreign policy problems on its western and northwestern borders and was not ready for any drastic actions against Romania, so all these conversations fell into the category of "unhealthy". After the completion of the Polish campaign, in accordance with the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0057 of October 11 and No. 0160 of October 23, 1939, the following changes occurred in the military-territorial structure of the Red Army. The territory of Western Ukraine was included in the Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO). On the territory of the Odessa, Nikolaev, Kirovograd, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye regions, the Moldavian and Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, the Odessa Military District (OdVO) was formed, the commander of which was appointed the former commander of the Kalinin Military District (KalVO) commander I.V. Boldin. The Directorate of the 13th Army (the former Odessa Army Group) should have been relocated to Stanislavov and renamed the Directorate of the 12th Army, and the personnel of the Directorate of the 12th Army located there, after the surrender of cases, should have been returned to the place of their former service to the Directorate of the Kharkov Military District (HVO)
[\[775\]](#).

Analyzing the situation in the Balkans, the apparatus of the ECCI prepared for September 28, 1939, a note "The Imperialist War and the Balkans", which noted that both belligerent groups would seek to draw the neutral Balkan countries into the war that had begun. Under these conditions, the tasks of the Communist parties in the Balkans were to "fight against the imperialist war, against intervention in the war, against the warmongers", which, according to the then Soviet terminology, were England and France, which, from the point of view of Moscow, were the main obstacle to the strengthening of Soviet influence. in South Eastern Europe. In their work, the communists were supposed to expose the policy of the ruling circles of the Balkan countries, fight for the friendship of the Balkan peoples, and "with all their might strive to establish and strengthen friendly ties with the great Soviet Union and unite the Balkan countries around the Soviet Union. In this way they will also contribute to the limitation of the theater of war and the rapid liquidation of the latter. Communist parties should have taken into account the aggravation of social problems and explained to the working people

their revolutionary goals. "Popularizing the grandiose experience of the USSR, they should indicate to the working people that only the overthrow of the capitalist governments, only the establishment of a workers' and peasants' government and joining the Soviet Union on the basis of equality and reciprocity, only the implementation of socialism will ensure national equality, a free and happy life for the working people of the Balkan —

countries"[776] . Since October 1939, the idea of creating a bloc of neutral states in the Balkans under the auspices of Italy began to be discussed. Britain and France viewed this initiative as an opportunity to maintain the status quo in Southeastern Europe, to prevent Germany and the USSR from gaining influence there, and to try to win Italy over to their side. In Moscow, this idea was treated with discontent, and in Berlin more calmly, since they expected to use the possible unification in their own interests. For Romania, the projected block was supposed to be another guarantee against Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. So far, according to Bucharest, Germany has performed the function of containing the USSR, but in the event of a protracted war, it will weaken and will not be able to protect Romania. Therefore, "the unification of neutral states in the present situation would protect part of Europe from revolutionary currents that are spreading wherever Russian influence is growing. It would thus correspond to the goals of the belligerent countries themselves, who have absolutely no interest in tomorrow's Europe being completely infected with Bolshevism. For its part, the Soviet leadership tried to keep Turkey, inclined towards strengthening the Balkan Entente, from rapprochement with Romania. So, on October 1, 1939, in a conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Sh. Saracoglu I.V. Stalin, by the way, pointed to the possibility of Ankara being drawn into territorial disputes in the Balkans. For example, "there was a complication between the USSR and Romania because of Bessarabia - we do not think to attack the Romanians, but we will not give Bessarabia as a present - again a conflict. In my opinion, Romania is like Poland: just as it grabbed a lot of land, so does Romania. Anyone who contacts Romania with mutual assistance must keep his sword at the ready: Hungary is here, and maybe someone else - th

Although in October 1939 Romania managed to improve relations with Hungary somewhat, on November 21 Budapest announced that it would not participate in the bloc of neutrals until the disputes with Romania were completely resolved. The Bulgarian leadership made a similar statement. After the conclusion of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance on October 19, 1939, Italy actually refused to participate in the proposed agreement, citing the fact that it was not a neutral, but only a non-belligerent power, and Germany, through diplomatic channels, notified the Balkan countries of the undesirability of their participation in this endeavor. In addition, the revived contradictions in the Balkans did not allow reaching an agreement, and by December the idea of the bloc was finally buried[778]. On November 3, Romania again tried to find out from England and France whether their guarantees extended to Bessarabia, blackmailing them with the possibility of rapprochement with Germany[779]. On November 15, the English Committee for the Prevention of the Supply of Oil to Germany recommended that foreign oil companies in Romania reduce supplies to Germany, increase exports to countries with convertible currencies and set the highest possible prices for oil exported to Germany. On November 16, German-Romanian negotiations resumed, during which the German delegation demanded an increase in the mark's rate to 75 lei. For its part, Bucharest offered Germany to pay for 40% of oil supplies with mottos, and the rest— with goods that Romania needs[780]. Romania turned to England and France for support, but London preferred to take a wait-and-see attitude, and Paris, although it increased its purchases of oil, took the bulk of the proceeds for it as loan payments[781].

The outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war exacerbated fears in the Romanian leadership regarding the Soviet Union, which was told on December 2 that Bucharest's policy towards Moscow "continues to be benevolent." True, Soviet diplomats in Bucharest received information about the transfer of Romanian troops to Bessarabia and Bukovina, where it was supposed to concentrate 20 divisions[782]. The attention of the Romanian leadership was attracted by an article by B. Stefanov in the magazine "Communist International", which stated that England and France were striving to draw in an

national minorities Romania into the war, but "the interests of the peoples of Romania, their peaceful and free development and a better future are impossible without the immediate conclusion of a mutual assistance pact with the USSR, similar to the agreements between the Soviet Union and the Baltic states"[783] . Bucharest immediately assured Moscow that it was not going to violate neutrality, that it was taking care of its national minorities and that it intended to "observe the best possible relations with the USSR" [784] . On the Soviet side, on December 8, it was stated that the article "expresses the personal views of the author, which do not correspond to the view of the Soviet government"[785] . Romania was also concerned about information that, in a conversation with the French ambassador in Moscow on December 5, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.P. Potemkin drew his interlocutor's attention to the fact that with the loss of Bessarabia, Odessa is a "dead port", and in the new international conditions, the Soviet government cannot be indifferent to this problem[786] . Therefore, the Romanian leadership intensified the search for an ally against Moscow and tried to win the support of the great European powers on the issue of Bessarabia. However, a Romanian request to Berlin on December 8 remained unanswered, despite the fact that on December 6 Bucharest agreed to increase oil supplies, hoping to receive additional weapons[787] . On December 14, England—

notified Bucharest that her guarantees extended to Bessarabia in the event that "Turkey immediately comes to the aid of Rumania and if there is no danger of opposition from Italy. If the Romanian Government is in a position to give an affirmative answer to these two questions, then His Majesty's Government is ready to immediately consider the new situation together with the French Government in order to determine what contribution it will be able to make to the defense of Romania." France on the same day informed Romania that the guarantees concerned only the case of German aggression, and that Britain and France could provide assistance in the event of a Romanian-Soviet conflict only depending on the position of Turkey. Considering that the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty contained a clause on Turkey's non-participation in anti-Soviet actions, getting its support was a serious problem. All these excuses convinced Bucharest that it would hardly be possible to draw London and Paris into a war with the USSR for Romanian interests. IN

Under these conditions, the Romanian government decided to make new concessions to Germany, which in early December again demanded an increase in the rate of the mark, hoping to enlist its support against the Soviet Union. On the same day, Romania raised the exchange rate of the German mark to the Romanian leu by 15%, notifying Germany that it was waiting for her help against the USSR, as it was doing this contrary to the opinion of England and France[788]. At the same time, on December 15, Romania asked Britain to keep her answer secret, since its disclosure could push the USSR to a violent solution of the Bessarabian issue.

Romania's attempts to get guaranteed support against the USSR from its neighbors also did not bring results. The allies in the Balkan Entente were not interested in getting involved in the Soviet-Romanian conflict. Hungary and Bulgaria sought to realize their own territorial claims against Romania. Italy expected to continue rapprochement with Hungary and limited itself to general promises. Meanwhile, from the beginning of December 1939, foreign oil companies in Romania began to raise prices for oil products exported to Germany. Accordingly, Berlin put pressure on Bucharest, and on December 21 the Romanian government increased the value of the mark by another 20%. True, on December 22, Romania proposed to England to start negotiations on increasing oil exports. By the beginning of 1940, the Danube was frozen over, and oil supplies to Germany by rail were reduced from 6 to 2 echelons per day. Accordingly, the export of oil to England and its possessions by March 1940 increased to 120 thousand tons per month. At the same time, England sought to ensure that the Romanian government paid for the cost of oil supplied by foreign companies to Germany in convertible currency. For its part, Germany recommended that Romania establish control over the activities of foreign oil companies. On January 17, 1940, the creation of the General Commissariat for Oil Issues

was announced in Bucharest, which was supposed to control the extraction, processing and export of oil. At the same time, negotiations were underway to increase oil exports to Germany to 130,000 tons per month. In response, Berlin provided Romania with the weapons necessary "to defend its independence and territorial integrity against any aggression." However, the weapons came to

Romania not only from Germany, but also from England and France, which, in response to the tightening of government control over oil companies, blocked the accounts of the Romanian government in their banks and threatened Romania with depriving it of its guarantees[789] . It is clear that under these conditions the Romanian leadership continued its policy of maneuvering between the warring countries. The next session of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Balkan Entente on February 2-4 showed that during the war Romania was not going to make territorial concessions to its neighbors. The Turkish proposal for military cooperation against aggression in the Balkans, although accepted, was never

implemented. Not wanting to aggravate relations with foreign oil companies in Romania, on January 21, 1940, Germany proposed a compromise solution to financial problems, but specific German-Romanian negotiations began only on February 13. In the end, on March 7, an agreement was reached that in 1940 Romania would supply Germany with 1.5 million tons of oil in exchange for Czechoslovak and Polish captured weapons, and the Romanian government would advance the supplier companies in foreign currency. Thus, Anglo-French-German pressure forced Romania to pay the bills of foreign oil companies[790] . In response to constant inquiries from the Romanian leadership about the possibility of Soviet aggression Germany, seeking to stabilize oil prices, on February 8 declared that the situation in Romania did not bother her, since she did not foresee any Russian aggression[791] . However, the Romanian leadership continued to take a firm stand against the territorial claims of its neighbors. So, visiting Chisinau on January 24, 1940, Carol II declared that the territory between the Prut and the Dniester "will be forever Romanian"[792] . On March 16, it was announced that 30 billion lei was allocated for the needs of the armed forces and that they were ready to defend themselves against any attack. Speaking in the Senate in connection with the opening of a new session of the Romanian parliament, Gafencu on March 19 announced Romania's readiness to defend what was obtained "as a result of the free decision of the meetings in Chisinau, Chernivtsi and Alba Iulia"[793]

Before choosing

Certain problems arose in the winter of 1939–1940. and the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Finnish war not only fettered the freedom of action of the Soviet leadership, but also sharply worsened relations between the USSR and the Anglo-French allies, who began to develop plans for anti-Soviet military operations. Even after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, England and France, seeking to strangle Germany with an economic blockade, continued preparations to establish control over Scandinavia and destroy the Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus[794] . At the same time, they tried to persuade Turkey, Iran and Japan to participate in the war with the USSR. On March 28, the Anglo-French allies again discussed their military strategy and decided to mine Norwegian territorial waters in order to impede the delivery of Swedish iron ore to Germany. However, the opinions of the parties differed on the issue of the bombing of Baku. While France insisted on accelerating this action, England took a more evasive position, fearing a Soviet-German alliance. In addition, the position of England was influenced by the fact that Turkey and Iran evaded interference in the struggle of the great powers, and the USSR, knowing about the common intentions of the Western allies, proposed on March 27 to improve relations with London. As a result, it was decided to continue preparations for an air strike in the Caucasus, so that "the operation could be carried out without delay, if an appropriate decision was made"[795] . It was necessary to strengthen the blockade of the USSR, especially in the Far East, and to delay the response to the Soviet offer of trade negotiations until the issue of the bombing of Baku was resolved [796]

Although Moscow did not know all the details of the preparation of the Anglo-French actions in the Caucasus, the available information made it possible to note the growing threat to the southern borders of the USSR. Therefore, as early as March 4, the command of the Red Army Air Force received instructions from the General Staff that "SAVO, ZakVO and OdVO are of particular operational importance," and began to prepare to provide these districts with the necessary material and technical means and ammunition "for 1 month of combat work"[797] . Speaking at Evening Session VI

session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 29, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov stated that "now in Syria and in the Middle East in general there is a big suspicious fuss with the creation of Anglo-French, mainly colonial, armies led by General Weygand. We must be vigilant in

regarding attempts to use these colonial and

non-colonial troops for purposes hostile to the Soviet Union. Any attempts of this kind would provoke retaliatory measures on our part against the aggressors, and the danger of such a game with fire should be completely obvious to the powers hostile to the USSR and to those of our neighbors who will turn out to be an instrument of this aggressive policy against the USSR . In addition to these rather serious warnings, the Soviet side also took specific military measures to strengthen the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District (ZakVO) [799]

In accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, the Air Force Commander ordered on April 9 and 11 the long-range bomber air regiments of the ZakVO and OdVO "to begin studying the Middle East theater of operations, paying special attention to the following objects": Alexandria, Beirut, Haifa, Alexandretta, Port Said, Nicosia, Larnaca, Famagusta, Aleppo, Suez Canal, Istanbul, Izmid, Sinop, Samsun, Trapezond, Mudaniya, Smyrna, Gallipoli, Ankara, Kirikale, Bosphorus and Dardanelles. It was necessary in strict secrecy to work out possible routes, bomb load and conduct 2 training flights over its territory with a range and navigation conditions corresponding to the Middle East theater of operations, including bombing and air battles with meeting fighters[800] . On April 7, the Air Force command asked the NPO Intelligence Directorate to transfer to the Air Force headquarters materials on the Mosul-Kerkuk region, including those that can be obtained in Berlin through the air attache. On April 23, reconnaissance materials were sent to the headquarters of the ZakVO from the 5th Directorate of the NPO "on the objects of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Palestine for a thorough study by the flight personnel" of the units. Transferred on May 25 to the headquarters of the Air Force of the district, these materials contained maps, plans, diagrams, photographs of the districts of Istanbul, Tabriz, Qazvin, Baghdad, Mosul, Haifa[801] .

Meanwhile, a British reconnaissance plane from the Habbaniya airbase in Iraq on March 30 conducted aerial photography of the Baku region, and on April 5 -

Poti and Batumi regions. London and Paris were completing the development of specific military plans for operations in the Caucasus. It was planned to prepare a single Anglo-French plan, which was to be submitted to the governments for consideration. However, the German invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9 tied the hands of the Western Allies to a certain extent, since the available air forces did not allow the air group to be strengthened in the Middle East. On April 23, the Supreme Military Council of the Allies, having again considered the problem of an air strike on the Caucasian oil fields, stated that "the threat of an attack is a reality and therefore is a means of pressure" on the USSR. It was decided to complete the preparation of the attack as soon as possible (tentative date is the end of June - the beginning of July) and increase pressure on Turkey in order to persuade it to participate in the anti-Soviet campaign[802]. In early May, France informed England that it would be possible to launch an operation against Baku as early as May 15, but on May 10, Germany launched an offensive on the Western Front, and the Allies had more pressing problems[803]. It is clear

that in the spring of 1940 the Soviet leadership tried not to aggravate relations with Romania. In the same speech on March 29, Molotov noted that "we do not have a non-aggression pact with Romania. This is due to the existence of an unresolved controversial issue, the issue of Bessarabia, the seizure of which by Romania the Soviet Union never recognized, although it never raised the question of the return of Bessarabia by military means. Therefore, there are no grounds for any deterioration in Soviet-Romanian relations either"[804]. This statement caused some concern in Romania. Already on March 30, the Romanian Prime Minister G. Tatarescu notified Germany of the need for further rearmament of the Romanian army and asked to influence Moscow so that it would not lay claim to Bessarabia[805]. To this the answer was received that relations with Romania would depend on the fulfillment by her of her economic obligations to Germany. The new Romanian inquiries showed that in Berlin they did not believe in the imminent possibility of a Soviet initiative in resolving [806] the territorial issue.

The situation on the Soviet-Romanian demarcation line was rather nervous. So, on November 13, 1939, west of Mogilev Podolsky, from the Romanian side, two shots were fired at

Soviet territory, as a result of which a collective farm bull was injured on the western outskirts of Serebriya. On December 1, near the city of Kuta, Soviet border guards detained 10 Romanian soldiers who had crossed the river. Cheremosh. January 18, 1940 on the river.

Cheremosh, Romanian soldiers fired on the Soviet border detachment, and when on January 21 the Soviet side demanded an investigation of this fact, it was stated that "the Romanian soldiers did not fire at our border guards, and that the shelling probably took place from two unknown persons who crossed into Romania from the USSR and who offered armed resistance to the Romanian border line, who tried to detain them. On March 10, during the arrest of an unknown person crossing the ice of the Dniester from the Bessarabian coast, fire was opened on the Soviet border guards. On March 13, a Red Army soldier of the 74th separate machine-gun battalion of the Tiraspol UR P.I. was wounded in the leg by a shot from the Romanian coast.

Konstantinov, who was guarding pillbox No. 653, and the border detachment of the 25th border detachment was fired upon. On March 15, the Romanian border guard opened fire on an unknown person who was trying to cross to the USSR. As a result, came under fire from. Tsekinovka. In total, in January-March 1940, the Romanian side opened fire 26 times on Soviet territory, its inhabitants and border guards. In response to the protests of the Soviet border guard, the Romanian side admitted 2 cases, rejected 5, and still had not received a response to 19. The Romanian border authorities continued their attempts to impose on the Soviet representatives the name of the Dniester line as the state border. Reporting these facts, on April 5, the GUPV of the NKVD asked— .

the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs "to take the necessary measures through diplomatic lines"[807] On April 9, Molotov handed over to the Romanian envoy in Moscow a memorandum on 15 cases of shelling of the left bank of the Dniester from the Romanian side and the problem of mining bridges across the river. "Such behavior of the Romanian units is unacceptable," Molotov stressed, "and the question arises whether the Romanian troops stationed near Soviet territory are controlled by anyone." The Soviet side insisted "on taking immediate measures—to stop such cases." The Romanian side, of course, denied its guilt and put forward counterclaims[808] . It is clear that no m

continued[809]. On April 19, the Soviet charge d'affaires in Rome, in a conversation with the Romanian envoy, noted that Molotov's speech was in fact an "invitation to a waltz", it was necessary to have a detailed conversation with him on the problems of Soviet-Romanian relations. In response, the Romanian diplomat said that it would be risky, since Moscow could put "the question of Bessarabia for discussion." His Soviet interlocutor noted that, perhaps, it would not be about territorial concessions, but about the creation of a Soviet military [base in Romania](#)[810]. It is not yet known whether this conversation was a personal initiative of the Soviet diplomat, or whether he was fulfilling an order from Moscow. In any case, the probing of the Romanian position gave negative results.

Meanwhile, in the first half of April 1940, Britain and France began to refuse to provide Romania with currency to pay for oil deliveries to Germany. Under their pressure, a number of Romanian ministers spoke out against the payment system stipulated in the March 7 agreement with Germany. However, the German representatives managed to get the consent of Carol II to settle this problem in favor of Berlin[811]. The spread of the war to [Scandinavia](#) and the passive position of England and France led to a decrease in their influence in the Balkans. Taking into account the developments in Europe, Carol II expressed the opinion on April 15 that Romania should "join the political line of Germany", and proposed that negotiations with Berlin be guided by these intentions, seeking a promise to protect the "territorial integrity of Romania"[812]. On April 19, the Crown Council of Romania [spoke](#) out against the voluntary cession of Bessarabia to the USSR, preferring to go to a military conflict [\[813\]](#). Accordingly, in May 1940, [the](#) Romanian government increasingly began to remind the German diplomats in Bucharest that "the future of Romania depends only on Germany"[814].

The course of the war in Western Europe required Romania to revise its foreign policy in favor of closer rapprochement with the only possible adversary of the USSR at that time - Germany. Already on May 27, a new "Agreement on the exchange of German military materials for Romanian oil products" was signed between Romania and Germany, according to which it was supposed to increase oil supplies to Berlin by 30% in exchange for providing Romanian

armies with modern weapons. Romania provided Germany with 1 billion lei for the purchase of oil from foreign companies operating on its territory. At the same time, the price of a ton of Romanian oil was reduced from 7 thousand to 3.5 thousand lei[815]. At the same time, the Romanian leadership decided to abandon neutrality and take an orientation towards Berlin, since "Germany was now becoming the master of the continent. It was necessary to enter into negotiations with her" and offer cooperation in any field at her request[816]. New Romanian inquiries about Germany's actions in the event of "aggression by Soviet Russia" on June 1 were answered that Germany was not interested in the problem of Bessarabia - this was a matter for Romania itself[817].

Soviet intelligence continued to collect information about the armed forces of Romania. As of January 1, 1940, the Romanian Air Force had 1439 aircraft (238 heavy and medium bombers, 440 light bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, 201 reconnaissance aircraft, 331 fighters, 229 attack and training aircraft), and taking into account hydroaviation (61 aircraft) and 250 interned Polish aircraft, their total number increased to 1750 aircraft. At the same time, according to incomplete data, there were only 727 aircraft in combat units[818]. According to intelligence report No. 4 of the intelligence department of the KOVO headquarters of June 1, 1940, general mobilization was announced in Romania on April 30, which made it possible to create an army of almost 2 million and deploy up to 50 divisions. Military units were formed from the soldiers of the Polish army. As of April 1, 1940, it was assumed that 21 infantry, 2 cavalry divisions and 1 mountain infantry brigade were concentrated in the east of Romania[819]. The armament of the Romanian army was estimated at 1,200,130 rifles, 50,000 carbines, 39,334 light and 16,320 heavy machine guns, 582 anti-aircraft machine guns, 5,134 guns, 525 mortars, and 198 tanks[820]. According to intelligence data, on June 1, 1940, the Romanian Air Force, which had 163 airfields and landing sites, had 11 air regiments: 4 fighter (162 aircraft), 3 bomber (96 aircraft), 3 reconnaissance (262 aircraft) and 1 naval aviation (18 aircraft). In total, there were 658 combat and 500 auxiliary aircraft[821]. Intelligence report No. 14 of the intelligence department of the KOVO headquarters reported that for the period May 20–31, 1940, "Romania continues to transfer military units to Bessarabia and

Bukovina and the construction of fortifications on the borders of the Dniester and the—

Prut pp"[822] . At the command and staff exercises conducted according to the plans for the operational training of the highest command personnel and the headquarters of the KOVO and OdVO, naturally, various options for possible operations against Romania were played out. Here we should mention one such game, the materials of which were then used in operational planning in June 1940. On April 19–23, a front-line operational game was held at the headquarters of the KOVO on the theme "Offensive operation of the front", during which they studied, among other things, "offensive the possibilities of the front" on the territory of Bessarabia. The general situation in the game was set as follows: in the spring of 1939, the "browns" (Romania) concentrated their forces on the border with the "reds", deploying the Eastern Front as part of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th armies. Having received 250 fighters and 150 bombers from the Anglo-French allies, they began provocations on the border and are preparing to go on the offensive against the "Reds" on July 23. In the meantime, their "white" allies (Turkey) announced mobilization in May 1939 and by July 15 deployed up to four army corps on the Caucasian border and 2 corps near the "orange" (Bulgaria) border. Other allies of the "browns", "violet" (Yugoslavia), in early May, admitted to their territory the "corps of the colored troops of the allies", which is being transferred to Romania, while they themselves have completed mobilization and are concentrating troops in the north-east of the country. The "Orange" deployed troops on the northern and southeastern borders, and the "yellow" (Hungary) - on the eastern border, but both countries declared neutrality. The Allied high command, preparing the main attack on the "Reds" from the territory of the "Whites", set the task for the "Browns" to pin down the troops of the "Reds" in the south-west, to defeat them on the river. Dniester and by the end of August 5 to go

to the front Odessa, Ananiev, Gaisin, Zhmerinka, Proskurov. The main command of the "Reds" on July 17 ordered to deploy the Southern Front against the "Browns" as part of the 16th, 8th, 19th and 3rd Cavalry Armies and "in order to disrupt the plan of aggression and ensure the country's defense capability" to defeat the enemy on his territory. The "Reds" were supposed to go on the offensive on July 21 from the front

Prut and Siret, and Dubossary, Nezavertailovka in the general direction to Chisinau, Iasi. It was planned by August 1 that the main grouping would go to the fronts of Kampulung, Felticheni, Dorohoy, Edinet, and the auxiliary grouping - to the fronts of Orhei, Khushi, Chimis-liya, r. Kogilnik. By the end of August 5, the "Reds" should reach the Yakobeni, Tirgu-Okna, Byrlad, Leipzigskaya, r. Kogilnik, preventing the withdrawal of enemy forces through the Foksha Gate. By August 10, the troops of the Southern Front were to reach the front of Kampulung, Tirgu-Okna, Fokshany, Galati, r. Danube, surrounding and defeating the main forces of the "browns" in the northern part of Bessarabia. The Southern Front consisted of 45 rifle and 10 cavalry divisions, 10 tank brigades, 17 RGK artillery regiments and 29 air regiments (1,872 combat aircraft). He was opposed by an enemy grouping of 39 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, 10 artillery regiments, supported by 889 combat aircraft. During the game, the participants carefully studied the theater of operations, noting the presence of defensive structures on the Dniester, Prut and Siret rivers, which, although they are not modern fortified areas, will require significant preparation for their breakthrough. The most profitable operational directions for the actions of the troops of the Southern Front were identified: Chernivtsi, Roman, Bacau and Tiraspol, Chisinau, Khushi, Focsani. Going on the offensive on July 21, the 16th and 8th armies of the "Reds" by the end of July 24 reached the line of

Krasnoilsk, Mikhaileni, Gertsu, Chervona Mari, Darabani, Potureni, Brichany, capturing a bridgehead on the southern bank of the Prut. The 3rd Cavalry Army was preparing to enter the operational breakthrough. Bridgeheads were captured near Mogilev Podolsky and Rybnitsa, and the troops of the 19th Army occupied the line of Mashkovtsy, Chisinau, r. Botna. The enemy stubbornly defended and launched counterattacks, but by the end of July 26, the main forces of the 3rd Cavalry Army reached the area of Falticheni, Pashkani, Tirgu-Nyamts, threatening the rear of the main enemy grouping. The troops of the 16th Army advanced to the line of Gura-Humorului, Suceava, Dorokhoy and continued to advance following the moving units along the river valley. Siret. The 8th army reached the front of Sareni, Tarnovo, Savka, and the 19th army repelled the counterattacks of the "browns" from Orhei and Cimislia, reaching the front of the river. Kogilnik, Korlucheny, Gura-Galbina. By the end of July 28

flank groupings of the troops of the Southern Front reached the line of Tirgu-Nyamts, Falticheni, Botushany in the north, and Orhei, Miklaushany, r. The road at Khushi, Cimislia. The 3rd Cavalry Army broke through behind enemy lines: its 8th Cavalry Corps occupied the Bolotino area, the 9th Cavalry Corps - the Falesti area, the 3rd Cavalry Corps - the Tirgu Frumos area, and the 9th Motorized Division - Roman. Under these conditions, the command of the "Reds" decided to complete the encirclement of the enemy in the area of the city of Yassy. To create an external encirclement front, part of the forces of the 16th Army advanced to the Jacobeni-Bacau line, and the 3rd Cavalry Army to the Bacau-Tekuch line. At the same time, it should be emphasized that this game was not a practice of the impending offensive, but an ordinary stage in the operational training of the highest command personnel and headquarters of the KOVO armies. It was precisely the assessment of the level of this preparation that was devoted to the conclusions of the game management, which, in particular, pointed out the need to "pay more attention to the study of the defensive operation"[823] .

Meanwhile, in April 1940, the transfer of Soviet troops from the Finnish front to the places of permanent deployment began. At the same time, there was a strengthening of the Red Army grouping in the South-Western direction. The command of the 8th Rifle Corps, 7th, 44th, 60th, 62nd, 72nd, 87th, 97th, 131st, 141st Rifle Divisions, 137th Rifle Divisions returned to KOVO. th, 168th howitzer artillery regiments and the 34th artillery division of the RGK, as well as the new 139th rifle division arrived. IN

The 51st, 95th rifle divisions, the 320th cannon, 120th howitzer artillery regiments of the RGK returned to the OdVO and the new 150th, 173rd rifle divisions and the command of the 14th rifle corps arrived. ^[824] In May, 2 fighter air regiment (20th from KalVO and 149th from LBO) and control of the 56th air brigade (from BOVO), and in OdVO - 3 fighter regiments (4th from BOVO, 146th from MVO, 69th from KalVO), management of the 13th air brigade (from KalVO) and 2 corrective air squadrons (15th from the PriVO and 23rd from the [Moscow Military District](#))^[825]. As a result, the KOVO Air Force grouping increased from 639 aircraft on March 1 to 1,334 aircraft on June 1, and the OdVO Air Force, respectively, from 231 to 812 aircraft^[826]. Along with the transfer of additional troops on June 9, it was ordered to begin the formation of 2 mechanized corps in the KOVO and 1 in [the OdVO](#)^[827]. At the same time, the demobilization of reservists drafted into the Red Army began, so the number of personnel of the KOVO and OdVO decreased, respectively, from 638,324 and 231,581 ^[828] people on May 1 to 613,674 and ~~220~~,110 people on .

The redeployment of Soviet troops was noticed by German diplomats in Moscow, which was reported to Berlin on May 21, 1940^[829]. On May 23, the [Romanian](#) General Staff turned to the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) with a request for help, referring to the concentration of the Red Army on the Dniester^[830]. On May ~~25~~, the German ambassador in Moscow, Count F.V. von Schulenburg turned to Molotov to clarify the rumors about the concentration of Soviet troops on the border with Romania. "Molotov replied that all these rumors were groundless," Schulenburg reported to Berlin. "There is no doubt, perhaps, that the Soviet troops in the southern part of Russia, in the Crimea and the Caucasus are being strengthened," but these measures do not go—beyond defensive ones^[831]. This information was also passed on to the Romanian diplomats in Moscow, who, in their reports to Bucharest, reported on the concentration of ~~of~~ Soviet troops on the Dniester^[832]. On June 1, Romania proposed to the USSR to expand trade, but the Soviet side did not support this proposal. At the same time, an incident with a Soviet aircraft that flew into the airspace of Romania at 62 [km was settled](#)^[833] On June 3, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR V.N. Merkulov sent message No. 2255 / b / ss to the Soviet leadership stating that among the population of the border strip of Bukovina and Bess

"Rumors are spreading about the forthcoming war between the USSR and

Romania"[834] . June 8 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria sent message No. 2328 / b / ss to the Soviet leadership stating that on June 7 at 14 o'clock the Romanians began to dismantle their part of the highway bridge across the Dniester near Zalishchikov. At 18.20, the Soviet border guards protested verbally and at 19.40 in writing, to which the Romanian side replied that [835] these actions were connected with the repair of the bridge. both the geopolitical position of Romania and the new European order that is being created, which is necessary in all areas. The Romanian government believes that the identity of interests that bound both states in the past also determines today and will determine even more tomorrow their relationship and requires the rapid organization of this cooperation, which presupposes the existence of a strong Romania both politically and economically, because only such Romania is a guarantee that she will be able to fulfill her role as the defender of the Dniester and the mouths of the Danube . However, Berlin was in no hurry to respond. On June 21, in Romania, instead of the "National Renaissance Front", the "Party of the Nation" was created, headed by the king. As the international situation changed, Hungary and Bulgaria began to more actively remind of their territorial claims to Romania. The expansion of the war in Western Europe in May-June 1940 allowed the Soviet Union to intensify its policy towards the Baltic states and Romania.

Soviet military planning

Like other states bordering the USSR, Romania was considered a potential enemy in Moscow, and the Soviet military command periodically prepared plans in case of war in the South-Western direction. The change in the international situation in Europe in May 1940 required the Soviet leadership to make specific preparations to resolve the Bessarabian issue. On May 11–14, the operational department of the KOVO headquarters ordered the military topographic department to start collecting mobilization sets of maps of the border zone of Romania[837] . Already on June 3, ~~the~~ chief of staff of the KOVO commander N.F. Vatutin developed and handed over to People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko a top secret memorandum of particular importance, which contained “brief considerations on the basics of organizing and conducting the first front-line operation against Romania. The immediate strategic goal of the front is **the encirclement and destruction of the armed forces of Romania in the territory east of the line of the Carpathian Mountains. Focsani. Galai. R. Danube with a complete prohibition of the withdrawal of the Romanians to the west of the specified line. As a result of the operation of the army of the front, by the end of M-23 - M-25 should take possession of the Carpathian ridge. Foksha gates and the lower reaches of the river. Danube and go to the front pass [od] Bold. Kosna. Focsani. Brailov. Ilim[an]**

Rasim. The total depth of the front-line operation is 220–250 km. The average pace of the operation is 10 km per day. The

operation must be carried out in close cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet.” According to the headquarters of the KOVO, the armed forces of Romania were estimated at 36 infantry divisions. The Eastern Front (headquarters - Bacau) was deployed against the Soviet Union, consisting of three armies: one army in Bukovina (presumably the headquarters - Chernivtsi), the 3rd army (headquarters - Iasi) and the 4th army (headquarters - Tekuch). The total strength of this grouping was up to 26 infantry and up to 2-4 cavalry divisions. The rest of the Romanian forces were deployed against Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria or were loca

Bucharest). Under favorable conditions, Romania could, due to the weakening of the western border, concentrate against the USSR up to 32 infantry, 4 cavalry divisions and up to 1200 aircraft. In the presence of allies, the main forces of Romania will most likely be deployed on the Dniester, in an unfavorable situation for her, the Prut will become the main defensive line. "Currently, the main forces of the Romanians are grouped in the region of Chernivtsi, Balti, Iasi. Auxiliary group - in the Chisinau area. Reserves in the regions: 1) Botushani, Iasi, Bakeu (the largest). 2) Fluid, Galati, Fokshany. Considering the question of possible allies of Romania, Vatutin pointed out that his decision

"largely depends on the further behavior of Italy: whether she will come out with Germany or against Germany. In this regard, the war with Romania can be under the following three options. If Italy is on the side of the Anglo-French allies, then they will be able to provide assistance to Romania through Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria will be pinned down by Turkey. "In this case, the Romanians will additionally be able to receive up to two or three corps and up to 500 aircraft, bringing the composition of the troops to 42-45 infantry divisions and 1700 aircraft. However, the arrival of the allies will be delayed, and the Romanians must be defeated before their approach. If Italy is on the side of Germany, then Romania will be left alone. In addition, the option is not ruled out when "Bulgarians and Hungary (or Germany) act against the Romanians simultaneously with us." In both "cases, during the first front-line operation, the Romanians will not be able to deploy more than 32 infantry divisions against us," Vatutin concluded.

Based on the characteristics of the theater of operations, the chief of staff of the KOVO suggested following operational solution:

"a) Deliver the main blow with the forces of the 12th and 5th shock armies and the horse-mechanized army from the front of Kuta, Kalus in the general direction to Chernivtsi [y], Bakeu.

b) An auxiliary strike by forces No. A (OdVO) (as in the document. - MM.) To deliver from the front of Grigoriopol, Glinnoye in the general direction to

Byrlad. c) By active actions to tie down the enemy on the Kalus, Dubossary front.

d) Immediate task: to force the river. Dniester, break through the defenses of the prka, destroy its opposing forces and by the end of the M-10 (no later) go out: **in the main**

direction - to the front of Kosna, Neamtsy, Botushani, Edinet, letting the cavalry-mechanized army into the Roman, Bakeu, Pyatra area. On the auxiliary direction - to the front: Mouth,

Khush [i], Falchiu [Falchiu], Leipzigskaia, passing the tank corps to the area of Dokolina, Byrlad. At the same time, the forces of naval and airborne assault forces and mmd -

capture the region of Fokshany, Galati, Tulcha, Brailov [Braila].

e) In the future, destroy the encircled enemy and reach M-23-25 on the front indicated earlier, in readiness to conduct the next operation on Bucurest [Bucharest]."

Based on this concept of the operation, the following grouping of forces and tasks of troops:

"a) 12 A - Shtarm Stanislav.

Composition: 4 sc, 12 sd, 5-6 tbr, 5-6 up RGK.

Combat strength [8th, 13th, 17th, 15th rifle corps, 96th, 192nd, 58th, 139th, 72nd, 7th, 80th, 62 -I, 135th, 33rd, 29th, 125th rifle divisions, 375th, 168th, 376th, 324th, 135th, 120th artillery regiments, 34th, 315th, 316th artillery divisions of the RGC]. Deployed at the front Yablunytsya, Borkut,

the mouth of the river. Zbruch. The main blow is delivered with its right wing in the area to the south

west of Snyatyn - between the river. Seret [Siret] and the Carpathian Mountains.

The immediate task is to destroy the enemy's Chernivtsi grouping in cooperation with 5 A and capture the area of Moldava, Radauts [Redauti], Seret [Siret], Chernivtsi[y]. Ensure the passage of the KMA into the breakthrough. Further - to the M-10, go to the front of Kosna, Neyamtsy, Folticheni,

throwing the enemy to the east and southeast, thereby preparing the complete encirclement of the enemy. The ultimate task is the encirclement and destruction of the enemy in cooperation with 5 A, No. A and KMA

and access to the front pass [od] Smelaya, Kosna, Okna with the transfer of part of the forces to reinforce 5 A. The border on the left is the river. Zbruch, Dorokhoy, lawsuit. Choldeshty, Roman ... b) 5 A - the army of Yarmolinty.

Composition - 3-4 sk, 9-12 sd, 4 tbr, 4 ap RGK.

Combat strength [27th, 30th, 36th, 37th rifle corps, 131st, 44th, 60th, 124th, 169th, 121st, 140th, 187 1st, 55th, 145th, 185th, 50th rifle divisions, 305th, 137th, 330th, 331st, 318th, 429th artillery regiments and one RGK artillery division] . The

mouth of the river is deployed at the front. Zbruch,

Kalus. The main blow strikes with his right wing in the direction of Bothu shani and further advances in the strip between pp Seret [Siret] and Prut.

The immediate task is to defeat the enemy between pp Dniester and Prut, assisting 12 A in the destruction of Chernivtsi gr. pr [otivni] ka and exit to the river. Rod with the capture of crossings.

Further - to the M-10 to go to the front of Botushany [Botosani], Edinet. The

ultimate task is to encircle and destroy the main forces op [opponents] with further access to the front Windows, Focsany.

The border on the left is Bar, Kalus, Bratushany, the mouth of the river. Ungur, b.

Prut to Yassy ... c) 10 A - the assault of Vapnyarka.

Composition - 1-2 sc, 3-6 sd. Combat strength [57th Rifle Corps, 130th, 176th, 115th, 151st

Rifle Divisions]. Deployed at the front Kalus,

Dubossary. Strikes: from the Mogilev-Podolsk region in the south-west [back] direction and from the Dubossary region in the north [ero]-west [back] direction. Assists from the front in the encirclement and destruction of the main enemy forces, after which, after capturing the Iasi region, it enters the second echelon and is used depending on the plan of the subsequent front-line operation.

The border on the left is Kochurova, Germanovka, claim. Budeshti, Maka reshti.

d) No. A (OdVO) - the army of

Grosulovo. Composition - 4 sk, 12 sd, 1 tk, A-5 tbr, A-5

ap RGK. Combat strength [35th, 7th, 25th, 61st rifle corps, 95th, 173rd, 51st, 147th, 46th, 30th, 64th, 144th -I, 132nd, 19th, 25th, 17th rifle divisions, tank corps, two tank and one motorized divisions, 403rd, 360th, 430th, 110th, 320th , 124th artillery regiment, two artillery divisions of the RGK].

Deployed at the front Grigoriopol, Glinnoe. Strikes with the left wing in the direction of Byrlad. The immediate task is to smash the Kishinev group of opponents

and go to the front of Chisinau, Leipzig and skip into the breakthrough shopping mall.

Further - throwing back the enemy to the north and north[ero]-west, force the river. Prut and to the M-10 go to the front of Ustye, Khush[i], Falchiu [Falchiu], Leipzigsкая. The ultimate task is to

encircle and destroy the main enemy forces with further access to the front of Fokshany, Brailov [Braila]. The border on the left is B[olynaya] Karpovka, Glinnoe, Leipzig ...

e) Primorskaya group - the headquarters of Odessa. Composition - 1 sc, 3-4 sd. Combat strength [48th Rifle Corps, 23rd, 137th, 84th, 149th Rifle

Divisions]. Task: providing the coast in the area of the Dniester estuary, Odessa, Nikolaev, contributes to

the offensive No. A by striking with its main forces in the area north of the Dniester estuary.

In the future, in cooperation with the sea and airborne assault forces destroys pr-ka east of the river. Danube and goes to the river. Danube.

f) Cavalry-mechanized [anized] army: Composition - 2 kk, 5 kd, 2 mk [2nd, 5th cavalry corps, 3rd, 5th, 14th, 16th, 9th cavalry divisions, two tank corps, four tank and two motorized mechanized divisions].

Enters the gap in the strip 12 and 5 A.

Destroys the nearest operational reserves and goes to the M-10 in the rear of the main grouping of Romanians in the area of Roman, Bakeu, Piatra.

Later, acting from the rear, in cooperation with 12, 5 and No. A, it destroys the main enemy forces, immediately directing one mmd to Focsany. The front reserve should have had the 4th and 24th

rifle corps, the 128th, 48th, 138th, 143rd, 126th, 113th rifle divisions, three airborne brigades and two more rifle divisions from HVO. Thus, according to Vatutin, troops from the KOVO, OdVO, KhVO, BOVO, MVO, KalVO and LBO should have been used for the operation. At the same time, several options were proposed for the combat composition of the troops necessary for the implementation of the above plan (see Table 3).

	1-й вариант	2-й вариант	3-й вариант
Армий	4	4	4
Конно-механизированных групп	1	1	1
Стрелковых корпусов	17	15	13
Стрелковых дивизий	50	45	39
Кавалерийских корпусов	2	2	2
Кавалерийских дивизий	5	5	5
Танковых корпусов	3	3	3
Танковых дивизий	6	6	6
Моторизованных дивизий	3	3	3
Танковых бригад	15	13	12
Артполков РГК	19	17	15
Авиабригад	15	13	12
Авиаполков	60	50	50
Авиадесантных бригад	3	3	3
Понтонных батальонов	14	13	13

During the operation, the Air Force, consisting of fifteen air brigades, was supposed to "suppress enemy aviation by fighting in the air and at airfields and ensure air supremacy from the beginning of the operation to its end to the line of Bystrits, Bucurest [Bucharest]", preventing the delivery of troops enemy from the central and western regions of the country. Assist ground forces in forcing the river. Dniester and on the battlefield, as well as destroy the naval bases of Constanta and Galati. Together with the Navy, destroy the enemy's navy and ensure dominance at sea up to the Bosphorus, as well as cover the transportation and landing of amphibious assault forces. It was necessary to prepare for the "landing of airborne troops: a) In the first period - in the

operational depth of the armies. b) To M-10 - In the Galati region - 1 adbr and 1 sd. In the Focsani area - 1 adbr. The following tasks should have been assigned to the Black Sea Fleet: "1. Destroy enemy fleets and naval bases and ensure complete dominance in the Black Sea. 2. Capture the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and block the exits from them. 3. Block the Black Sea coast of Romania. 4. Cover the Black Sea coast of the USSR.

5. Prepare and land troops in the lower reaches of the river.

Danube. 6. To assist from the sea the offensive of the Primorsky group, the amphibious assault until the capture of Galati by him. Provide food for the landing forces:

sea and air. According to Vatutin's calculations, the concentration and deployment of the Soviet grouping will last 20-27 days, and the main forces will be able to go on the offensive for 20-21 days, even before the full concentration of the front's reserves is completed. Within 10 days, Soviet troops must cover the enemy and go to the front:

"a) on ch. direction - to the line of Kosna, Neyamtsy, Botushani [Botosani], Edinet. b)

On the auxiliary direction - to the front of Ustye, Khush [I], Falchiu [Falchiu], Leipzig. c) KMA

- to the area of Roman, Bakeu, Piatra.

d) TC - to the area of Dokolina,

Byrlad. e) MMD - to the Focsani

area. Landing of amphibious assault forces in the lower reaches of the river.

Danube and its possession of Galati. The landing of airborne troops in the area of Focsani

and Galati. Capturing the Foksha Gates. In the future, in 7 days it was supposed to finally encircle and destroy the main forces of the Romanian army. In the next 5-6 days, fully reach the front of the Carpathian

Mountains, Fokshany, Braila, r. Danube. In anticipation of the operation, it was necessary "no later than 10.7.40 to create two-month stocks of food forage in the territory of Stanislav, Tarnopol, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Vinnitsa, Kirovograd, Odessa regions and the AMSSR", accumulate 6 ammunition ammunition at the advanced and district warehouses of the KOVO and OdVO and have in the warehouses of KOVO, OdVO and HVO fuel based on the month of the war. In addition to the existing stocks, it was necessary to provide for the delivery of approximately 50,000 more tons of fuel for the ground troops

and 20,000 tons for the Air Force. According to the chief of staff of the KOVO, "with the successful completion of the first front-line operation, the main forces of the front are withdrawn against the Foksha Gate to deliver the main blow to Bucurest [Bucharest] with the aim of finally eliminating Roman

Dobruja and further mastery of European Turkey and the Dardanelles. Reporting on the above, Vatutin asked for "instructions on the further development of the operational plan"[838] As you can see, the proposal of the chief of staff of the KOVO was quite radical. However, the main work on the preparation of the operation plan was carried out, of course, in the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. Until June 7, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, appointed on that day by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 02469 commander of the troops of the KOVO[839] and who left for Kiev the next day. By the evening

of June 9, a draft directive was prepared at the General Staff, according to which three armies were allocated for operations against Romania, whose troops were estimated at 36-38 infantry, 4 cavalry divisions, 5 mountain infantry and 1 mechanized brigades with 658 combat aircraft. From the troops of the KOVO, the 12th army was involved in the operation to liberate Bessarabia (8th, 13th, 15th, 17th rifle corps, 7th, 58th, 60th, 62nd, 72nd I, 124th, 137th, 139th, 141st, 146th, 192nd rifle divisions, 81st motorized division, 5th, 23rd, 24th, 10th, 26th, 14th, 38th Tank Brigades, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Corps, 3rd, 5th, 16th, 32nd, 34th Cavalry Divisions, 375th, 135th - th, 168th, 305th, 324th, 120th artillery regiments, 315th and 316th artillery divisions of the RGK) and 5th army (36th, 37th and 49th rifle corps, 8th, 44th, 74th, 130th, 135th, 139th, 140th, 147th, 164th rifle divisions, 9th cavalry division, 36th tank brigade, 376th, 124th, 331st, 429th artillery regiments and 34th artillery division of the RGK). From the troops of the OdVO, the 9th army was allocated for the operation (35th, 7th and 14th rifle corps, 15th, 25th, 30th, 51st, 95th, 150th, 156 -I, 173rd, 176th rifle divisions, 4th tank brigade, 522nd, 320th, 110th, 430th artillery regiments and

39th artillery division of the RGK). It was proposed to strike the main blow with the forces of the 12th Army from the area north of Chernivtsi in the direction of Siret. Further, one grouping of troops was to advance on Dorohoy, Costesti and along the Prut to Iasi, and the other - on Suceava and along the river. Siret on Roman, Bacau, Mareshesti, Galati, Braila and Izmil. By the end of the first day of the operation, the mechanized units were to occupy Dorohoy, by the end of the second day - Andriesheni, and by the end of the 3rd day - Iasi and Khushi. T

front Briceni - Lipcani and further to Balti. The 9th Army, with its 35th Rifle Corps, was to advance on Chisinau and further on Khushi. The 30th Infantry Division was to cross the Dniester Estuary and advance on Akkerman, Sarata, and the 150th Division was planned to be transferred from the Crimea on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet and landed in the Zhebriyan region[840] .

In further versions of the plan, there was an increase in the troops involved in the operation and a reduction in those standing in front of them [841] . Thus, 9th ~~the~~ command of the 55th tasks of the rifle corps was introduced into the army, and the amphibious landing at Zhebriyan should have been prepared from units of the 74th rifle division deployed in the Odessa region. It was originally planned to entrust the Black Sea Fleet with the following tasks: "a) Organize a continuous and reliable patrol

service by submarines, aircraft and light forces in the Black Sea near the Bosphorus and be ready to quickly lay minefields near the Bosphorus; b) Destroy the Romanian military and navy as in

swimming, and in military bases;

c) Block all the coast and ports of Romania (Constanta and others); d) On the first

day, firmly close the Danube arm from possible attempts to pass along the Danube by Romanian armed ships;

e) To provide assistance and assistance to the troops of the 9th Army under crossing the river. Dniester through the spit in the Dniester estuary;

f) Organize the transportation and landing of the 74th division division from Odessa to the area of Zhebriany"[842] .

On June 13, from 13.20 to 14.45, a meeting was held in the Kremlin, which higher military-political guides, was attended by I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, his deputy lieutenant general I.V. Smorodinov, head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, army commissar of the 1st rank L.Z. Mekhlis, commanders of the troops and members of the Military Councils of the KOVO - General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, Corps Commissar V.N. Borisov and OdVO - Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin and Corps Commissar A.F. Kolobyakov, People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, head of the Main Marine

headquarters Admiral L.M. Galler and the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky[843] . Unfortunately, the materials of this meeting are still secret, but it is quite obvious that it was about the preparation of an operation against Romania. In particular, the leadership of the Navy insisted on a sharp reduction in tasks for the Black Sea Fleet, and this section of the plan was prepared personally by Haller [844] . It was decided not to carry out an amphibious assault near Zhebriyan (this idea was implemented on August 24, 1944 during the Iasi-Kishinev operation). In addition, the issue of creating an operational association of the Black Sea Fleet on the Danube River - the Danube military flotilla, the creation of which began four days later, was resolved. The result of all this work was the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the

General Staff No. 101396 / ss, which Lieutenant Colonel Shikin and Major Ryzhaev, who arrived by plane from Moscow at 21.45 on June 20, 1940, handed over to the commander of the KOVO troops, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov.

"I order: 1. Start

concentrating troops and be ready by 10 p.m. on June 24 for a decisive offensive in order to defeat the Romanian army and occupy Bessarabia.

2. When concentrating, have the following grouping: a) 12th Army - Army Commander Lieutenant General Comrade.

Cherevichenko, Deputy commander - lieutenant general comrade. Parusinov. Army

Headquarters - Kolomyia.

Deploy army troops: directorates of 13th, 8th, 17th rifle corps; 139, 60, 62, 124, 72, 58, 146, 131 and 81 rifle divisions; 5, 10, 23, 24, 26 and 38 tank brigades; 135, 168, 305, 324, 375 and 376 artillery regiments of the RGK; 315 and 316 artillery divisions in the area of Kuta, Snyatyn, Stetsova, Kolomyia.

Directorate of the 15th Rifle Corps, 7th and 141st Rifle Divisions, 120th Artillery Regiment of the RGK in the area of Gorodenka, Filipkovets, Novosyulka-

Kostyukov. Directorates of the 2nd and 4th cavalry corps, 3rd, 5th, 16th and 34th cavalry. divisions in the area of Yabloniv, Gvozdets, Podgaychiki, Kolomyia.

192 rifle division in the area - Ustseryki, Polyanki, Kishvorovnya.

Army aviation - five SB regiments, two regiments light bomber and eight fighter regiments.

The dividing line between the 12th and 5th armies: the Zbruch river, Kho-tin, Lipkany, all points inclusive for the 12th army. b) 5th army - army commander, lieutenant

general comrade. Gerasimenko, Deputy Commander - Major General Cde. Advisers. Headquarters - Dunaevtsy. Army troops to deploy: Directorate of the 49th Rifle

Corps, 80th, 44th and 135th Rifle Divisions; 36th and 49th tank brigades, 137th and 331st artillery regiments and 34th artillery division of the RGK in the area - Bagovitsa, Studenitsa, Staraya Ushitsa, Krushanovka.

Management of the 36th Rifle Corps, 169th and 130th Rifle Divisions at the front of Kalus, Yampol.

Kamenetz-Podolsky fortified And Mogilev-Yampolsky areas in their areas. Army aviation - two SB regiments, one light bomber regiment and three fighter regiments.

The dividing line of the army on the left is the Savranka River, Art. Popelyuhi, Kamenka, Kopacheni, Pyrlitsa, all points inclusive for the 9th army. c) 9th army - army commander, lieutenant

general comrade. Boldin, Deputy commander - lieutenant general comrade. Kozlov. Army Headquarters - Grosulovo. Deploy army troops: 140th Infantry Division

on the front B[olyii] Molokish, Rybnitsa, Gederim. Directorates of 35th, 37th and 7th rifle corps, 173,176,30,164, 51, 95, 147, 150 and 15th rifle divisions; 21 tank brigades, 522,110, 320, 124, 430, 439 artillery regiments and 317 artillery division of the RGK in the area - Dubossary, Tiraspol, Ploskoe, Shibka.

Management of the 5th cavalry corps, 9th and 32nd cavalry divisions, 4th and 14th tank brigades in the area - Karmanovo, Pavlovka, Kassel.

Directorate of the 55th Rifle Corps - Odessa, 25th and 74th Rifle Divisions in the area - Ovidiopol, Dalnik (southern), Baraboy; 116 rifle division - Odessa.

Rybnitsa and Tiraspol fortified areas in their areas. From June 22, the

northwestern fortified area will be subordinated to the commander of the 9th army. Transfer the Dnieper military flotilla to northwestern fortified area. Army aviation - one DB regiment, five SB regiments, one light bomber regiment and six fighter regiments

regiments.

d) Front reserve - 8th, 17th and 86th rifle divisions in the area - Chertkov, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Dunaevtsy and 100th rifle division in the area - Vasilyevka, Frunzovka, Calm. Arriving in the district 301, 318, 360

and 403 artillery regiments of the RGK should be used to reinforce the 12th and 5th armies. 3. To

command and control troops from the Directorate of the Kyiv Special Military District, allocate the Directorate of the Southern Front. Front Commander - General of the Army comrade. Zhukov. Front

headquarters - Proskurov. To

assist and promote the success of the 12th and 9th armies, the Commander of the Front has at his disposal three air regiments of DB and four regiments of TB for airborne landings. 4.

From 10 p.m. June 21, 1940, the Black Sea Navy is to be operationally subordinated to the Commander of the Southern Front.

5. According to intelligence data,

ROMANIA currently has up to 21 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions on the territory of BESSARABIA and BUKOVINA. 6. The task of the troops of the Southern Front is to deliver

the main blow from Kolomyia to Chernivtsi and further along the Prut River to the south and

an auxiliary strike from the east to Chisinau, Khushi to surround and capture the Romanian troops deployed in BESSARABIA.

Why should the armies set the task

of: a) 12 armies - with the main forces, at least 9 rifle divisions, with tank units, with the support of strong artillery and all aviation of the army, break through the enemy's position on the front of Chernoguza, Russish-Banil, Zelena, Hliveste and advance along the river Prut to Chernivtsi. To develop success, throw a cavalry mechanized group into the gap consisting of two cavalry corps, all tank brigades of the army, with the direct and constant support of army aviation, develop an offensive by this group along the Prut River and, by the end of the second day, reach the Dorokhoy, Darabani front. By the end of the fourth day, capture the Yashi [Yasi] area, establish interaction with units of the 9th Army, encircle and prevent the enemy from retreating to Romania. With rifle corps, consolidating the success of mechanized units and cavalry, with a swift offensive, encircle and destroy the Romanian troops stationed in the northern part of Bessarabia. b) 5th Army - 49th Rifle Corps, consisting of three rifle divisions, two tank brigades, two artillery regiments and one

artillery division of the RGK, with the assistance of aviation, cross the Dniester River in the Tsviklevtsy, Studenitsa, St. Ushitsa and develop an offensive against the Larga station, Balashinesti, encircle the enemy located to the west of Radautsi with joint actions with the 12th army. In the future, interacting with units of the 12th Army, advance south along the Prut River. 36 Rifle Corps, consisting of two rifle divisions, on the first day demonstrating crossings across the Dniester River at the Kalus front to Mogilev-

Podolsky, from the morning of the second day, force the Dniester River in the Yampol, Soroca region and advance in the direction of Balti.

c) 9th army - demonstrating the crossing of the Dniester River by the 140th rifle division in the Rybnitsa region, the main forces consisting of 35th, 37th and 7th rifle corps, 5th cavalry corps, 4th, 14th and 21st tank brigades, with the assistance of strong artillery and all army aviation, force the Dniester River at the front of Cellars, Tiraspol and, delivering the main blow south of Chisinau to Khushi, together with the cavalry-mechanized group of the 12th Army, encircle and destroy the enemy in the northern part of Bessarabia. On the first day, with mechanized units and cavalry, go to the Bardar, Ginchesti, Mileshti-Mich area. Rifle units to occupy the city of Chisinau. With the development of the offensive, allocate at least two rifle divisions [in] a barrier to the southwest and south to protect against possible enemy counterattacks from southern Bessarabia. 55 Rifle Corps, with

the assistance of the Black Sea Fleet, capture the Bugaz lighthouse, occupy Akkerman and continue the offensive on Sarat. Protect the Black Sea coast

from Odessa to Ochakov

inclusive.

d) The troops of the Southern Front, after occupying the area of Yasha, Khushi, Chisinau, continue a decisive offensive along the eastern bank of the Prut River, capture Cahul and Reni and, advancing south from Chisinau, encircle the enemy in southern Bessarabia north of the Danube. 55 Rifle Corps to develop an offensive along the northern bank of the Danube to the west, contributing to the encirclement of the enemy in southern

Bessarabia. 7. By order of the front, prepare an airborne assault for a joint strike with units of the 12th Army in the Tirgu-Frumos area. The landing should be carried out only after mechanized units have entered the area. 8. To set the main tasks of aviation: a) close

interaction with the troops on the battlefield;

b) an attack on enemy groupings facing

our parts;

c) to assist in assault actions the advancement of our units and, first of all, mechanized units and cavalry; d) destruction of enemy aircraft at airfields; e) attacking

suitable enemy columns and their headquarters; f) covering the areas of concentration of their troops; g) airborne assault. 9. Set the task for the Black Sea Fleet: a) to assist the troops of the 9th Army with naval artillery fire when crossing the Dniester River through the spit of the Dniester Estuary and further advancing along the Black Sea coast; b) to prevent the appearance and actions of enemy ships along the sections of the coast occupied by the troops of the 9th Army; c) establish surveillance over the ports of Romania, block the Black Sea coast from the Dniester estuary to the Sulina branch of the Danube inclusive;

d) to protect the Black Sea coast (the area of the Odessa naval base and the Ochakovsky sector of coastal defense) from the actions of enemy ships. 10. To ensure this operation, raise the posts of VNOS KOVO,

OdVO and the city of Kiev (without local air defense systems) in the manner of training camps, without noise, personal calls and organize air defense of the most important points, warehouses, airfields and areas of concentration of troops. 11. The actions of the troops must be bold, quick and decisive. When meeting with the enemy, do not limit yourself to frontal strikes, but cover his flanks, surround and capture. By quick actions

of mechanized units and cavalry, destroy communications, capture headquarters and disorganize the rear. work out the organization in advance

And

resolute

protection

of captured cities, appoint commanders in advance

garrisons and ensure order from the first days of the occupation of cities.

Time to go on the offensive will be indicated additionally.

12. In the development of this directive, develop a plan of action for the troops of the front, work it out with the corps commanders. Submit the action plan for approval by June 23, 1940 . "[845] —

At 22.40 on June 20, the chief of the General Staff informed the commander of the OdVO troops that "from 10 o'clock on June 21 you are subordinate to the Commander of the KOVO General of the Army Zhukov" [846]. to the operational subordination of the commander of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District. Commander of the Odessa Naval Base to become subordinate to the Commander of the Odessa Military District. The first division of monitors arriving from Kiev to Kherson will be transferred to the operational subordination of the commander of the Odessa naval base . The headquarters of the KOVO undertook to refine the version of the plan for the upcoming operation prepared for June 17. On June-

19, in Proskurov, special classes were held for the Military Councils of the armies and corps commanders, at which they were acquainted with the nature and plan of the operation and received instructions on the specifics of the combat training of troops and rear[848] . On the same day, the commander of the KOVO troops issued order No. D / 007 on the treatment of prisoners of war, according to which officers and non-commissioned officers were to be escorted to camps on the eastern side of the Dniester, and soldiers should be used in the occupied territory for work on the restoration of railways. Prisoners of war were required to be placed in barracks or tents, primarily trophy ones, and fed at the rate of rear rations. "It is strictly forbidden, without the permission of the Military Council of the KOVO, to disband the prisoners of war soldiers, no matter what nationality and place of residence they may be"[849] . On June 21, Zhukov signed order No. 00126 / ss, according to which the heads and commissars of garrisons and their administrations were appointed for the cities of Chernivtsi, Hertsa, Siret,

Radautsy, Dorohoy, Khotyn, Soroca, Balti, Chisinau, Izmail, Orhei, Akkerman, Bendery and Cahul [850]. The order put into effect the "Instruction to the head of the Red Army garrison", approved by Zhukov on June 19, according to which:

"1. The head of the garrison is the representative of the Soviet power - civil and military. 2. The head of the garrison is obliged to: a) Organize and maintain the strictest revolutionary order in the garrison. b) Immediately after taking office, check whether the most important objects in the garrison have been captured: telegraph, telephone, radio stations, railway station, power plant, water supply system, barracks, airfields, oil and gas storage facilities, clear these objects of hostile elements and organize their protection.

c) Establish a wartime regime in the garrison, not allowing people to appear on the streets later than 21:00 and before 07:00. Walking at this time is allowed only with special passes issued by the Head of the garrison. Street demonstrations, rallies, meetings may be made only with the permission of the Head of the garrison.

d) Organize the seizure of firearms and cold steel from organizations and individuals. e) To prevent and suppress all attempts at armed uprisings, sabotage, robbery, violence, looting, agitation hostile to the Soviet regime, the spread of false and panic rumors, no matter from whose side they come. f) Maintain constant communication with the operational points

of the NKVD and assist them in their work by all available means. g) Register all the premises that can be used and adapted for the

accommodation of military units, apartments for command personnel, clubs, canteens, warehouses, garages, stables, etc.

h) Organize the reception, accounting, storage and protection of trophy property.

i) Organize the normal activities of all institutions of urban economy and trade establishments.
j) Organize political and educational work among the population. k) Organize the security of places of detention, preventing the release of prisoners of any nationality without prior authorization from the NKVD. The head of the garrison has the right: a) to issue orders and separate orders, binding on all institutions and individuals.
Failure to comply with the orders and orders of the Head of the garrison or evasion of execution are punished to the fullest extent of the revolutionary law of wartime. b) Conduct searches and arrests. Stop all attempts at armed resistance immediately, without stopping before using weapons"[854] .

On June 21, the commander of the KOVO troops issued order No. D / 009 on the creation of trophy commissions to organize the collection, accounting and [852] evacuation of trophy property

On June 22-23, the Military Councils of the 12th, 5th and 9th Armies, on the basis of draft directives of the command of the Southern Front No. A-1 / 00144ss / s and No. A-1 / 00145ss / s, worked on the ground with the commanders of corps and divisions issues of occupying the starting position, organizing the upcoming offensive, interaction between the combat arms, command and control, communications, rear arrangements and actions for the next stage of the operation. With the rest of the command staff, these issues were worked—

out the day before the start of the operation[853] . At 5:00 pm on June 23, Colonel Danilov arrived at the General Staff from Kyiv, who delivered draft directive documents of the command of the Southern Front for approval by the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. First of all, it was document No. A-1 / 00138 / ss / s, containing the "Plan of the operation of the Southern Front to encircle and capture the armed forces of Romania

concentrated in Northern Bessarabia": "I. **The task of the Southern Front.**

Surround and capture the armed forces of Romania, located in the northern part of Bessarabia, and, developing their operations to the south, clear Bessarabia of the enemy.

II. Estimation of the forces and intentions of the

enemy. The Romanians concentrated against the USSR up to 26 infantry divisions, 2–3 cd, 1–2 mkhbr

and up to 640 aircraft. Hiding behind small forces in the central part of the river. Dniester, the Romanians mainly have three large groups: two on the flanks of the front to cover the Chernivtsi and Chisinau directions and one as a front reserve, in the operational rear behind the center of the so-called Eastern Front.

According to the Intelligence Directorate, the strength of these groups is determined: Chernivtsi up to 8–9 infantry divisions, Chisinau up to 5–6 infantry divisions, and the front reserve - A-5 infantry divisions, 1 mkhbr and 1–2 cd.

Directly along the river Dniester in the Balti direction can be expected no more than 1 pd and 1 cd. Up to 3 infantry divisions, the Romanians are forced to keep the Black Sea coast on the defensive. In addition, a reserve army is being created in the Focsana region, where new forces are concentrated: on 20.6. as part of this army, up to 6 infantry divisions and 1 mkhbr are noted, the rate of further strengthening of this army can be up to 0.5–1 division per day. In total, in Bessarabia and Bukovina, enemy forces are estimated at 21 infantry

divisions, 3 cd and 1 mkhbr. Based on this enemy grouping, his medium operational density can be:

a) in the Chernivtsi direction - 22 km per 1 pd and 3.4 or [udiya] per 1 km. b) in the Chisinau direction - 28 km per 1 frontier and 1.6 weapons per 1 km. c) in the Balti direction - 58

km per 1 front line and 0.3 guns per 1 km. Enemy engineering fortifications mainly go along

the river. Dniester, Prut, Seret [Siret], creating difficult barriers when operating from east to west. In the Chernivtsi direction, there is a strong fortified area on the outskirts of Chernivtsi and a prepared cut-off position along the Bergomet-Storozhinets line. It is possible that there may be bunkers in this area.

The probable plan of action of the enemy is active defense. Relying on their strong flanks and prepared and advantageous lines of the river. Dniester, Prut and Seret [Siret], the enemy will probably look for solutions by striking our advancing groupings. The most dangerous direction for us in a possible counterattack by the enemy is a strike from the south on the flank of the 12th Army. This area requires special attention and constant support.

III. Openka directions and terrain. In

accordance with the task of the front, the execution of the operation can develop in three operational directions: a) In

the Chernivtsi-Yasi direction, between the river. Seret [Siret] and Prut. This operational direction is operationally beneficial, as it leads to the rear of the entire enemy grouping located on the territory of Northern Bessarabia. The capacity of this operational direction is up to 4–5 sk. The number of through tracks when taking into account all country roads is 7, which provides each building with almost two roads; there are only two good roads.

The main obstacles of operational importance are the prepared line along the river. Cheremosh, Prut and forests from [north]-west [west] of the line

Do-rokhoi, Dorabani. b) Kamenets-Podolsk-Baltsy operational direction. There are only two good through roads from north to south, more than 7 field roads. Barrier of operational significance - r. Dniester. The ground is impassable during rainy seasons. According to the plan of the operation, this operational direction is operationally disadvantageous, since actions in this direction push the enemy out and exclude his encirclement.

c) Chisinau-Yasi direction - the shortest direction leading to the deep rear of the enemy and his entire northern grouping. However, this operationally beneficial operational direction has three large and insurmountable obstacles: pp. Dniester, Prut and Seret [Siret]. With the development of actions in the

Chisinau-Khushinsky direction, it is necessary to provide strong support for the actions of troops from an attack from southern Bessarabia.

IV. The purpose of the operation.